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TAIWAN AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

A THESIS

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By

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PREFACE

Benedetto Croce argued that "every true history is contemporary history."[1] In that spirit, this thesis is a reinterpretation of material of historic record in the light of contemporary developments within the Communist bloc. The majority of the documents consulted are less than twelve years old, and the hazards of focusing perspective at such short range are acknowledged. Although expert guidance was afforded by the academic community of Stanford University, the views expressed are in no sense the responsibility of any save the writer; they are specifically not the responsibility of his sponsor in postgraduate education, the United States Navy. Most of the quotations presented were selected from material perused in a year's research at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, California.

Los Altos Hills
April, 1962

James Bond Stockdale

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1. H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York: Random House, Inc., 1958), p. 211.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> All recorded history /is/ a series of objective unique events whose significance lies in their organization into distinctive patterns and not in ill-defined formulas or generalized denominators.[1]

Sino-Soviet scholar Allen S. Whiting has pointed out that there is nothing concerning the Peking-Moscow alliance about which we are less informed than what actually transpires at the highest level of exchange.[2] On the other hand, the history and structure of the relationship between these two world powers holds the key to one of the most important terms in the equation of world politics on which the West must base its predictions of the ultimate results of their foreign policy alternatives. In the face of the dearth of definitive material from Moscow and Peking, the only feasible access to the numerators, denominators, variables, and constants of the Sino-Soviet "term" of the equation lies in the empirical methodology of framing hypotheses that reasonably encompass, or at least are not refuted by, the evidence available at the moment. This is, of course, a pragmatic

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1. A. L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 86.
2. Allen S. Whiting, Conflict Resolution in the Sino-Soviet Alliance (paper at the 3rd International Sovietological Conference, Japan, September, 1960).

process in which current hypotheses must be continually updated as subsequent events lend new meaning to sketchy contemporary evidence, and as old material becomes inadvertently available as the twists and turns of historic evolution squeeze it forth and drop it into the hands of the West.

The distillation of the material available at present requires the resolution of a seemingly endless chain of incongruities. The history of China in the decades before the mainland victory of the Communists tells the story of the rise of Mao Tse-tung in the face of continued opposition by Joseph Stalin.[3] Documentary evidence of Sino-Soviet discord then goes into a relative eclipse from 1949 to 1956, when it emerges in an antithetical form: Mao Tse-tung objects to the Khrushchevian defamation of Stalin. This "father" of discontinuities appears to give birth to successive generations of similarly dichotomous evidence as research probes the history of almost any issue of common interest to both countries.

External evidence of the "modern" dispute has progressed in steady crescendo from hints of dissatisfaction in 1956, to Chou En-lai's open affront of Premier Khrushchev at the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the

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3. Michael Lindsay, China and the Cold War (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1955), p. 167. "...Mao Tse-tung rose to leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in competition with rivals preferred by the Comintern." Professor Lindsay lived in the Communist areas of China from 1941 to 1945 and is personally acquainted with many of the Peking leaders (see below).

Soviet Union in 1961, and at this writing has assumed proportions which Harrison Salisbury has described as the most serious break in the Communist movement since V. I. Lenin left the Social Democratic party and formed the Bolsheviks shortly after the turn of the century.[4]

Communist "totalistic" leadership must tread the fine line of demanding a standard of orthodoxy that is rigorous enough to maintain allegiance, yet flexible enough to accommodate the variant demands of dissimilar societies. The exponential rate of industrialization's growth (and that of its sociological by-product—the middle class psychology) place diverging pressures on the decision makers of Moscow and Peking at this stage of development. "Stalinism" is apparently symbolic of China's dissimilar policy needs.

Put in the form of a sweeping generalization, one of the main themes of Sino-Soviet discord in recent years has been a difference of perception of the "capitalist menace." The point is argued in the cipher of Communist rhetoric under the heading of "coexistence." The writings of political philosophers usually encompass such a broad spectrum of possible human activity that they can be interpreted in various ways, and thus are the seed of theoretical debates over policy.

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4. New York Times, January 14, 1962. Data concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute is more plentiful since 1956, but is possibly less pure as a result of the upsurge of Western interest. Quincy Wright speaks of the "feedback" effect that plagues the social scientist (people being evaluated become influenced by the generalizations made about them). (Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 116.) A possible example; Chou En-lai to Edgar Snow in 1960: "We are not left wing opportunists, as interpreted by the Western press." (Edgar Snow, "Red China's Leaders Talk Peace—On Their Terms," Look Magazine, January 31, 1961.)

Just as Rousseau has been called the common ancestor of Marx and Jefferson, so Lenin is apparently the common ancestor of Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung on the point of coexistence. Lenin has been quoted as saying both "let the American capitalists leave us alone, and we shall leave them alone,"[5] and "frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable."[6] He is therefore open to interpretation. Khrushchev's public definition of coexistence is doctrinaire:

> The policy of peaceful coexistence is, then, as far as its social content is concerned, a form of intense economic, political and ideological struggle between the proletariat and the aggressive forces of imperialism in the world arena.[7]

The current Communist interpretation of political coexistence, however, may be paraphrased by saying that to "coexist" with a country is to be adequately satisfied with the status quo and current prognosis of development to forego the predictable need to further the advance of socialism on the battlefield. Over-all gains are better optimized by activity short of massive military violence. Therefore, to deny the possibility of coexistence is to admit that the present prediction indicates that over-all gains will probably be maximized by eventual war.

The individual "situation estimates" of Russia and Communist China have been transmitted under this code since

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5. Moscow Radio (Tass), April 22, 1955 (85th anniversary of the birth of Lenin).
6. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VII (New York: International Publishers Co., 1943), p. 288.
7. Radio Peking, New China News Agency, January 20, 1961.

1952. From the start, Russian leaders have made it plain that in their judgment indications permit the prospect of "coexistence" with all countries, including the United States. The Chinese Communists apparently used the phrase with reluctance at first, but finally settled on the "five principles of coexistence" which they formalized in 1954 with their neighbors to the south. Depending on the immediate world political situation, they have since followed Russia's lead and made some involved and sweeping statements about the concept and toward whom they direct it, but the full text of their message contains qualifying remarks that always exclude the United States, and usually all other non-Communist countries outside the Bandung group.[8]

Limiting the discussion to the United States, Russia believes the status quo is sufficiently satisfactory to avoid the need of armed conflict, Communist China does not. Ergo, China is less satisfied with the status quo with the United States than Russia.

It is not difficult to find out what disturbs the Chinese Communists about the status quo with the United States. All one must do is ask. In 1960, Edgar Snow spent four months in mainland China. During that period he was permitted to quote Mao Tse-tung only in a one-paragraph statement:

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8. Bernard Ullman, "The Long Shadow of Mao Tse-tung," New York Times, April 16, 1961.

> It is inconceivable that a peace pact can be concluded without diplomatic relations between China and the United States. It is also inconceivable that there can be diplomatic relations between China and the United States without a settlement of the dispute between the two countries in the Taiwan region.[9]

Mr. Snow's frequent conversations with Chou En-lai often returned to the same subject:

> The invasion and occupation of Taiwan can only make the United States the enemy of the Chinese people.... If the so-called "Taiwan clique" is to appear in the United Nations, under whatever form and in whatever name—be it the Chiang Kai-shek clique or some other clique—we will definitely refuse to take part in the United Nations and sit together with them, so as not to create a situation of "two Chinas".... If the United States persists in its policy of aggression against China and does not settle the dispute between China and the Taiwan region, how can there be a solution to Sino-U.S. relations?.... If the United States does not give up its policy of aggression and the threat of war against China, no solution is possible.[10]

The Chinese Communists are in disagreement with the Russians, they differ with the Russians in their evaluation of the status quo with the United States, and their main dissatisfaction with the United States involves Taiwan. This thesis examines the Taiwan issue as a possible source of Sino-Soviet discord, from the roots of the controversy to the present.

At first glance, it might appear that of all the possible points of friction introduced by conflicting Moscow and Peking goals, the pressing forward of the boundaries of International Communism into the Pacific area would be one aim on which the two capitals would have been in continuous

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9. Snow, loc. cit.
10. Ibid.

and complete agreement.[11] Particularly if one views the Eurasian Communist heartland as a single unit under uncontested monolithic control, East Asian history of the past thirteen years becomes merely the story of the United States' containment of a two-pronged attempt to include the whole of Korea and the island of Taiwan into the Moscow-directed orbit. On closer examination of the history of the Taiwan issue, however, discontinuities of evidence appear and begin to multiply. If there was a coordinated two-pronged plan for the spread of Communism in East Asia in 1950, why did they choose to strike first at Korea where the attack would be an open affront to United Nations policy and the dangers of mobilizing adverse world opinion were greater than those to be expected in the case of an attack to Taiwan?[12] Why did Russia grow more and more non-committal as the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1955 approached its climax? Why did Peking take great pains to insure maximum United States opposition to her bombardment of Quemoy in 1958? Has Russia's behavior in the United Nations been rationally directed toward accumulating a maximum of votes for Peking's admission?

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11. The Russians have not publicly disagreed with the Chinese Communists over Taiwan. This perhaps makes the issue even more worthy of study. Zbigniew Brzezinski notes that it is unlikely that issues which had come under discussion at the highest level would ever be made the subject of public display. "In such a case the offense...would be far more serious and a greater violation of the code of proletarian internationalism..." (Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Problematics of Sino-Soviet Bargaining (paper at the 3rd International Sovietological Conference, Japan, September, 1960).
12. The development of the case presented herein does not imply the assumption that President Truman's action at the start of the Korean War was predictable. International

This investigation proceeds through the Taiwan issue in historic sequence, framing eight hypotheses which "reasonably encompass" the myriad of apparent inconsistencies of evidence. The turn of events lends itself to analysis in three separate periods: the Stalinist era ("Socialism in One Country"), the era of Soviet policy transition (1953-1955), and the modern Khrushchevian era, (aptly named by Jan Triska the phase of "Socialism in One Region").[13] In the first, Stalin may be seen to have created Peking's Taiwan dilemma by indirectly harnessing American public opinion to "contain" Communist China's eastern coast. In the second, Peking's attempt to settle the account was probably frustrated by Moscow's last minute acknowledgement that the sweep of history had forced International Communism around the corner of the point of maximum cohesion. In the third, Mao Tse-tung served notice that the debt would stand, at least for the foreseeable future. In short, the evidence can be interpreted to show that the Taiwan issue is not in any sense a simple goal of Communist expansion, free of a history of intra-bloc complications. Khrushchev inherited a debt

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politics, like a game of the playing field is usually based on a plan of attack, but the outcome largely depends upon the improvisations made by the participants as multiple and unpredictable situations evolve. The individual's "style of play" is indicative of his basic plan of attack. Stalin's "style of play" did not indicate the disregard of mathematical odds when an arbitrary choice was presented, and his adjustment to this and other junctures of history presents a study in his "usage" of events that suggests important dominant motives.

13. Jan F. Triska, "Socialism in One Region," The New Leader, December 26, 1960, p. 10.

for which the Chinese Communists still hold him responsible. Communist policy in this area must be framed against a background of Moscow-Peking intrigue at the highest level. If Berlin is a "bone in Khrushchev's throat," Taiwan is a "boil on his buttock."

Such is the essence of the story the hypotheses imply. Their formulation requires interpolation of evidence too sketchy in places to qualify as "proof," but at least they explain documentary discontinuities which appear to refute other popular interpretations, and are themselves not openly contradicted by currently available primary evidence.

Admittedly, it is doubtful that the trickle of reliable documentation that continually escapes from the Communist world will leave the configuration of the total story unscathed, but it is submitted that the importance of analyzing Sino-Soviet relationships obviates the luxury of confining intellectual effort to "proven facts." Moreover, although the hypotheses present a continuum of logic that currently appears credible, the invalidity of one does not negate the value of the others. Taiwan is a useful vehicle of research because it offers data on Sino-Soviet relations "at the critical point" where their structure rotates from "Mao hates Stalin," to Mao loves Stalin." A study of the history of the issue in this light also produces thought-provoking background material for future United States' China policy decisions.

In emphasizing the points made herein, it may appear that the areas of Sino-Soviet disagreement are held to be more efficacious than those of agreement, or that the Taiwan issue is believed to be a dominating factor in their areas of dispute. Neither is considered to be the case. The aim is merely to give form to the Taiwan factor of the Sino-Soviet term in the international political equation of the present. In order to accomplish this, the issue's "objective unique events" are arranged in what is hoped is a "distinctive pattern," and not in "ill defined formulas or generalized denominators."

CHAPTER II

THE STALINIST ERA

MAO TSE-TUNG CONQUERS THE MAINLAND

The basic dilemma which post-revolution Russia was to face in the incorporation of China into the fold of International Communism was foretold in a debate between V. I. Lenin and M. N. Roy (of India) at the Second Congress of the Third International in Moscow in the summer of 1920. The problem under discussion was, and remains, critical in Communist tactics: how to proceed in the underdeveloped areas where there is a conflict between the goals of social revolution and those of national liberation. Marxism eschews both capitalism and imperialism, but usually the only force that can defeat imperialism is controlled by the local capitalists. When this complication is added to the Marxist preoccupation with the idea of eventual salvation being vested in the proletarian "worker," in spite of the fact that these areas are usually dominated by peasant farmers, the need for tactical compromise is indicated. Two basic approaches are possible: in the debate of 1920, Lenin favored support of the "bourgeois democratic" elements in the early stages, at the expense of slighting the peasant base of budding "communists"; Roy favored early concentration on action

through the masses and grass roots Communist parties, at the expense of alienating some of the leaders of the nationalistic movement.[1] Neither position in this argument excluded the utilization of some of the inroads of the other, and the basic adjustment of Communist tactics was established: both routes to Communism would be used simultaneously.

This compromise is a seedbed of intra-party conflicts because the fine line of optimum technique requires continuous adjustment as conditions change in the area of proposed domination, and this must be set arbitrarily by the responsible leaders of the party heirarchy. Communist cadres must monitor the process at all levels as the bourgeois nationalistic revolution goes on simultaneously with the formation of party cells which are ultimately to take control at the critical moment. If the Communist peasant leader finds his efforts being compromised by too much Kremlin support of the powerful landlord class, he feels he is a victim of "rightist deviation"; if at this time his group is interfering with the party leadership's manipulation of their Trojan Horse (the national bourgeoisie), he is simultaneously being accused of "leftist deviation." Right and left refer to an arbitrary line established by the viewpoint of the observer.

This is one of the world's most complicated political maneuvers, and coordination without intra-party strife is difficult, even if all participants are able to maintain an

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1. Robert C. North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists (Stanford University Press, 1953), p. 18.

objective attitude, free of their own special interests. In the evolution in China, Mao Tse-tung might be seen to have developed a special interest in the efficacy of the peasantry.[2] Stalin's special interest appears to have been Stalin. After the death of Lenin, his major rival for leadership of the world Communist movement was Trotsky. One may analyze the history of Stalin's career from many viewpoints, but one common denominator that appears to apply in practically every situation was his insistence on taking a stand opposite Trotsky and his followers on all tactical questions. George F. Kennan, who served three tours of duty in Moscow as a United States diplomat during Stalin's reign, counsels:

> Do not be deceived as to which of these apprehensions ...the apprehension of danger to his personal position or that of danger to the Soviet state—was the greatest. Trotsky, and all that Trotsky represented, was Stalin's real fear...[3]

Reflections of the Stalin-Trotsky feud could be noted almost from the outset of Russian relations with the Communist movement in China. M. N. Roy, who was privy to most of the intrigue of China policy within the Third International, observed: "If Trotsky said this, Stalin said that."[4] In the ambivalent tactics of supporting both the national bourgeoisie

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2. Mao Tse-tung: "To give credits where they are due, if we allot ten points to the accomplishment of the democratic revolution, then the achievements of the urban dwellers and the military units rate only three points, while the remaining seven points should go to the peasants in their rural revolution." (Ibid., p. 171.)
3. George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1960), p. 252.
4. North, op. cit., p. 109.

and the Chinese Communist Party, Trotsky favored a path to the "left," i.e., one which would give primary assistance to the Communist peasant base. Stalin insisted on concentrating first on assisting in the establishment of a strong "anti-imperialist" national government. Trojan Horse tactics with the Kuomintang Party were attempted forthwith.

Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese nationalistic party, had been unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain aid from the West.[5] Early in 1923, he met with Adolf Joffe (one-time head of the Russian peace delegation at Brest-Litovsk), in a secret meeting in Shanghai. It was agreed that members of the new-born Chinese Communist Party would be accepted as members of the Kuomintang, and that assistance would be granted by the Soviet Union. Michael Borodin, close friend of Lenin, was dispatched to Canton as a Chinese adviser.[6] Chiang Kai-shek, brother-in-law of Sun Yat-sen was sent to Moscow for study, in preparation for his post as the commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy. Chou En-lai was installed as head of the political department of the academy.[7] Mao Tse-tung became the editor of a Kuomintang political periodical.[8] In 1926, following the death of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek became the leader of the Kuomintang

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5. Claude A. Buss, The Far East (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1955), p. 151.
6. Franz Borkenau, "China: Trial, Error, and Failure," Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Arthur E. Adams (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1961), p. 77.
7. North, op. cit., p. 76.
8. Ibid., p. 170.

movement, as a result of a coup planned by the Soviet adviser, Borodin.[9]

Chiang immediately set about planning an armed sweep to the north from Canton, to extend the areas of Kuomintang rule. While Borodin (who opposed this idea) was in northwest China, Chiang's troops surrounded the houses of the Russian advisers and the decision was forced.[10] Stalin sent word that the cadres should back Chiang, as two Kuomintang armies started north. Chiang's army headed for Shanghai and the treaty ports; a so-called left-wing Kuomintang group headed for the Wuhan ports, inland on the river. As Chiang approached Shanghai, his Communist supporters within the city anticipated his arrival by starting an insurrection. Chiang waited at the gates until the anti-Kuomintang forces had been effectively destroyed, then entered and destroyed the Communists.[11] Moscow thereupon acknowledged that Chiang should be considered highly suspect, but Stalin insisted that the Kuomintang could still be used as a suitable instrument of Soviet policy. He ordered support of the Wuhan group, and this too led to disaster.

As a result of these 1927 incidents, the Chinese Communist Party was decimated and forced to disperse.[12] It was Mao Tse-tung, dismissed from the Central Committee Politburo that same year for "leftist deviation,"[13] who

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9. Ibid., p. 86.
10. Ibid.
11. Kennan, op. cit., p. 271.
12. The Chinese Communists now claim that the reverses of 1927 cost them four-fifths of their personnel. (Edgar Snow, Lecture in San Francisco, January 16, 1962.)
13. North, op. cit., p. 116.

ultimately salvaged the party as they re-grouped in south China.

The break between Mao and Stalin was not overt. Political affinity of the Chinese Communist Party for Moscow was continually stressed,[14] but there is evidence that things were never the same after 1927. "From this time on, Moscow had, in Mao—though this had at times to be concealed—an ally, but not a satellite."[15]

Henceforth until 1949, with the possible exception of the period between the start of hostilities against Japanese troops in Manchuria in 1937 and the entry of the United States into World War II, the dominant battle in China was that fought between the Nationalist (Kuomintang), and Chinese Communist forces.[16] During the war against the Japanese, the Kremlin granted financial aid, not to the Communists, but to Chiang Kai-shek.[17] At Yalta, Stalin

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14. Mao Tse-tung in 1940: "...if China wants independence she can never win it without the aid of the Socialist state and the international proletariat. That is to say, she cannot attain it without the assistance of the Soviet Union..." (Mao Tse-tung, On New Democracy (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954), p. 31.)
15. Kennan, op. cit., p. 269.
16. The McCarran Hearings revealed that after the New Fourth Army Incident of January, 1941 and more particularly after the United States had entered the war, both Communists and Nationalists devoted more attention to fighting each other than to resisting the Japanese. (North, op. cit., p. 212.)
17. Ibid., p. 4. Stalin was not only giving material aid to Mao's enemies; he was recruiting in his ranks. In 1938, the ruler of the important resource-rich Sinkiang province, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, with the knowledge of Mao Tse-tung, became a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1961), p. 431.)

guaranteed continued support of the Nationalists.[18] In 1945, the governments of Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek negotiated a 30-year agreement, containing many commercial and territorial provisions suggestive of Russian imperialistic motives. Stalin appeared confident that his backing of the Nationalist-bourgeoisie would continue to have tactical validity for some time to come. James F. Byrnes recalls a conversation he had with Stalin in Moscow in December, 1945:

> I reminded him /Stalin/ how he had declared at Potsdam that Chiang Kai-shek's government was the only possible government in China and that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists at all. In response, he pointed out that the Soviet Union had a treaty recognizing Chiang.... /Stalin inquired about the strength of the Communists in the Tientsin area./ ...I replied that Mao Tse-tung, the Communist leader, claimed to have 600,000 in that area.... Stalin laughed heartily and said all Chinese were boasters who exaggerated the forces of their opponents as well as their own.[19]

The date of Stalin's acceptance of the idea of the imminence of Mao's mainland victory is not known, but it appears to have been plain to him in 1948. On February 10th of that year, he told Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj:

> It is true, we have also made mistakes. For instance, after the war we invited the Chinese comrades to come to Moscow and we discussed the situation in China. We

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18. Ibid., p. 5. In April, 1945, Stalin told Ambassador Hurley he considered Chiang Kai-shek "selfless" and "a patriot." (U. S. Department of State Publication 3573, United States Relations with China (white paper on China), August, 1949, p. 95.) (Hereafter referred to as White Paper.)
19. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 226. There are many recorded instances of Stalin's chauvinism and racial prejudice. Vladimir Dedijer remembers being hailed by Stalin as "Serb"; Stalin referred to Albanians as faithful dogs. (Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), pp. 303, 375.)

> told them bluntly that we considered the development of the uprising in China had no prospect, and that the Chinese comrades should seek a modus vivendi with Chiang Kai-shek, and dissolve their army. The Chinese comrades agreed here with the views of the Soviet comrades, but went back to China and acted quite otherwise. They mustered their forces, organized their armies and now, as we see, they are beating the Chiang Kai-shek army. Now, in the case of China, we admit we were wrong.[20]

Russia continued to make the most of their alliance with Chiang Kai-shek, nevertheless. A powerful Soviet army still existed in Manchuria under Kao Kang (a member of the Chinese Communist party known to be almost completely Russia-oriented);[21] the Japanese factories in Manchuria were stripped and much of the machinery found its way to Russia.[22] In the fall of 1948, Russia asked the Nationalists for an extension of certain commercial rights, and negotiations were conducted well into the year 1949; almost to the end the Soviet representatives maintained a diplomatic behavior toward the Chiang Kai-shek government that was a model of correctness.[23] Contracts were signed regarding trade, oil, and mining rights. On May 11, 1949, practically on the eve

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20. Ibid., p. 322.
21. Dallin, op. cit., p. 72.
22. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1960), p. 5. Lingering Chinese Communist complaints about this matter were contained in statements released after the "Hundred Flowers" era of 1957. (New York Times, June 24, 1957.)
23. Russian consulates were closed in cities which came under Communist domination. On February 8, 1949, the Soviet ambassador followed the Nationalist government to Canton after the fall of Nanking. He was one of only four ambassadors to take this step. (Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand Co., 1956), p. 231.)

of Mao Tse-tung's mainland victory, a USSR-Nationalist agreement regarding Sinkiang airline rights was made.

It is difficult to imagine that the Chinese Communists could view these last minute Russian efforts to gain Nationalist concessions as a valid support of the nationalist-bourgeoisie in the world Communist cause. It must have been as obvious to them as to others[24] that Stalin was merely trying to erect as many precedents for Russian influence in China as possible.

In summary, it is possible to view the success of the Chinese Communist revolution as a testimonial to the tactical skill of Mao Tse-tung in the face of opposition by "friend" and foe alike. It was he, and not the Kremlin who supplied the military as well as ideological leadership. He codified a dynamic procedure of multi-front revolution that established him as a key contributor to Communist canon.[25] His success adds prestige, (and perhaps Kremlin resentment of his audacity) to his views on Marxism expressed in 1940:

> ...in applying Marxism to China, Chinese Communists must fully and properly unite the universal truth of Marxism with the specific practice of the Chinese revolution; that is to say, the truth of Marxism must

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24. Dallin, op. cit., p. 71. "Stalin was apparently still determined to guarantee Russian, as distinct from Communist, interests in China, and this ambition, which he continued to press even after 1949, had a significant influence on Sino-Soviet relations throughout the period of Stalin's rule." (A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 344.)
25. John Kautsky, "The New Strategy of International Communism," The American Political Science Review (June, 1955), pp. 475-486.

> be integrated with the characteristics of the nation and given a definite national form before it can be useful; it must not be applied subjectively as a mere formula. Formula-Marxists are only fooling with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no place for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution.[26]

Stalin's contribution to the Communist's mainland victory can by no means be completely discounted. He was the titular head of International Communism, and it was this force that rapidly brought to a conclusion a revolutionary movement in China that dated back to the T'ai P'ing rebellion, nearly one hundred years before. The founders of Communism had established that the criterion of success was success; he could take credit as the Supreme Commander. Nevertheless, two other factors appear to have contributed to his motivation: egotism and Russia's imperialistic interests. As one studies this era, it is possible to believe that Mao Tse-tung could agree with George Kennan's observations of Stalin the man:

> This was a man dominated...by an insatiable vanity and love of power, coupled with the keenest sort of sense of his own inferiority and a burning jealousy for qualities in others which he did not possess.... At the same time, let us note, he was a man with the most extraordinary talent for political tactics and intrigue, a consummate actor, a dissimulator of genius, a master not only of timing but of what Boris Nikolayevsky has called the art of "dosage"—of doing things gradually, of measuring out what the traffic would bear on any given occasion.[27]

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26. Mao Tse-tung, On New Democracy, op. cit., p. 81.
27. Kennan, op. cit., p. 248.

MAINLAND VICTORY TO THE DEATH OF STALIN

The Chinese Communist government was formally established on October 1, 1949. Chiang Kai-shek's forces were taking refuge on the big offshore island of Taiwan, and the capital of Nationalist China was established in the city of Taipei on December 9th. The problem of "who represented China" was being faced by every capital in the world, and the issue cut across nearly every dilemma that was facing international relations. It was an issue in the cold war, an issue in United Nations solidarity, an issue in international trade, and to some, it was a moral issue. The U.S.S.R. severed relations with the Nationalists and recognized the People's Republic of China government in Peking on October 2nd. Prime Minister Nehru of India (who had previously been called a "dreg of mankind" in the Chinese Communist press) declared that his government intended to recognize Peking. Burma and Pakistan followed suit.

The decision was more difficult for Britain. They had many grievances with the Chinese Communists. Although British diplomatic and consular representatives had remained in the wake of the Communist advance since 1948, many of these officials had been subjected to abuse. The British destroyer H.M.S. Amythest had been shelled and detained on the Yangtze river in 1949. On the other side of the balance, however, were the future of Hong Kong, their great reliance on Chinese mainland trade, and considerations of Commonwealth

attachments to India. In their view, the morals of the case were not at issue; in Churchill's words, diplomatic recognition "is not to confer a compliment but to secure a convenience."[28] Britain granted diplomatic recognition to Peking on January 6, 1950.

The Communists' mainland victory precipitated formal agreements with the U.S.S.R. Mao Tse-tung met Stalin personally for the first and last time at a Moscow conference which opened in December, 1949. Their meeting lasted for nine weeks,[29] during which time Mao summoned his chief lieutenants, including Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, from China. The published results indicate that a "balanced but temporary"[30] compromise resulted. The key agreement was a 30-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Both Russia and Communist China agreed that if either were "attacked by Japan or any state allied with it," the other would "immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal."[31] Chinese concessions included agreements for the joint operation of the principal railways in Manchuria, joint use of the naval base at Port Arthur, and the establishment

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28. House of Commons Debates (November 17, 1949), Vol. 469, col. 2225-6.
29. Mao Tse-tung on arrival in Moscow, December 16, 1949: "I have come for several weeks. The length of my sojourn here depends in part upon the amount of time which it will take to solve the questions of interest to the People's Republic of China." (Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), January 2, 1950, Pravda article.)
30. Dallin, op. cit., p. 75.
31. Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951), p. 5.

of long term joint stock companies.[32] These "mixed companies" were known to be a most irritating form of Russian subjugation of China's industrial potential.[33] The Chinese Communists also agreed to accept the status quo, i.e., Soviet-dominated "independence" of Outer Mongolia. No documents have thus far revealed any discussion of Korean matters.

The Korean War started following the North Korean attack on South Korea in the early morning hours of June 25, 1950. The United Nations gave military assistance to the South Korean forces, and on June 27th the United States Seventh Fleet took station in the Taiwan Strait, under Presidential orders to prevent military attacks either toward the island by Communist units, or toward the mainland by Nationalist units. Chinese Communist forces entered North Korea in October, 1951. Armistice negotiations started in June, 1951, and hostilities ceased in July, 1953. Stalin had died in March of the latter year.

The period of the Korean War has been described as a high point of Sino-Soviet harmony,[34] and yet dialogues can be more or less honestly constructed for this era that reflect Chinese frustration in a manner similar to that during the "East Wind over the West Wind" controversy which marked the sharp divergence of Moscow and Peking propaganda lines

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32. Comments in the Yugoslavian press described this as Stalin reserving rights for Russia that Lenin had renounced. (Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. I, No. 15, December 20, 1950, p. 4.)
33. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 192, 423. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 6.
34. G. F. Hudson in The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 1.

following the orbit of Sputnik, five years later.

Stalin (October 4, 1951):

> ...one of the types of atom bombs was recently tested in our country....The Soviet Union does not contemplate ever attacking the United States or any other country...[35]

Mao Tse-tung (October 23, 1951), at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference:

> ...another extremely important fact is that the power of the Soviet Union, our closest ally, has been greatly strengthened. At such a time, if any other imperialist country tries to tred the old path...can we not fully predict the result? /Resolution passed by CPPCC/ The Chinese people of all strata see that the American imperialists are their most deadly enemy.[36]

Stalin (in answer to a question regarding the inevitability of war, February 16, 1951):

> At least at the present time /war/ cannot be regarded as inevitable.[37]

Chou En-lai (February 25, 1952):

> According to authenticated data, American troops, since January 28, 1952, have repeatedly employed...bacteriological weapons.[38]

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35. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), October 6, 1951.
36. Radio Peking (NCNA), October 24, 1951.
37. Great Britain, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1951 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 290. (Hereafter referred to as Documents, 1951.)
38. Germ warfare charges were merely one aspect of the "Hate America" campaign that started in China about January, 1952. China "abandoned the theme of the American Government vs. the American people and concentrated on linking everything American to a new theme of American venality, bestiality, and sinister intent..." (The Hate America Campaign in Communist China (U. S. Department of State publication, 1953).) The germ warfare charges apparently required extensive preparation. Sporadic news items covering supposed American "plans" preceded them. (Radio Peking (NCNA), March 7, 1951; Chinese International Service, May 4, 1951.) A Chinese Communist woman let a

Stalin (April 1, 1952):

> The peaceful coexistence of capitalism and communism is fully possible.[39]

Chou En-lai (May 5, 1952):

> [The United States'] lack of good faith has indeed reached depths never before plumbed.[40]

Stalin (December 24, 1952):

> I still believe that war between the [United States and the U.S.S.R.] cannot be considered inevitable, and that our countries can continue to live in peace.[41]

Chou En-lai (February 4, 1953):

> The Chinese people love peace but do not fear war.[42]

The ideological debate continued, as well:

Chou En-lai (October, 1951):

> ...intellectuals...are beginning to accept...the guidance of Marxist Leninist theory and its crystallized expression in China, the teachings of Mao Tse-tung.[43]

U.S.S.R. Communist Party spokesman Yevgeni Zhukov (November, 1951):

> It would be risky to view the Chinese revolution as a kind of pattern for the popular-democratic revolution in other Asian countries...[44]

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hint of the plans slip while in Bulgaria in August, 1951. (Great Britain, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs, 1953 (London, Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 232.) (Hereafter referred to as Survey, 1953.)

39. Facts on File: Weekly World News Digest, 1952 edition, p. 101.
40. Radio Peking (NCNA), May 6, 1952.
41. Facts on File, op. cit., p. 409.
42. Radio Peking (NCNA), February 5, 1953.
43. Ibid., November 2, 1951 (italics inserted).
44. Dallin, op. cit., p. 92.

TAIWAN: SACRED GOAL OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Taiwan was incorporated into the Chinese Empire in 1682, and was ceded to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo, enroute to the Teheran conference with Stalin in 1943. The Cairo Declaration was drafted, in which it was promised that all territories "stolen" from "China" by Japan were to be returned as part of the provisions of peace after World war II. Taiwan, and the major islands just to the west, the Pescadores, were specified. The U.S.S.R. approved this action in the Potsdam Proclamation of July 1945. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, General MacArthur's General Order Number 1 directed that Chiang Kai-shek should receive the surrender of the Japanese forces on Taiwan. On October 25, 1945, the Chinese Government General of Taiwan under General Chen Yi was inaugurated at Taipei. The transfer was thus completed, but the legal status of the island was to have been confirmed by a clause in the Japanese Peace Treaty. The Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 (signed by neither the Taipei, Peking, nor Moscow governments) confirmed Japan's renouncement of claim to the islands but did not specify the recipient.

Although there are several thousand descendants of the aboriginal pre-Chinese tribes on this island of about eleven million population, the term "Taiwanese" refers to the descendants of the early Chinese settlers. The Taiwanese have strong

local roots, since even before the Japanese conquest in 1895, mainland China's political control over Taiwan was not stringent. There was friction between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders who commenced arriving after World War II, partly because of the inefficiency and corruption of the administration of General Chen Yi. In February, 1947, major riots were triggered by the killing of an old woman selling bootleg cigarettes. Fifty to seventy thousand mainland troops were sent to quell the disturbance.[45] It has been estimated that ten thousand Taiwanese were killed.[46] Although Chiang Kai-shek ultimately purged Chen Yi, he defended him in a speech in Nanking at the time of the riots, and thus a victory was scored for the Communist cadres on the island.[47] Although political conditions commenced to improve as Chen Yi's successor took charge, the addition of over one million civilian mainlanders and approximately six hundred thousand Nationalist troops in 1949 placed great strain on the island's economy. By 1950, the United States had ceased military aid to the Nationalists, and their outlook was bleak. With the arrival of the Seventh Fleet in accordance with President Truman's order of June 27, 1950, and later with the renewal of United States' military assistance to the Nationalist forces, and increased doles of non-military aid, their powers

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45. George Kerr, "Formosa: The March Massacres," Far Eastern Survey, XVI, November 5, 1947, p. 225.
46. Barnett, op. cit., p. 389. Robert P. Newman, Recognition of Communist China? (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1961), p. 67.
47. Kerr, op. cit., p. 266.

of self-defense and standard of living gained steadily, throughout the Korean War, and after.

The Chinese had considered Taiwan the richest prize of World War II,[48] but even considering this, after the arrival of the Seventh Fleet, the public pronouncements of the Peking leaders and the propaganda articles of their periodicals so fanatically stressed the mainland government's determination to take the island as to make the phenomenon exceptional, even in Communist literature. The true intensity of the incessant fulminations must be read in volume to be fully appreciated. Aside from the outright vilification of the United States, there was an obvious attempt to give the threats credibility by staking Peking's reputation on them. The Communists deliberately presented their revolution as only partially completed, pending acquisition of Taiwan.

An example of how the theme is made an integral part of the entire Chinese Communist movement is offered by extracts from an article by General Chu Te, Central Committee Politburo member, and Commander in Chief of the People's Liberation Army in 1951:

> Armed with Marxism-Leninism and led by the great comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Communist Party of China, following the failure of the '24 - '27 revolution has on its own led the Chinese people through ten years of cruel war ('27-'36) creating a people's revolutionary force and the political and military lines adapted to the practical conditions of the Chinese Revolutionary struggles.... All these formed the solid foundation on which the Chinese people defeated the Chiang reactionary Kuomintang clique..../In 1948, Mao said/: "It is the turning point from the growth to the extinction of Chiang's twenty

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48. Buss, op. cit., p. 570.

> years of counterrevolutionary rule. It also is the turning point from the growth to the extinction of more than one hundred years' rule of imperialism in China." /Chu Te again/ But the liberation war of the Chinese people is not completely ended because, as already mentioned, Taiwan Province, the territory of the People's Republic of China, has not yet been liberated. In June 1950, the American aggressors announced their armed control of our Taiwan at the same time they started their brutal armed intervention against Korea....Since the American imperialists have not yet learned the lesson they should have learned /in Korea/, the Chinese People will certainly make any adventurer who follows the example of Chiang suffer the same inglorious fate.[49]

Ceremonial devices perpetuated the issue. At the closing of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on November 1, 1951, Mao Tse-tung announced that two chairs on the National Committee would be left vacant, pending their occupancy by delegates from a conquered Taiwan.[50] On patriotic holidays, authorized lists of slogans were circulated throughout the country in advance. Even while the Korean War was in progress, Taiwan rated high on the lists. The May Day slogan list for 1953 had 55 entries. Number 1 was "Oppose American blockade and embargo," and number 2 was "Oppose American invasion of Taiwan."[51]

The stream was continuous; annual samples are provided. Chou En-lai (1950):

> Now, in the name of the Central Peoples' Government of the Peoples' Republic of China I declare: Despite any military steps of obstruction taken by the United States Government, the Chinese people are irrevocably determined to liberate Taiwan without fail.[52]

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49. Radio Peking (NCNA), June 28, 1951 (italics inserted).
50. Ibid., November 2, 1951.
51. Ibid., April 21, 1953.
52. Ibid., July 7, 1950 (italics inserted).

Chou En-lai (1951):

> The Chinese People...will never give up their sacred duty of liberating Taiwan.[53]

General Chu Te (1952):

> Except Taiwan, all Chinese Territory has been liberated and our national defense is more and more consolidated.[54]

General Chu Te (1953):

> The present situation is that although the Korean War has ceased, American imperialism is still in occupation of our territory Taiwan.[55]

The issue was undoubtedly an excellent source of patriotic stimulation when it was felt necessary to divert attention from internal problems, but in view of the fact that the chant continued, almost without regard for the world political situation or the "ebb and flow" of the mainland economy, it appears doubtful that this is an adequate explanation.

As the hypotheses which follow will indicate, it is possible that the issue was being kept "alive" for another audience as well. Taiwan could be symbolic of the last Chinese wounds of that "consummate actor," Stalin, whose "talent for political tactics and intrigue" had kept them from the United Nations at the climax of their mainland victory; instigated a Korean War which ultimately imposed United States' military opposition to the "completion of China's revolution"; and repeatedly vetoed their opportunities

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53. Ibid., August 25, 1951.
54. Ibid., October 1, 1952.
55. Ibid., October 1, 1953.

to withdraw from the Korean conflict as they were branded as an aggressor by the United Nations, permanently sealed from the Taiwan Strait as a result of a United States policy change, and even more firmly established in the eyes of much of the world as incorrigible militaristic fanatics. In short, the "Taiwan chant" might have been a cry for internal unity, an issue for "Hate America," and a complaint to Moscow against a Stalinist "dosage" which had tread the fine line of keeping them in the Kremlin fold yet provided for the "containment" of their eastern borders as well. This sort of Stalinist rationale conforms to the results of the research of some experts in the Sino-Soviet field, notably that of the British authority Edward Crankshaw:

> I suppose it is generally taken for granted in the West that during all this period [that of the Berlin blockade and the Korean War] Stalin was pursuing with fanatical concentration of purpose a single aim: world domination. I question whether he ever held his aim in view....I am content to suggest that what happened in Stalinist Russia from 1939, with the conclusion of the nonaggression pact with Germany, until the death of Stalin in 1953 is much better seen as a continuation of the old Russian imperialist dynamic, complicated and reinforced by a distorted Marxism, than as a calculated bid for world domination or world revolution....In China he built up Chiang Kai-shek at the expense of Mao Tse-tung; in Yugoslavia he repeatedly snubbed Tito, telling him that the Great Alliance was a matter of life and death and that he was not going to let it be imperiled by Tito's revolutionary zeal....Even after the war, Stalin was against helping the Greek Communists, so ardently supported by Tito, and poured cold water on the aspirations of Mao Tse-tung— in both cases for reasons of state....It should have been clear in 1949 that he was seriously concerned over the establishment of a Communist regime in China. But even today too many people go about wondering half fearfully whether Mao Tse-tung may one day "do a Tito"—oblivious of the fact that by his very act of seizing power in China he made himself a

> Tito. He achieved, that is to say, a Communist revolution in China on his own initiative and with his own arms. The only kind of "revolution" Stalin trusted was one he had made himself with his own agents working under his own detailed and strict directions.[56]

HYPOTHESIS I

> Russia purposely spoiled Communist China's chances for United Nations membership in 1950.

The peculiarity of Russian tactics within the United Nations' chambers, the statements of individuals with privileged information, and scholarly opinion are offered in support of this hypothesis.

A. Facts

The People's Republic of China sent a telegram to the United Nations on November 18, 1949 challenging the credentials of T. F. Tsiang, Nationalist China's representative. On December 29, 1949, the Soviet delegate in the Security Council made a statement in support of replacing the delegate from Taipei with the delegate from Peking. On January 10, 1950, though not on the agenda, the problem was the subject of the first speech of the day by the Soviet delegate. He offered a resolution to replace the Nationalist Chinese delegate with a representative of the People's Republic of China.

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56. Edward Crankshaw, "Russia's Imperial Design," Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. Robert A. Goldwin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 714-15.

Dr. T. F. Tsiang was President of the Security Council for the month of January, 1950. He ordered the Soviet proposal printed and circulated and stated that a special meeting would be called for the consideration of the proposal. The Russian delegate then objected to this ruling on the ground that it was made by a person who didn't represent anybody. A vote was taken on the objection, and it was defeated (all "aye" except Russia who voted "no," and India who abstained). The Russian delegate then stated that he could not take part in the work of the Security Council "until the Kuomintang delegate is excluded from membership."[57] The Russian delegate then left the chambers. The Soviet proposal was discussed by the remaining members on the following day, January 11th. The Chinese delegate (Dr. Tsiang) announced that he would not preside over the Council during the discussion of this motion, since it directly concerned his government. Under the Provisional Rules of Procedure, he sat as an ordinary member. On the basis of this action, the Soviet delegate returned to the session.[58]

During this, and subsequent meetings, the following positions were established: The Soviet government wanted to divorce the matter of individual country's policies on diplomatic recognition from the question of United Nations

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57. United Nations, Journal of the Security Council (New York, 1950), p. 4.
58. David Brook, The U.N. and the China Dilemma (New York: Vantage Press, 1956), p. 10.

representation. The United States had partially based their opposition to the Soviet motion on the fact of their diplomatic recognition of Nationalist China.[59] On a second point, Russia took the same stand as Nationalist China. They both felt that the matter was a political question, and therefore subject to a veto. The United States held that the question was one of the correctness of credentials, and therefore procedural, and therefore not subject to a veto.[60] The reason for the Soviet stand on this point is not clear. One weak thread of reason might be associated with this otherwise inexplicable decision. According to the rules, if the matter were procedural, the Nationalist Chinese delegate could sit through the hearings.

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59. In March, 1950, United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie effectively ruled in favor of Russia on this point by stating that diplomatic recognition and United Nations membership were separate matters. (Wei, op. cit., p. 283.)
60. Although international sympathy born of the exigencies of the Korean War have since eliminated the requirement of the United States to commit herself irrevocably on this point, it might be assumed that a new position was taken in 1953. On July 28th of that year, Secretary of State Dulles told correspondents that the United States was prepared to consider using the veto rather than to buy Korean unification at the price of admitting Communist China to the United Nations. During the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the appointment of Dean Rusk as Secretary of State in January, 1961, Mr. Rusk was asked to state his position on this issue. He said that in his opinion, U.N. admission should not be based merely on credentials (he believed the veto was applicable). (U. S., Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., January 12, 1961 (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961).)

[illegible]

On January 13, 1950, the Security Council voted on the Soviet proposal. The United States voted against it, clearly specifying that it was not to be considered a veto. The motion was defeated (6 "no," 3 "aye," 2 abstentions). At this juncture, the Soviet delegate left the chambers, not to return until August 1, 1950. His voluntary absence deprived him of taking advantage of British efforts to clear up the matter of Chinese representation,[61] or to veto United Nations action at the start of the Korean War. His excuse for departing was that his delegation "will not sit on the Security Council as long as the representative of the Kuomintang group has not been excluded."[62]

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61. Britain abstained on votes regarding Chinese U.N. representation from the time they recognized Peking in January 1950 until the 19th of September, 1950. On that date they voted for an Indian resolution to seat Communist China in the General Assembly. (Motion defeated.) They then voted for a Canadian compromise which referred the subject to a special committee. The committee was unable to render a decision, and they so informed the General Assembly in October 1951. On June 6, 1951, when the matter of Chinese representation on the Trusteeship Council was introduced, they voted with the United States in favor of Nationalist China for the first time. Some historians consider the change of British policy in June, 1951 a tacit compromise in Far East policy: a quid pro quo for the dismissal of General MacArthur. (Survey, 1951, op. cit., p. 354.) Each autumn for ten years (1951-1960) Britain voted with the United States to keep the issue off the General Assembly agenda. In December, 1961, the matter became an agenda item as an "important question," which required two-thirds of the vote for passage. The motion proposed to seat the Peking government and to expel the Taipei government. Britain voted for the measure, and thereby failed to vote with the United States for the first time since 1951. The motion was defeated. Even when casting the 1961 vote, the British delegate noted that the motion had no bearing on Security Council membership, and that his action did not imply a desire to see Nationalist China removed from the latter body. (New York Times, December 16, 1961.)
62. Journal of the Security Council, op. cit., p. 10.

B. Opinions of individuals with privileged information

(1) Statement made in the House of Commons by Mr. Bevin (Foreign Secretary) on the Chinese United Nations representation question, May 24, 1950:

> I think Mao Tse-tung has been receiving advice from Moscow...what is happening at this moment is that the Chinese are attempting to raise side issues which may be annoying and irritating to a country of this character. To that we have no intention of submitting ....I think that the sponsors of the new Chinese Government have really created the present difficulty, for the first thing was that Russia walked out because at the immediate moment of recognition we were not ready to admit a new Chinese representative and we had not completed our negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the new government of China....The question of the legal position was being examined, and Russia walked out. Since then we have been able to do nothing. The onus of keeping China out of the U.N. is on Russia....What it amounts to is that they are on strike....America, with all her feeling with regard to China has in my view adopted a very fair attitude. She says, "We will not vote for. We will not veto....If there are seven members who vote for, then we will accept the decision..." Two of the members Russia is keeping off the council by refusing to function; one is herself. There are five already and there is this stagnating of the U.N. as Russia herself has placed herself in this rather embarrassing position. We have tried, quite frankly, to see if we could get this cleared up by seeing whether seven votes could be collected.[63]

(2) In a House of Commons debate concerning the Japanese Treaty of Peace bill on November 26, 1951, the Minister of State, Mr. Kenneth Younger said that there had been good ground for hope that the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations would be settled even after the Korean War had started, before Chinese Communist intervention.[64]

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63. House of Commons Debates, May 24, 1950, Vol. 475, col. 2083-86 (Italics inserted).
64. Survey, 1951, op. cit., p. 400.

(3) Prime Minister Eden in the House of Commons (1955):

> No one knows better than the late government what caused the delay in the admission of the present Chinese Government to the United Nations. It was the act of aggression by the Chinese Communist Government in Korea which unfortunately held up the whole process of the admission of China to the United Nations.[65]

C. Scholarly views (considered representative of a larger body of opinion)

(1) Arnold Toynbee:

> ...on 6 January 1950 the new communist Chinese government at Peking had been recognized by Great Britain on the ground that it had now become the effective government of China de facto, whereas the United States deprecated Great Britain's action as precipitate and forebore to follow suit, till American policy was overtaken by a series of events in the Far East—first in the North Korean attack of South Korea in June 1950, and then the Chinese intervention in the war in November—which erected one further obstacle after another to an American recognition of the communist Chinese regime. The consequences were a complete breach between the United States and China and a serious disagreement between the United States and their West European allies.[66]

(2) Michael Lindsay:

> British action in the United Nations during 1950 can be fully explained by the tactical decision that it was unwise to force a vote on the admission of the Peking Government until the support had been lined up to secure a favourable vote. By contrast, the Soviet tactics of forcing the issue on every possible occasion could be explained by a Soviet policy of preventing the Peking Government from obtaining the U.N. seat unless it could be presented as a concession extorted from a hostile U.N. by Soviet pressure. Governments which might have been ready to vote for China on the merits of the case would not give a favourable vote when it appeared to be yielding to Soviet threats. (This hypothesis about Soviet motives could not be definitely proved or

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65. London Times, January 27, 1955.
66. Survey, 1949-1950, op. cit., p. 3.

disproved without access to Soviet archives but the case for doubting Soviet good faith is rather stronger than the Chinese case for doubting British good faith.)[67]

(3) Henry Wei:

In 1950 prospects seemed bright for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. The prestige of the Nationalist Government was then at a low ebb in consequence of the White Paper....Under the circumstances, if the Soviet delegation had been more tactful, it might have succeeded in leading the Peking Government into the United Nations....Instead of escorting its friend through the main entrance whose doors might have yielded to a few gentle knocks, it had chosen to shoot its way in and thrust its friend through a narrow side window, which, by the way, was closed.[68]

(4) Yugoslav analysts:

...the so-called Government of Chiang Kai-shek has obviously lost the right to speak in the name of the Chinese people....In any case, in January 1950, there could be no doubt that the real purpose behind the Soviet action of leaving the Security Council was not to gain entrance into the Security Council for the Peking representative, but, on the contrary, to obstruct this...[69]

HYPOTHESIS II

Before the start of the Korean War precipitated President Truman's order for the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait, Communist China assumed that she could proceed with the capture of Taiwan without United States opposition.

Two basic elements support this conjecture: (A) Official and unofficial United States policy pronouncements before June 27, 1950, gave Communist China every reason to

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67. Lindsay, op. cit., p. 11.
68. Wei, op. cit., p. 283.
69. Dushan Timotiyevich and Zdravko Pechar, "China 1950," Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), I, No. 15, December 20, 1950, p. 3.

believe her efforts would not meet United States opposition. (B) The Chinese Communists were about ready to attack when the Korean war started.

A. United States publicized Taiwan policy before the Korean War

No attempt is made here to establish actual policy. This was attempted during two years of domestic conflict in the United States, to nobody's satisfaction. Much of the documentation herein originates in the transcript of the United States Senate joint Armed Services-Foreign Relations committee hearings following the recall of General MacArthur--printed under the title "Military Situation in the Far East." The closest approach to a definition of United States Taiwan policy before the outbreak of the Korean War was incorporated in the testimony of Secretary of State Acheson:

> First of all, it was understood that Formosa had strategic importance so far as the United States was concerned..../But/ in the existing condition, and strength of the Armed Forces of the United States, it was not possible to commit or promise to commit any forces whatever, armed forces of the United States, to the defense of Formosa.[70]

This did not satisfy eight members of the Foreign Relations committee who submitted a minority report, in part as follows:

> The evidence before the committees indicates that this policy has been neither firm nor continuous. On the contrary, the policy has been obscured by

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70. U. S., Senate, Military Situation in the Far East; Hearings Before the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, 82nd Congress (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951), Part 3, p. 1671. (Hereafter referred to as Military Situation.)

> constant conflict within the State department, in the press, and in public debate. There has not been and even today there is no unanimity of opinion in the Government on the subject of aid to the Republic of China.[71]

What the United States would actually have done in the event of a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan was thus "obscure" to persons at a high level of the United States government. The answer is believed to be unknowable, but the question is academic for the substantiation of the hypothesis. It is important to note that to the outside world, United States position on this point was quite probably not perceived as "obscure" at all. Outsiders had every reason to believe that the United States would do nothing.

The United States had publicly washed its hands of affairs involving the Chinese civil war. On January 8, 1949, President Chiang Kai-shek had asked for peace terms on the continent. The United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France were asked to be mediators. All four governments rejected the offer.[72] United States non-military aid to the Chinese Nationalists had been drastically curtailed,[73] and military aid had been stopped. The details of the United States' discouragement with the Nationalist forces was published and distributed as the State Department White Paper of August 5, 1949. In the introduction, Secretary of State Acheson had written:

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71. Ibid., Part 5, p. 3593.
72. Wei, op. cit., p. 229.
73. Ibid., p. 228.

> A large proportion of the military supplies furnished the Chinese armies by the United States since VJ day has...fallen into the hands of the Chinese Communists through the military ineptitude of the Nationalist leaders, their defections and surrenders, and the absence among their forces of the will to fight... and now it is abundantly clear that we must face the situation as it exists in fact. We will not help the Chinese or ourselves by basing our policy on wishful thinking.[74]

This assessment of the situation was amplified by Mr. Acheson in a public speech at the National Press Club in Washington on January 12, 1950:

> Nobody, I think, says the Nationalist Government fell because it was confronted by overwhelming military force which it could not resist, certainly no one in his right mind suggests that now...what has happened in my judgment is that the almost inexhaustible patience of the Chinese people in their misery ended... /The Communists were able to capitalize on the/ grossest incompetence ever experienced by any military command.[75]

Mr. Acheson also described a United States defense perimeter extending from Japan through the Ryukyus to the Philippines. These latter remarks are often referred to in the United States as having suddenly revealed a weakness in Far East policy, but strangely enough, they got comparatively little play in the Communist press. After all, they were merely a repetition of a statement of General MacArthur made nearly a year before:

> Now the Pacific has become an Anglo-Saxon lake and our line of defense runs through the chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia. It starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu Archipelago,

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74. White Paper, op. cit., p. xv.
75. Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, p. 115.

> which includes its broad main bastion, Okinawa, then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain...[76]

On January 3, 1950, there had been wide Far East circulation of a UP release, Tokyo date line, which said that the State Department had notified its attaches that the loss of Taiwan island to the Communists was expected. It quoted a classified State Department document of December 23, 1949 (correctly) which said "the loss of the island is widely anticipated, and the manner in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight to the expectation."[77] There was considerable

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76. New York Times, March 2, 1949. This accumulation of material does not imply that there was no United States domestic concern about the future of Taiwan before the Korean War. General MacArthur had become alarmed by mid-June, 1950. At that time, it was revealed in the Senate committee hearings, he held private discussions with Secretary of Defense Johnson on this subject in Tokyo. They came to an agreement on the importance of Taiwan. (Military Situation, op. cit., Part 4, p. 2590.) What is noteworthy, however, is that neither General MacArthur nor any other prominent officials had made public statements about it before Korea. (Survey, 1949-1950, op. cit., p. 346.) After the Seventh Fleet was stationed in the Taiwan Strait, General MacArthur's feelings with regard to Taiwan became public. While he was in Taiwan in early August, 1950, Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement that inferred that he and the General had agreed that the United States had a permanent interest in the fate of the Nationalists. Mr. Averell Harriman was sent to Japan from Washington to visit General MacArthur, and on August 10th, the General issued a statement denying that his visit to Taiwan had had any political object. On August 26th, General MacArthur sent a telegram to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in which he said: "Formosa in the hands of a hostile power could be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender." The President ordered the statement withdrawn. It is interesting to note the sensitivity of the Administration to any hint of interest in Taiwan, except as it was associated with the Korean War.
77. Military Situation, op. cit., Part 3, p. 1675.

discussion at the joint committee hearings in 1951 about the leak of this information. The document was issued to State Department personnel in the field as a precautionary measure, to limit alarm and provide policy coverage should the attack take place. It is difficult to believe that the Communist attack was considered just another contingency, however. Secretary of State Acheson testified that he had had studies of the danger to Taiwan made in September and October, 1949. He stated that "These studies unanimously reported that the fall would occur, and would occur probably in the year 1950."[78]

Other practical action taken by the Department of State lent credence to an externally-perceived view that the United States was "apparently prepared to see Formosa occupied by the communists."[79] On May 24, 1950, the American consul-general in Taiwan advised his countrymen to leave the island, unless they had essential business there.[80] At that point, many Far East scholars were convinced,[81] leading Americans were convinced,[82] and even the Chinese Nationalists were apparently convinced,[83] that the Chinese civil war had been

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78. Ibid., Part 3, p. 1672.
79. Survey, 1949-1950, op. cit., p. 345.
80. Ibid., p. 346.
81. Lindsay, op. cit., p. 37.
82. (Dwight D. Eisenhower and Robert Taft), Trumbull Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 15.
83. Governor K. C. Wu (of Taiwan) spoke of the Korean War and the reversing of United States policy. (New York Times, July 5, 1950.) Chiang Kai-shek's State of the Nation address, February 19, 1954: "Four years ago today our Republic of China was practically written off in international politics." (Radio Taipei (Radio Free China), February 20, 1954.)

left to the devices of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. It would seem that the Communists could quite logically take the last statement on the subject by the President of the United States on January 5th, 1950, at face value:

> The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States government will not provide military aid or advice to the Chinese forces in Formosa.[84]

It would appear that Mao Tse-tung remembered this speech well. On the day following President Truman's order stationing the U.S. Navy in the Strait, he made one of his rare references to specific contemporary events:

> Truman stated on January 5th of this year that America would refrain from interfering in Taiwan. Now he himself proved that his statement was false and he has torn to shreds all the international agreements regarding U.S. noninterference in the internal affairs of China.[85]

B. The credibility of the Chinese Communist threat to Taiwan before the Korean War

The taking of Taiwan would have been a difficult feat for Communist China in 1950, even without United States involvement. It required an amphibious operation over 100 miles of open sea; this had to be accomplished without

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84. Department of State Bulletin, January 16, 1950, p. 79.
85. Radio Peking (NCNA), June 30, 1950. President Truman's speech is still referred to; Chou En-lai, September, 1958: "Were it not for the fact that the U.S. government later went back on its own statement...Taiwan and the Pengu islands would have long been liberated. (Radio Peking (NCNA), September 6, 1958.)

equipment that would even approximate the complexity of a modern Navy. On the other hand, they weren't faced with a Tarawa. In the spring of 1950, Taiwan was a haven for discouraged and demoralized Nationalist troops who fled from mainland and offshore island defeats to join native Taiwanese, many of whom were still sullen from the 1947 Nationalist massacre. Taiwan was a fertile ground for subversive activity; a token amphibious "landing" of assorted naval vessels and motorized junks, well-timed with "fifth column" activity and a few paratroops could have been quite effective. Taiwan was a Chinese Communist target of special significance, and required special treatment. It was the last stronghold of the "remnant forces," and its fall (along with that of Tibet) would signal the completion of the twenty year war. To falter at this point, however, would threaten the loss of momentum just when they needed high morale to solidify mainland gains. In making preparations, they were apparently proceeding with confidence,[86] but caution.[87] Budgetary limitations were a concern, but United States opposition was apparently not a factor connected with these Taiwan aspirations.[88]

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86. Mao Tse-tung in 1938: "Weapons are an important factor in war but not the decisive one; it is man and not material that counts." (Mao Tse-tung, On the Protracted War (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954), p. 56.)
87. Mao Tse-tung in 1940: "We do not make a fight unless we are sure of victory; we must on no account give fight without plan, without preparation and without certainty of outcome." (Mao Tse-tung, Questions of Tactics in the Present Anti-Japanese United Front (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954), p. 13.)
88. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 22.

General Su Yu addressed Third Field Army (February, 1950):

> The liberation of the islands along the southeast coast, especially Taiwan, is an extremely big problem and will involve the biggest campaign in the history of modern Chinese warfare....A considerable number of Chiang Kai-shek land, sea, and air forces are concentrated there.[89]

Mao Tse-tung (March, 1950):

> The financial condition of our country has begun to improve....However, in order to bring about a fundamental turn for the better...considerable retrenchment in military and administrative expenditures by the state is necessary.[90]

Liu Shao-chi (May Day address, 1950):

> After Taiwan is liberated, the enemy's blockade and bombing will naturally end, the country's military expenditures can be greatly reduced, a great increase in investment in economic construction can then be made, and our country can move ahead on the road to transitional economic reconstruction.[91]

People's China editorial (May, 1950):

> As comrade Liu Shao-chi points out in his May Day address, the brilliant success of the amphibious operation, ending in the liberation of Hainan, demonstrates the People's Liberation Army's mastery of the art of sea borne landings. The Chinese people are assured of the impending liberation of Taiwan. The Hainan campaign was its prologue.[92]

Mao Tse-tung addresses the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (June 6, 1950):

> Only Taiwan and Tibet still remain to be liberated and this is still a serious task...on the condition that it guarantees sufficient forces to liberate Taiwan and Tibet, consolidate the national defenses and suppress the counter-revolutionaries, the People's Liberation Army, while retaining its main force, should demobilize part of its troops in 1950.[93]

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89. General Su Wu, "Liberation of Taiwan in Sight," People's China, February 16, 1950, p. 8.
90. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 18.
91. Supplement, People's China, May 16, 1950.
92. People's China, May 16, 1950, p. 4.
93. Radio Peking (NCNA), June 13, 1950.

Although the date of the proposed attack was never announced, the close of the "invasion" season comes with the arrival of the typhoon season in the early autumn.[94] Mainland preparations in the spring of 1950 indicated that they intended to beat this deadline.

> Throughout these months, Communist China carried out her tremendous military build-up in the coastal provinces of Chekiang and Fukien. No less than 18 Communist armies were concentrated in this area opposite Formosa across the hundred-mile Strait. Preparations for crossing the Strait were pushed at feverish speed; all kinds of coastal craft were assembled, and training for amphibious operations were intensive. Old airfields were enlarged and new ones built to round out the plans for the impending assault on the island stronghold.[95]

It has been reported that a massive "frog man" training program in preparation for the Taiwan assault was commenced about the first of January, 1950 in the pools of southern Chekiang and northern Fukien. This program hit reverses when an epidemic of schistosmiasis (Asiatic blood fluke) swept the trainees. (The disease is contracted by contact with organisms in fresh water lakes and rivers.) It has been suggested that this epidemic served to delay the attack

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94. In April, 1950, the Japanese Communist Party is reported to have known of the coming attack in Korea, but to have understood it was to have been scheduled for August. Resolution of the Communist "Chibu Conference": "The North Korean armies will carry out the southern campaign for the unification of the country at the beginning of the rainy season...our operations are scheduled, until further notice, for August." (Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, Red Flag in Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 240.)
95. Ping Chia-kuo, China: New Age and New Outlook (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 139.

on Taiwan.[96]

The Taipei press was reflecting a peak of anxiety by mid-June, 1950. On June 16th, a General in the Nationalist Army warned the people of an impending paratroop invasion which would accompany the amphibious assault.[97] On June 19th, reports were relayed from Saigon of some twenty landing craft that were enroute from Shanghai to load units of General Chen I's Third Field Army that was massed on the coast.[98] Taipei Radio estimated that one million men were in position with Chen I, and that they were delayed only until they could arrange for ships.[99] Peking's exhortations to units stationed opposite the island paralleled those broadcast prior to the earlier Hainan island invasion of April.[100] In summary, there is an impressive array of evidence that suggests that an attack was imminent. General MacArthur testified later that his concurrence with Washington's decision to turn down Chiang Kai-shek's offer to send troops to Korea in July, 1950 was based on the continued threat to Taiwan, even in the face of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, stationed

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96. Frank A. Kierman, Jr., The Fluke that Saved Formosa (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, MIT, 1954), p. 139.
97. Radio Taipei (Radio Free China), June 16, 1950.
98. Ibid., June 19, 1950.
99. Ibid., June 9, 1950. This number was probably exaggerated. Ex-Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson testified at the joint committee hearings that United States intelligence believed that between June 10th and June 24th, 1950, the Communist forces massed on the Strait increased from more than 40,000 to about 156,000. (Military Situation, op. cit., Part 3, p. 2621.) The latter figure exceeds the manpower estimated to have been available at the Strait during the 1958 offshore island crisis (see below).
100. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 22.

in the Strait:

> /After the orders to neutralize the Strait/ There was a concentration of Red Chinese troops on the mainland which threatened Formosa seriously....There were the Fourth and Third field armies which afterward showed up in Korea.
>
> I went down to Formosa.../July 31, 1950/. The week before that, I had been receiving reports from the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressing trepidation for the safety of Formosa.[101]

This hypothesis is offered in order to show that Communist China could reasonably feel that the complications of the Korean War and the resultant United States action robbed them of their opportunity to invade Taiwan in the summer of 1950. If it is assumed that President Truman's decision to intervene was unexpected,[102] this contention needs further defense in view of a possible Chinese Communist

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101. Military Situation, op. cit., Part 1, pp. 22, 23.
102. Technically, the United States had decided to intervene in Korea before the Security Council called for the military support of United Nations members. (Stephen S. Goodspeed, The Nature and Function of International Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 224.) General MacArthur was ordered to provide naval and air support in Korea on the night of June 26th; the Security Council called for Korean military support after a meeting on the morning of June 27th; President Truman made his previous orders public at noon that day. (Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), p. 336.) The idea of accompanying action in Korea with "neutralization" of the Taiwan Strait was part of the original recommendations of the State and Defense Departments submitted to President Truman by Secretary of State Acheson during the Sunday night meeting, June 25th, after the President's urgent flight from Missouri. As soon as this facet of possible Korean actions was mentioned, President Truman interrupted Mr. Acheson's presentation and directed that the Seventh Fleet be signalled immediately and started on the way toward the Taiwan area. (Ibid., p. 335.)

afterthought: "Even without the Korean War, the United States would have surprised us by preventing our Taiwan landings as well."

In the early summer of 1950, the situations in Korea and Taiwan were entirely different. The United Nations as a body had established a prior interest in preventing Communist aggression in Korea. There was a United Nations Commission on station in South Korea, and in October, 1949, the General Assembly had charged it with the responsibility of investigating matters which might lead to military action at the 38th parallel.[103] Moreover, there is every reason to believe that the United Nations aspect of the Korean attack weighed heavily on the United States' decision to intervene there.[104] As the news of the North Korean attack as reported in United States Ambassador Muccio's telegram is traced from the State Department watch officer (Assistant Secretary of State (Far Eastern Affairs) Dean Rusk), to Secretary Acheson, to President Truman in Missouri, United Nations action was immediately recommended at each step.[105] The catalytic effect of the mutual confidence of United States and United Nations officials made the decision to intervene in Korea easier.

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103. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), p. 6.
104. Truman, op. cit., p. 336.
105. Time Magazine, December 26, 1960, p. 10.

The United Nations would not have supported action against the invasion of Taiwan. The Strait "neutralization" was a unilateral action by the United States throughout the Korean War; British Naval units never participated. During the November 1950 Chinese Communist offensive in Korea, General MacArthur requested the use of Chiang Kai-shek's troops there. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reply denied this request because:

> ...it would disrupt the united position of the nations associated with the United States in the United Nations and leave the United States isolated. It may be wholly unacceptable to the Commonwealth countries to have their forces employed with Nationalist China...[106]

The United Nations aspect contributed to the United States' decision on Korea. The United States might have entered Korea unilaterally, although there would have been less impetus. They might even have entered the Taiwan Strait unilaterally in the absence of the Korean War, but the impetus would have been even less. Thus, if the Chinese Communists availed themselves of the Western literature on the subject, they would have to conclude that the odds of surprise U.S. action in Taiwan were considerably less than in Korea.

What is more germane to the argument, however, is the Chinese Communists' apparent assessment of the situation immediately after June 27, 1950. At this stage there is much

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106. Major General Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-1951 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), p. 397.

evidence to indicate that they considered the Seventh Fleet's presence in the Strait as purely a "corollary" of United States Korean action, as President Truman's announcement had specified. Moreover, at least while the North Koreans appeared to be forcing the United Nations armies off the peninsula, Peking's deployment of their military forces indicated that they expected to be able to go ahead with their Taiwan landings that same summer.

> Had a North Korean victory remained certain, albeit delayed by a few weeks, there would be no reason to withdraw forces positioned opposite Taiwan. The context of the Seventh Fleet's orders gave credence to the World Culture analysis linking a U.S. defeat in Korea with a U.S. withdrawal from the Taiwan Strait. In the event of a U.S. defeat and withdrawal, the invasion might be rescheduled according to the dictates of weather...[107]

Before the Korean War the Chinese Communists did not believe the United States would oppose their 1950 Taiwan landings by surprise; after the start of the Korean War they did not believe it. They probably still do not believe it. In their eyes, only the complications in Korea prevented the "completion of their revolution."

HYPOTHESIS III

Soviet Russia instigated the Korean War.

A Korean Communist organization, closely supervised by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had existed since the 1920's. Hundreds of Korean Communists had served in the

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107. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 65.

Russian Army, others had served with the Soviet intelligence agencies and the NKVD. After World War II, many of these Koreans returned to their country with dual Russian-Korean citizenship; they maintained close ties with Vladivostok and Moscow during the initial "liberation" of North Korea. Many of the senior North Korean Army officers had had extensive experience on active duty with the Soviet Army. The Commander in Chief, General Kim Il-sung had served in Russia.[108] Chief of Staff and Chief of the Security Agency General Nam Il was a Soviet citizen who had fought the Germans at Stalingrad as Chief of Staff of a Russian division, and had helped liberate Warsaw.[109]

In 1949, Korean soldiers were trained and equipped in Siberia. Aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons, and naval mines were supplied by the Russians at that time.[110] On March 17, 1949, a Soviet-Korean trade, technical assistance, and credit agreement was signed. Some sectors of the North Korean economy (notably oil and shipping) came under direct Russian control through joint-stock companies.[111] In short, in the summer of 1950, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) gave every appearance of being a full-fledged Soviet satellite.[112]

The history of the relationship between the Chinese and the North Korean Communists was less amicable. Immediately

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108. Dallin, op. cit., p. 61.
109. Life Magazine, June 27, 1960, p. 100.
110. Dallin, op. cit., p. 62.
111. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 42.
112. Ibid., p. 34.

after World War II, the North Korean Communist Party persistently purged and weeded out the anti-Soviet, pro-Chinese cadres.[113] In early 1950, twelve thousand Korean troops returned home from China. It has been reported that this was part of the settlement of a Korean-Chinese dispute concerning Soviet-sponsored dam construction on the Yalu River in 1948-1949, and was brought about by Russian good offices. Communist China had asked that these troops be returned as part of an early phase of their demobilization program in response to economic pressures on the mainland.[114] Although the Peking and Pyongyang governments exchanged diplomatic recognition on December 25, 1949, the Chinese ambassador didn't arrive at the North Korean capital until August 13, 1950. He stayed a few months, and then returned to Peking, leaving a charge d'affaires. Not until 1955 did an ambassador return. It's almost impossible to construct a case for the idea of North Korea being a Chinese Communist satellite in the summer of 1950.[115]

The North Korean attack was planned.[116] Even a campaign against South Korea required outside concurrence, if only for logistical reasons.[117] There were rumors of an

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113. Ibid., p. 43.
114. Ibid.
115. Dallin, op. cit., p. 77.
116. North Korean forces which quickly occupied Seoul brought police and political officers who had prepared lists of the names and current addresses of key "reactionaries," which they duly arrested. (Lindsay, op. cit., p. 33.)
117. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 42.

impending Korean attack in official circles of Moscow in the summer of 1949. Medical supplies were being shipped to Korea, even though they were in short supply in Russia at that time.[118] By April and May, 1950, large Russian deliveries of tanks, trucks, and heavy artillery were arriving at North Korean installations.

The best informed observers at the time of the attack were unanimous in placing the blame on Russia and Russia alone.[119] In July, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson spoke of the 38th parallel being part of the iron curtain, and "behind that curtain the Soviet Union established a Communist regime."[120] On October 24, 1952, in the United Nations General Assembly Secretary Acheson charged the Soviet Union with being the instigator of the trouble in Korea.[121] Also in the United Nations, United States Ambassador Warren Austin stated his conviction that the influence of the Chinese Communists compared to the Russians in starting the Korean War was "one to ninety-nine."[122] John Foster Dulles, while a consultant to the Secretary of State, made frequent references to Russian instigation of the war. In July, 1950 he said: "The Communists of North Korea have struck hard with Russian

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118. Yuri A. Rastvorov, "Red Fraud and Intrigue in the Far East," Life Magazine, December 6, 1954. Rastvorov was a former Lieutenant Colonel of the MVD who defected to the United States in January, 1954.
119. James Reston, New York Times, June 27, 1950.
120. Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1950, p. 50.
121. Ibid., November 3, 1952, p. 680.
122. Buss, The Far East, op. cit., p. 659.

tanks, Russian planes, and Russian heavy artillery.[123]

Editorial opinion in Yugoslavia in the fall of 1950 not only blamed Russia for the attack, but felt that one of its main purposes was to establish hegemony over Communist China in the Far East.

> If the Soviet Government wished to assert itself as the big Asiatic power and to make itself the arbiter in the solution of Asiatic problems, then North Korea was a stronghold in Asia on which Moscow could count one hundred per cent in such an action...that would be a step along the road of letting China know that there were /not/ "two centers," and that China should join the camp headed by Moscow.[124]

HYPOTHESIS IV

> Communist China entered the Korean War reluctantly, either in response to a preceived threat to her border or on orders from Russia.

A. The case against a previously coordinated Sino-Soviet plan (six particulars offered)

(1) Notable irregularities existed in the Chinese Communist press coverage of the Korean War during the first five weeks of the conflict.

Although from the very moment of President Truman's announcement of his sending armed forces to Korea and the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, a continuous barrage of protests were published in regard to the Taiwan aspect of the

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123. Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1950, p. 49.
124. Timotiyevich and Pechar, op. cit., p. 4. This was one of the first periodicals to detect Russia's reluctance to see Communist China admitted to the United Nations. (New York Times, December 27, 1950, p. 9.)

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

case,[125] the action in Korea was either ignored, or belatedly reported. No Peking newspaper reported the Korean War for 48 hours following the attack. The Peking People's Daily carried a front page story on June 27th, but thereafter until July 6th it was relegated to the back pages. From that time on, until about the last of July there was always at least a 48 hour delay in reporting United States or United Nations action in Korea.[126] United States' action in the Taiwan area was condemned promptly, and frequently.

(2) Chinese Communist troop deployments during the first weeks of the conflict indicated improvised contingency planning.

Between mid-May and mid-July, the northeast China garrison was in the process of being strengthened by troops from the Hainan invasion. They could have reached the Korean area in force, long before the Chinese Communist intervention. At about the time of the initial North Korean attack, approximately 30,000 troops from Chen I's Third Field Army were moved from their station on the coast opposite Taiwan to the Shantung area, roughly midway between Taiwan and Korea. This appears to have been a reserve force, available for action in any contingency.[127] A substantial body was kept opposite Taiwan, at least until General MacArthur's visit to Taiwan

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125. Within 24 hours of the Truman statement, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai denounced the move as "armed aggression against the territory of China in total violation of the United Nations Charter." (Radio Peking (NCNA), June 29, 1950.)
126. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., pp. 53, 58.
127. Ibid., p. 64.

in early August.[128] In summary, although there were early redeployments, they might be considered to have been of a normal precautionary nature.

(3) The Chinese Communist propaganda machinery was not oriented toward Korea initially.

A routine propaganda campaign had been planned for July 1-7 in connection with the Stockholm Peace Appeal. This was modified to accentuate the recent developments by placing it under the direction of a hurriedly established "Chinese People's Committee for Resistance to United States Invasion of Taiwan and Korea." Campaigns were thereafter conducted under various headings, always starting with the word "Taiwan" until about the time of the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. Then "Resist America, Aid Korea" became the keynote.[129]

(4) The Chinese Communists apparently hadn't budgeted for the Korean War.

Before the Korean War started, there was a notable preoccupation with the need for concluding the Taiwan invasion

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128. The Nationalist Chinese Defense Ministry estimated in mid-August, 1950, that the troop strength off Taiwan had remained relatively constant. (Radio Taipei (Radio Free China), August 17, 1950.) General MacArthur's testimony, noted above, points out that the threat to Taiwan remained long after the Korean War had started. The Taipei press reported sporadic bombardment of Quemoy island from early June through October 5, 1950. (Radio Taipei (Radio Free China), October 7, 1950.) This is perhaps less significant than might be supposed; occasional shelling of this Nationalist outpost has been more the rule than the exception since 1949. The longest lull in bombardment since 1949 was 104 days, broken in December, 1961. In a sample day in January, 1962, 143 shells were reported in one night. (New York Times, January 17, 1962.)
129. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 62.

and getting on with domestic economic recovery in the quotations already noted. This appeal did not stop on June 27th. On July 16th, General Chen I told the East China Military and Administration Council that he shouldered the "sacred responsibility" for liberating Taiwan, but felt that economic recovery and postwar reconstruction should not be neglected.[130]

(5) The Chinese Communists issued warnings before they entered the Korean War.

As the United Nations forces approached the 38th parallel on their northward march in early October, 1950, the pros and cons of carrying the attack into North Korea were dominant issues in the world public eye. This was discussed in the United Nations in the context of extending the political goals of the war. The pertinent proposal was an "Eight Power Resolution" which would add the unification of Korea to the previous aims of ending armed aggression and the restoration of peace and security in the area.

On September 30th Chou En-lai announced in a speech widely carried in the press:

> The Chinese People absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists.[131]

On October 3rd, Chou En-lai summoned Ambassador K. M. Panikkar of India to a dramatic midnight meeting in Peking and told him that if the United States or United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel, Communist China would send troops to North Korea. This warning was promptly relayed to

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130. Radio Peking (NCNA), July 20, 1950 (Shanghai dateline, July 19, 1950).
131. Chou En-lai, "The First Year of People's China," People's China, October 16, 1950, p. 7.

the United States and United Nations.[132]

The Eight Power Resolution was passed in the General Assembly on October 7th; at about the same time, the first United States Army units crossed the parallel.[133] During this period, the Peking press revealed numerous warnings, but one of the most noteworthy was again enunciated by Chou En-lai, this one October 10th:

> Now that the American forces are attempting to cross the 38th parallel on a large scale, the Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a serious situation created by the invasion of Korea...[134]

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132. Appleman, op. cit., p. 758. Chou En-lai specifically excluded South Korean troops as a source of provocation. South Korean units had already crossed the parallel on October 1st. (Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 108.) This warning was forwarded to the United States forces in the Far East on October 4th. (Appleman, op. cit., p. 758.) "Whereas the threat was greatly discounted in the United States, [Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, United States Eighth Army Commander] and his staff gave full weight to the words and to the warning which came from the Indian Ambassador in Peiping that Communist China was preparing to enter the war." (S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1953, p. 7.)
133. Some references say the United States troops crossed the parallel a few hours before the resolution was passed (Gordon B. Turner and Richard D. Challenger, National Security in the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 36), some infer that they crossed afterward (Willoughby and Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 378). All agree that from the standpoint of propriety of action on the part of United States military commanders in the field, the matter is immaterial. The military decision to cross the 38th parallel had long been made in Washington, and was transmitted to General MacArthur on September 27th in the form of orders defining his mission as the destruction of the North Korean armed forces. (Turner and Challenger, op. cit., p. 36.)
134. Radio Peking (Chinese International Service) (in English), October 11, 1950 (italics inserted).

The first Chinese Communist troops crossed into North Korea in force about October 13th.[135]

In summary, repeated warnings were given; the terms and timing of the warnings preceded the act upon which they were conditional; they were received by the threatened parties; they were reiterated after the conditional limits had been exceeded. It would seem doubtful that Peking would have bothered with warnings at all if they were merely participating in a completely pre-planned, coordinated maneuver.

(6) Inconsistencies in Chinese Communist military tactics in Korea during November 1950 suggest either a pragmatic approach to their total involvement in the war or that they were ill-equipped to fight.

On November 5th, after the United Nations forces had engaged the Chinese in combat, General MacArthur made a special report of their intervention to the United Nations. On November 7th, the Communists publicly admitted that Chinese "volunteers" were participating in the Korean War. At this juncture, the Chinese forces withdrew and a three week period of relative disengagement existed until the "Home by Christmas" United Nations offensive of November 24-26 was turned into a "new war" on November 27th by the Chinese counterattack.

In explanation, it has been variously suggested that the Chinese were making one last effort to avoid total involvement, pending United Nations response to their

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135. Appleman, op. cit., p. 765.

admitting to sending "volunteers,"[136] that they were employing the "mobile war" maxims of Mao Tse-tung,[137] that they were waiting for the decimation of the pro-Soviet North Korean troops,[138] or that they were hurriedly being supplied for a war for which they had not been prepared.[139] No attempt is made here to pinpoint the most likely reason behind this incongruous withdrawal. The mere fact of their disengagement, however, speaks for a pragmatic operation rather than a long planned maneuver.

Some facts regarding the lack of Soviet logistic support of the Chinese Communist armies before this time are considered pertinent. Allen S. Whiting interviewed Chinese Communist prisoners of war. They left the impression that there had been little preparation for their arrival in Korea. None of the Chinese armies engaged in the fighting in late October and November 1950 had been trained in using Russian weapons, and the only known piece of Soviet equipment utilized by them at that stage was a sub-machine gun. They relied on American and Japanese relics of World War II. Captured documents told of the plight of an ill-clothed and ill-equipped Chinese Communist Army before their November offensive.[140]

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136. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 137.
137. Mao Tse-tung in 1938: "We have always advocated the policy of "luring the enemy to penetrate deep" precisely because this is the most effective policy for a weak army in strategic defense against a strong army." (Mao Tse-tung, On the Protracted War, op. cit., p. 110.)
138. Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), I, No. 13, November 22, 1950, p. 3.
139. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 161.
140. Ibid., pp. 124, 161, 193.

B. The case for Chinese Communist entry on the basis of apprehension regarding their borders

The first element in the appreciation of this concept requires the admission that from some viewpoints, there appeared to be inadequate justification for the "neutralization" of the Taiwan Strait on the basis of the Communist threat in Korea. That this was possible is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that it was a view held in many quarters among United States allies in Europe, particularly in Great Britain.[141] A second element lies in the realization that the concept of the possibility of a Western pincers movement against China was prevalent on the mainland and that a myth of eventual American invasion antedated the Korean War.[142]

There is ample evidence that educated opinion in mainland China was quick to appreciate the significance of the

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141. "Just how a Chinese communist occupation of Formosa could threaten the security of the United Nations forces in Korea was not clear in view of its distance from the theatre of war and of the complete air and naval supremacy enjoyed at that time by the United Nations." (Survey, 1949-1950, op. cit., p. 350.)

142. Ibid., p. 498. Before the war there had been publicity of a specific "General MacArthur-Kuomintang plot"; "limited evidence from people who were in China during the period suggests that this official publicity was largely believed even by educated Chinese opinion." (Lindsay, China and the Cold War, op. cit., p. 38.) Pawel Monat (Polish Military attache to Communist China and North Korea during the Korean War period—who defected to the United States in 1959): "The Chinese were terrified of General MacArthur. They regarded him as a brilliant and unpredictable enigma. For all they knew, if they didn't stop him, he might attack across the Yalu, just as he had swept unexpectedly across the 38th parallel." (Pawel Monat "Russiand in Korea: The Hidden Bosses," Life Magazine, June 27, 1960, p. 102.)

new power situation which faced them, once the Seventh Fleet took station in the Strait. A sophisticated article appeared in World Culture as early as July, 1950, which offered the conjecture that President Turman took action in the Taiwan Strait to appease the Republican Party and thus get support for his Korean plans:

> Before June 27th, the problem of liberating Taiwan pitted the strength of the People's Liberation Army against the Chiang Kai-shek remnants, with the help of the American imperialists occupying the background position. Since June 27, the problem of liberating Taiwan pits the strength of the People's Liberation Army against the American imperialists with the Kuomintang bandit remnants moving into the background.[143]

Public speeches in the late summer of 1950 reflected an increasingly defensive attitude.

Chou En-lai at the 33rd session of the Central People's Government Council, (August 11, 1950):

> The U.S. aggressive circles have always been hostile to the People's Republic of China. They have continuously attempted to carry out armed intervention and to pose the threat of war against China from three fronts, namely Taiwan, Korea, and Indo-China....The United States government has seized control of the military, political, and economic affairs of Taiwan, and turned Taiwan into a U.S. colony as well as a military base for attacking our country.[144]

Vice Chairman Chu Te at the National Conference of Combat Heroes and Model Workers (September 25, 1950):

> We have to liberate all of China, including Tibet and Formosa, and simultaneously, have to establish our national defense forces to protect us from aggression and to defend the Orient.[145]

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143. World Culture, XXII, No. 1, July 7, 1950.
144. Radio Peking (NCNA), August 13, 1954. Mao Tse-tung in 1940: "We will never attack unless attacked; if attacked, we will certainly counter-attack." (Mao Tse-tung, Questions of Tactics..., op. cit., p. 12.)
145. Radio Peking (NCNA), September 28, 1950.

[illegible]

Defensive preparations were being made on mainland China. On October 17th, a warning appeared in the press concerning a scheduled test firing of the Shanghai anti-aircraft batteries.[146] Prominent leaders stressed defense of their country at any cost. On September 25, 1950, Acting Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, General Nieh Jung-chen told Indian Ambassador Panikkar:

> /China cannot/ sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to the /Sino-Korean/ border....We know what we are in for, but at all costs American aggression has to be stopped. The Americans can bomb us, they can destroy our industries, but they cannot defeat us on land....They may even drop atom bombs on us. What then? They may kill a few million people. Without sacrifice a nation's independence cannot be upheld.[147]

On the other hand, there were indications in 1952 that Peking was more anxious to push forward with their internal development programs than to continue the increasingly pointless military stalemate.[148] By this time, any real threat to their borders was clearly out of the question.[149]

It is admitted, that to most Western minds, the idea of the mainland Chinese (before their entry into the Korean War) being honestly afraid of their being invaded by the United States appears irrational. Rationality, however, is

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146. Ibid., October 17, 1950.
147. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 107.
148. Howard L. Boorman, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance: The Political Impact," Moscow-Peking Axis, Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 15.
149. The dismissal of General MacArthur was probably prima facie evidence of the fact that Washington would not permit attacks across the Yalu, but of course both the Moscow and Peking propaganda insisted that he was really recalled because his efforts had not been adequately "aggressive."

a relative concept.

> It is surprisingly difficult...to find processes in human history which are truly mechanically latent in the sense that they are quite independent of any image which may be held by the people participating in them.[150]

C. The case for entry on the basis of Russian orders

Until about the first of August, 1950, the Chinese Communists were apparently still thinking in terms of an imminent assault on Taiwan. Their news stressed this point continually, and the Korean issue was in the background. In early July, Ambassador Panikkar called on Mao Tse-tung and after their conversation later reported to his government in New Delhi that the Chinese leader was treating Korea as a "distant matter," and was concentrating on Taiwan's future.[151] An editorial in the Peking People's Daily on July 21st said that by

> ...actively preparing for the liberation of Taiwan, we shall be giving efficient aid to the support of Korea.[152]

In early August, the emphasis was still on Taiwan, but a more long-range view was indicated; a drawn out Korean War was envisioned. World Culture commented:

> A prolonged war of attrition will naturally increase the difficulties of the Korean people but it will increase the difficulties of the American imperialists much more.[153]

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150. Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (University of Michigan Press, 1956), p. 117.
151. New York Times, July 15, 1950.
152. Radio Peking (NCNA), July 22, 1950.
153. World Culture, XXII, No. 5, August 5, 1950.

In a speech in early August, 1950, Chinese Communist General Jung Pei indicated a switch to long range versus immediate military plans:

> The People's Liberation Army is making full preparation for the battle to liberate Taiwan by building a powerful Navy and Air Force...[154]

As late as August 15th, the Korean War was still described in the context of a foreign conflict. The People's Daily editorial on the fifth anniversary of North Korea's "liberation" said:

> We joyously celebrate the victory that has been won by the Korean people...nevertheless, the Korean people must be fully aware that they still have many difficulties ahead, and must prepare to meet and overcome them. We believe the heroic Korean people have all the necessary forces for overcoming any difficulties.[155]

A transition of propaganda themes started about mid-August, however. On August 20th, Chou En-lai sent a telegram to the Secretary General of the United Nations in which he said:

> Korea is China's neighbor. The Chinese people cannot but be concerned about the solution of the Korean question...[156]

Within a week, the Chinese Communist press had linked Korea's problems with China.

> The barbarous action of American imperialism and its hangers-on in invading Korea not only menaces peace in Asia and the world in general but seriously threatens the security of China in particular....North Korea's enemy is our enemy. North Korea's defense is our defense. North Korea's victory is our victory.[157]

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154. Radio Peking, (NCNA), August 4, 1950 (italics inserted).
155. Ibid., August 16, 1950 (italics inserted).
156. Ibid., August 21, 1950.
157. World Culture, XXII, No. 8, August 26, 1950.

August, 1950 is a very difficult month in which to exactly pinpoint Communist trends. Many developments in the United Nations ranks caused a flurry of comments that tend to obscure bloc policy developments. General MacArthur's visit to Taiwan served to clarify the details of the United States intentions in the Strait.[158] On leaving Taiwan in early August he said:

> ...Taiwan, including the Pescadores islands, cannot be subjected to armed attack....It is my responsibility, and I am determined to defend it.[159]

In about the second week of August, the arrival of United States reinforcements in Korea caused a shift in the balance of military power in South Korea.[160] On August 17th, Ambassador Austin, United States representative in the United Nations, indicated that the United States advocated forcibly uniting Korea.[161]

In spite of the diffusing effect of these developments, the Chinese Communist abrupt linking of their future with the Korean War was plainly notable, and the timing roughly coincided with rumors of a high level Sino-Soviet conference. Four Far Eastern radio news sources (Karachi, Taipei, Hong Kong, and Tokyo) reported the arrival of Vice Premier Molotov in Peking:

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158. He also apparently clarified the role of the Chinese Nationalists. Their press indicated confusion about the duration of the Seventh Fleet's stay, their rights with regard to harassment, etc. before he arrived.
159. Radio Peking (Chinese International Service), August 5, 1950.
160. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 71.
161. Ibid., p. 86.

> Russian Kuzma Derevyanko, chief of the Soviet mission in Tokyo shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War was reported to be in Peking by Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong....Derevyanko, Mao, Molotov, and a well known Japanese communist are reported arguing about using Russian submarines and transport airplanes for an invasion of Taiwan. Mao agreed to delay, but was displeased at his predicament.[162]

On the last day of September, the United States Far East daily intelligence summary reported an alleged high-level conference in Peking on August 14th, at which it had been decided to provide 250,000 Chinese Communist troops for service in Korea.[163] A United States Department of Defense release of December 15, 1954 stated:

> In August 1950...a Kremlin directive providing for this Chinese Communist intervention was transmitted to Peiping from Moscow by Lieutenant General Kuzma Derevyanko. On 14 August the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee approved the Kremlin action.[164]

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162. Radio Taipei (Voice of Free China), August 27, 1950 (Hong Kong dateline). No confirmation of Molotov's trip has been found. He might have been a logical emissary. He had Communist prestige and was out of work at the time. (His title of Vice Premier was largely honorary; he had been replaced as Foreign Minister after the failure of the Berlin Blockade.) (Dallin, op. cit., p. 9.) Agence France Presse correspondent Pierre Brisard dismissed the report about Molotov as "a fiction of Nationalist propaganda from Taipei," but felt that high level conferences were being conducted between the Soviets, the Chinese Communists, and the North Koreans. (Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 187.)
163. Appleman, op. cit., p. 758.
164. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 187. Yuri A. Rastvorov ex-Lieutenant Colonel, MVD who defected to the United States in 1954 reported a conversation with Colonel Pyotr Shibaev in March 1951. Colonel Shibaev had been in the Soviet Embassy in Peking during August 1950 and said that it took a lot of argument to convince Mao Tse-tung that China had an interest in the Korean War. "He said it was not a problem for the Chinese. But Comrade Stalin continued to press him...the two of them were firing stiffer and stiffer messages back and forth between Peking and Moscow. Finally, after long argument

D. Finally, the case for reluctance

It is noteworthy that although "sympathy" for the North Korean cause was advanced on the mainland from the outset of the war,[165] during the entire episode through 1953, only rarely did the China mainland press base their allegiance on "comradely Communist brotherhood." In the Chinese Communist press, Korea was a military theatre of operations, not the home of the vanguard of International Communism to the east. In addition, the Chinese Communists gave every indication of viewing a prolonged war with distaste, always qualifying the necessity for it with remarks about the long-range benefits.[166]

In summary, this hypothesis has been defended by evidence of a progression of apparently reluctant and pragmatic Chinese Communist moves. The exact details of the story are not available; nor are they necessary to make the hypothesis reasonable. The most logical sequence which can

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they reached an agreement, but only after Stalin promised China all kinds of aid." (Rastvorov, "Red Fraud and Intrigue in the Far East," Life Magazine, op. cit.) In 1957, the Chinese Communists published selected examples of excesses by "anti-party" elements during the domestic relaxation of the "Hundred Flowers" era. Among them was a statement by General Lung-Ung, Vice Chairman of the National Defense Committee: "It is totally unfair for the People's Republic of China to pay all the expenses of the Korean War." (New York Times, June 24, 1957.)

165. Lindsay, op. cit., p. 175.

166. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit.,p. 129. Mao Tse-tung in 1947: "Avoid battles of attrition, in which the gains are not sufficient to make up the losses, or in which gains merely balance losses..." (Mao Tse-tung, Turning Point in China (New York: New Century Publishers, 1948), p. 7. Original manuscript entitled Present Situation and our Task.)

be constructed with the data available commences with the Chinese Communists' normal precautionary redeployment of military forces following the United Nations' entry into Korea. They initially retained forces in position to continue toward their primary goal of Taiwan. When United States reinforcements turned the tide in Korea in early August, 1950, Peking was pressured by Russia into making some sort of a commitment, probably contingent on the United States Army crossing the 38th parallel. Troop movements started again in September.[167] An effort was made to stop the crossing of the parallel by warnings.[168] Troops who could have crossed the Yalu months before, as well as new arrivals, then proceeded into North Korea, long after the time when they would have been most effective.[169] Once in North Korea, the ill-equipped Chinese Communist troops made initial contact with the United Nations forces and withdrew for reasons unknown. They did not pass the "point of no return" until late November, five months after the war

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167. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 90.
168. The Communists did not consider this crossing a foregone conclusion. An order to the North Korean Army dated October 14th, 1950 from Kim Il Sung, Commander in Chief of the North Korean People's Army stated in part: "Other reasons that we have failed are that many of us felt that the thirty-eighth parallel would be as far as the United States forces would attack..." (Appleman, op. cit., p. 765.)
169. Far East Command Intelligence Estimate of October 28th: "...it would appear that the auspicious time for such Chinese intervention has long since passed; it is difficult to believe that such a move, if planned, would have been postponed to a time when remnant North Korean forces have been reduced to a low point of effectiveness." (Ibid., p. 759.)

started.[170]

A complete knowledge of the motives of the Chinese Communist leaders is not obtainable, but a combination of Russian influence and apprehension regarding their border is indicated.

> As the North Koreans retreated, the Russians undoubtedly exerted strong pressure on the Chinese to step in to prevent complete defeat. The Chinese themselves may well have considered defeat of the North Korean regime a threat to China's security.[171]

HYPOTHESIS V

> In January, 1951, Soviet Russia prevented Communist China from accepting Korean peace terms that might well have resulted in the eventual elimination to two Peking grievances of present primary significance: United Nations membership and the possession of Taiwan.

In December, 1950, the Chinese Communists made their sole appearance at the United Nations headquarters in New York. On leaving town on December 16th, Peking's Ambassador Wu stated that Chinese troops would not withdraw from Korea unless the United Nations troops withdrew, the United States Navy left the Taiwan Strait, and the Chinese People's Republic was admitted to the United Nations.[172] These conditions were made formal in a telegram from Foreign Minister Chou En-lai to the United Nations on December 22, 1950:

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170. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 117.
171. A. Doak Barnett, "The United States and Communist China," The United States and the Far East, ed., William L. Thorp, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 150.
172. London Times, December 18, 1950.

> ...as a basis for negotiating for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea...the American aggression forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan...and the representatives of the People's Republic of China must obtain a legitimate status in the United Nations...[173]

By early January, cease fire discussions in the United Nations had polarized in the opposing views of Russia and the United States. Endless arguments indicated that Russia was not really serious about ending the war. Some members, notably those of the British Commonwealth, were hopeful, nevertheless. At the Prime Ministers' meeting in London in early January they drafted a set of "Five Principles" which they hoped would be agreeable to the Communists. The United States privately approved this proposal;[174] it is notable that the acceptance of the conditions of the "Principles" still remains as the high watermark of United States leniency in regard to Peking's demands concerning United Nations membership and freedom of action in the Taiwan Strait, since the beginning of the Korean War. The first four proposals had to do with the arrangements of the cease fire; article 5 is quoted below:

> As soon as agreement has been reached on a cease-fire the General Assembly shall set up an appropriate body which shall include representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic of China with a view to the achievement of a settlement, in conformity with existing

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173. Leland M. Goodrich, Korea, A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 73.
174. Ibid., p. 161.

> international obligations and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of Far Eastern problems, including, among others, those of Formosa and of representation of China in the United Nations.[175]

At 3:00 P.M. on Thursday, January 11th, at a meeting of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada made the five conditions public. Mr. Malik, the Soviet delegate, expressed chagrin because "his delegation found itself in an unfavourable position since, unlike some delegations, it had not been acquainted with the principles prior to the meeting."[176] He thereupon rejected the proposals out of hand because: (a) the Chinese Communist government had not been represented in the committee discussions, (b) the proposal contained no assurance of the withdrawal of United States forces from Korea, and (c) the proposals were in the nature of an ultimatum.[177]

Nevertheless, the proposals were submitted to Peking for their consideration as a result of a majority ruling. The Soviet press heartily applauded what were apparently Mr. Malik's ad lib. excuses; no China mainland comment prior to January 15th could be found. On the 16th, Chou En-lai sent a telegram to the United Nations declining the offer. He repeated his conditions of December 22nd. The importance of Chou En-lai's belated reply can be appreciated only if one

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175. Ibid., p. 160.
176. United Nations, Official Record of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee, Summary Record of Meetings, Vol. II, January 3-May 17, 1951, p. 479.
177. Ibid., p. 480.

considers what was hanging in the balance:[178]

(1) The matter of United States intentions regarding the permanency of Seventh Fleet protection in the Taiwan Strait. On August 31, 1950, President Truman announced that it would not be necessary to keep the Seventh Fleet in the Strait after the end of the Korean War.[179] He repeated this intention in a broadcast on September 1, 1950.[180] Moreover, as has been previously noted, there is reason to believe that this policy had been anticipated on mainland China. Throughout 1950, the United States had insisted on connecting the issues of Taiwan and Korea as part of the same problem. Continual arguments in the United Nations occurred between Russia and the United States over this point. Communist China, with Russia's backing, had wanted to argue the cases separately. In New York in late 1950, Communist China's Ambassador Wu was extremely indignant about a last minute agenda change that linked United States "aggression" in Taiwan (about which he had come from Peking to testify) with General MacArthur's report of Chinese Communist entry into the Korean War.

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178. "In accepting the "Five Principles" the United States went a long way toward accommodating its position to that of other members of the United Nations. In fact, the Truman administration was subjected to strong criticism at home for so doing. It would seem that the Peking government by failing to accept these principles as a basis for negotiation, missed a golden opportunity to achieve some of its political objectives..." (Goodrich, op. cit., p. 175.)
179. New York Times, September 1, 1950.
180. Department of State Bulletin, September 11, 1950, p. 407.

By mid-January, however, it would appear that there was an obvious chance of the United States changing its position, considering the two theatres of operation separately, continuing its Seventh Fleet-Taiwan Strait patrol with or without the Korean War, and moreover that this chance was general knowledge.[181] The policy change did not formally come about for several months, but perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that an astute politician (i.e., Stalin) could have predicted the outcome, provided pressure was maintained in Korea.

(Pronouncements of an official United States policy change on this matter evolved as follows: On April 11, 1951, President Truman removed General MacArthur from all his commands.[182] The President immediately explained

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181. A visit of Senator Knowland to Taiwan in November was reported by the Peking radio. He was quoted as saying that the Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan would jeopardize the defense of the free world and be a threat to the security of the United States. (Radio Peking (NCNA), December 2, 1950.) A Peking press article made mention of a remark reportedly made by United States United Nations representative Gross in "January, 1951" to the effect that the United States might reconsider their promise to leave Taiwan in the light of United States security. (Ibid., February 8, 1951.) That Communist occupation of Taiwan should be considered a threat to United States security was an entirely different concept than that held by the United States government before the Korean War was confirmed by ex-Secretary of State Acheson in 1958: "Four times between 1948 and 1950 our highest military authorities concluded that this proposition was not true and did not justify American military action." (New York Times, September 7, 1958.)

182. "Even granting the correctness of Truman's views, his brutal treatment of a distinguished public servant was a blunder of the first water. The President might better have shown the General the door rather than kicking him out of the fifth story window. Public opinion in

his action in a televised speech to the American people. In reply to the Presidential address, the Policy Committee of the Republican Party issued a statement. Among other points, it asked if Taiwan would be delivered up to Peking. On April 13th, the Department of State declared that diplomatic recognition would be limited to the Chinese Nationalist government, that the United States would not discuss the Japanese Peace Treaty with Peking, and that the policy of "neutralization" of Taiwan remained unchanged.[183] On April 25th Mr. Acheson made public an agreement between his government and that of the Chinese Nationalists. An exchange of notes had taken place on January 30th and February 9th, 1951 that provided for military aid for internal security and self-defense.[184] On May 18th, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk made a speech before the China Institute in Washington in which he said that the United States would continue aid in support of the Nationalist Government.[185] Finally, on June 2nd, the testimony of Secretary of State Acheson at the MacArthur hearings made the point absolutely clear and official: Taiwan and Korea were considered two separate problems as far

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America reacted hysterically in favor of the dethroned idol, who returned to receive a hero's welcome." (Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, Sixth Edition (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1958), p. 823.)

183. Survey, 1951, op. cit., p. 348.
184. Department of State Bulletin, May 7, 1951, p. 747.
185. Ibid., May 28, 1951, p. 847.

as the United States government was concerned.)[186]

(2) The matter of Peking's legal position with regard to Taiwan: The key to this dilemma, of course, revolved about the arrangements of peace with Japan. A separate Japanese peace with the West was a threat to Communist China's claims.[187] Hints of such a separate peace had been in the international wind since 1949.[188] Further antagonism of the United States was almost sure to complicate Peking's problems; an article on this subject by Chou En-lai was printed in Pravda on February 14, 1951.[189]

(3) The factor of Communist China's bad name should the United Nations pass a resolution charging her with aggression: That this was in the wind was certainly no secret on January 11, 1950.[190] The resolution was passed February 1, 1951.

Thus, it is possible in retrospect, to conceive that by turning down the "Five Principles" in January, 1951,

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186. Military Situation, op. cit., Part 3, p. 1755.
187. This threat materialized into one of the strongest British-American arguments of the decade. Over British objection, the United States insisted on excluding Peking from the treaty. Later in a House of Commons debate, the United States was charged with insisting that Japan conclude a separate treaty with Taipei; this insistence was held to be in violation of a prior United States-British agreement. (Survey, 1952, op. cit., pp. 356-357.) The legal status of Taiwan is still not resolved.
188. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 37.
189. Alberto Falcionelli, Russo-Chinese Relations after Stalin's Death (1953-1960), paper at the 3rd International Sovietological Conference, Japan, September, 1960, p. 12.
190. On January 1, 1951, the Taipei Radio (in Japanese) spoke of the "prevalent rumor" that the United States was planning to ask the United Nations for a resolution branding Communist China as an aggressor in Korea.

Communist China was knowingly locking the door behind herself. Parts or modifications of the three contingencies might have befallen Peking even if they had accepted, though it would appear that the odds were against it. The important points are two: first, by refusing the offer Communist China completely removed the issues from the realm of possible moderation, and second, she didn't have a choice. Stalin gave her no option.

This argument requires ignoring the factor that is traditionally cited as predominant in explanation of their refusal: the Communists were on the march in Korea, and it is unusual for a winner to accept a questionable peace. This point is acknowledged, with reservations.[191] The

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191. It is possible to find other weaknesses in the position that ascribes the refusal of the cease fire offer merely to Communist military successes. In the first place, the Communist offensive was about to come to an end. On January 25th, the United Nations forces were pushing northward again. Second are the circumstances surrounding still another cease fire offer submitted by the Arab-Asian states on January 24th. The Yugoslav press reported that the Arab-Asian offer was prompted by a Chinese Communist appeal to Ambassador Panikkar in Peking, probably without former clearance from Moscow. The offer called for the convening of a seven nation conference and required slightly more Western concession than the "Five Principles." After its introduction in the United Nations, the U.S.S.R. delayed without comment for four days before finally voting for acceptance of the proposal. By this time, it was possible to predict that the United States would refuse it, which it did. Secretary of State Acheson had publicly said "the Chinese Communists have no intention of ceasing their defiance of the United Nations" (Department of State Bulletin, January 29, 1951, p. 164.), and both Houses of the United States Congress had passed resolutions calling for the United Nations' naming of Communist China an aggressor (Survey, 1951, op. cit., p. 339). The foregone conclusion of the United States refusal

exchange in the United Nations on January 11th is considered highly significant, particularly from the point of view of current Peking hindsight.

As a postscript to this episode it should be noted that the turn of events did not even permit Peking to hold out for the conditions on which they based their refusal of the "Five Principles" offer. As best can be determined without access to the complete Communist press, demands for Chinese Communist United Nations membership and free access to Taiwan disappeared from their statements as irrevocable prerequisites to a Korean cease fire, in early April.[192]

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before the Soviet acceptance was noted by the Yugoslav editorial: "It is...interesting to note that in the recent past, Moscow has made use of every opportunity to take a stand ahead of China on all questions relating to China, while this time Moscow adopted the Chinese stand without any clamour." (Review of International Affairs, II, No. 3, January 31, 1951, p. 3.) (The Yugoslav position on the Korean War was stated by Foreign Minister Edward Kardelj as follows: Against the North Korean attack, United Nations intervention, Chinese Communist entry into the war, and the United States action in Taiwan. They were for Chinese Communist membership in the United Nations.)

192. The last articles which could be located in which the United Nations and Taiwan demands were clearly tied to a Korean cease fire were broadcast in the press news of the NCNA of March 29th in the case of Communist China, and in the Soviet Home Service of April 4th in the case of Russia. The "twists and turns of historic evolution" must squeeze more data forth and "drop it into the hands of the West" before the details of this Communist policy change can be reconstructed. Conditions on the battle line in Korea do not provide good correlation for an explanation. More promising is the fact that it occurred at about the time United States public announcements started to indicate less and less inclination to leave the Taiwan Strait, regardless of the Korean War (see above). The fact that it coincided with the dismissal of General MacArthur, and that there were later rumors of Communist informants which were privy to his instructions

In the late spring, the Korean battle had become an obvious stalemate. Lieutenant Colonel Yuri A. Rastvorov, who was on active duty with the Russian MVD in the Far East at that time has reported:

> [The] relationship between Moscow and Peking became badly strained as Mao watched his crack troops being bled white in Korea. It was then that Stalin decided to start truce discussion.[193]

On June 23rd, Mr. Malik made a radio speech in New York in which he said:

> The Soviet peoples believe that, as a first step, discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel.[194]

Peking concurred with this proposal. Taiwan and United Nations membership were not mentioned. Armistice negotiations were started immediately.

Conclusions may therefore be drawn that (a) Russia was calling the tune regarding cease fire negotiations, (b) their decisions did not always work out for the best Chinese Communist interests, and (c) the Chinese were in a position to realize this at the time.

> Sino-Soviet relations during the Korean conflict are, in many respects, still a riddle. At times, Russian and Chinese moves seemed perfectly timed to present a common communist front. Yet there were instances in the United Nations negotiations where, it would appear,

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before he received them (Willoughby and Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 383; MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Knopf Inc., 1956), p. 392), might further complicate the research. Regardless of the reason, the policy break was sharp. A steady flow of consistent demands stopped abruptly in early April, 1951.

193. Yuri A. Rastvorov, op. cit., Rastvorov added: "Stalin ordered the negotiations dragged out as long as possible."

194. United Nations Bulletin, XI, July 15, 1951, p. 86.

the Russians failed to take complete advantage of tactical opportunities favorable to them and made only inconclusive gestures toward advancing Chinese interests.[195]

HYPOTHESIS VI

Stalin's death was the predominant factor in the cessation of the Korean War.

This supposition is based on the striking difference in the Soviet attitude toward Communist China before and after Stalin's death and on an abrupt change of Communist Far East foreign policy as soon as Malenkov came to power in March, 1953.

The record of Sino-Soviet relations during the Korean War period is rife with discontinuities. The Sino-Soviet agreements of February, 1950 contained provision for "joint tenancy" of Port Arthur by both countries.[196] As part of the agreement, Russia was to vacate the port at the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Japan—or on December 31, 1952, whichever occurred first.

Chou En-lai and a party of diplomats flew to Moscow in the autumn of 1952.[197] After discussions, Chou presented

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195. Boorman, op. cit., p. 14.
196. Charles B. McLane, "The Moscow-Peking Alliance: The First Decade," Current History, December, 1959, p. 329.
197. Harrison Salisbury observed that the Chinese party was treated in an extremely off-hand manner in Moscow. At a Russian reception where Chou En-lai was being feted, the other Chinese were relegated to an outside room where a very junior Russian diplomat greeted them and then vanished even before the toasts began. (Salisbury, op. cit., p. 307.)

a note "polite to the point of hypocrisy"[198] in which the Chinese government "requested" the Soviet government to agree to postpone the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Chinese seaport. Great care was taken to publish the fact that this was a Chinese request, and not a Soviet inspired idea.[199] The "request" was approved by Russia, and the exchange of notes was made part of the agreements of 1950. These notes provided that Soviet troops would continue to occupy the port until a peace treaty was concluded between the Communists and Japan, regardless of the date.[200]

Liu Shao-chi had gone with Chou En-lai, and remained to represent Peking at the 19th Party Congress in October. He stayed until mid-January, 1953. Liu Shao-chi was then an important Communist theoretician, and a member of the Chinese Politburo. Upon return after his long stay, he was met in Peking at the airport by virtually the entire membership of the Politburo, yet no announcement was ever made that would give a hint of the purpose or results of his mission. "The visit was, and remains, an enigma."[201]

In the early 1950's, the Chinese Communists were facing financial trouble. They had had to pay the major portion of the bill for the Korean War,[202] for which they

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198. Dallin, op. cit., p. 193.
199. Boorman, op. cit., p. 11.
200. Radio Peking (NCNA), September 16, 1952. Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Peking after Stalin's death and signed agreements calling for the departure of Soviet troops even though a Communist-Japan peace treaty had not been concluded (see below).
201. Boorman, op. cit., p. 13.
202. Barnett, Communist China and Asia, op. cit., p. 346.

had apparently not budgeted, and had announced the beginning of their first Five Year Plan in early 1953. Not until after the death of Stalin was the receipt of Soviet economic aid announced; published details of the scope of the Plan were accordingly delayed until the autumn of 1953.

> It is very possible that Stalin was not enthusiastic about the Chinese desire to shift their own efforts and the Soviet aid away from the war in Korea, where the fighting tied down a sizeable proportion of the West's ground forces, to economic development in China, where industrialization would in time probably raise China's status within the Soviet Bloc.[203]

Peking's displeasure with the Korean stalemate can be deduced from evidence other than financial need. By 1952, the only major obstruction to the establishment of a truce agreement in the talks at Panmunjom was the prisoner of war issue. In November of that year, the Indian government privately contacted Peking and Pyongyang and presented a prisoner proposal. Prime Minister Nehru later told the House of the People that "China's reaction...was not disapproval."[204] The proposal was then made public, and introduced at the United Nations. Soviet representative Vyshinsky, presuming to speak for China and North Korea, rejected the plan outright. Four days later, Chou En-lai announced that he would accept only the Soviet truce plan. China obviously did not dare swerve from Russian policy, and that policy was to keep fighting in Korea. No Chinese Communist relaxation of pressure against the West was permitted. In the same year

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203. Barnett, "The United States and Communist China," op. cit.
204. Dallin, op. cit., p. 69.

of 1952, Yugoslavia's Tito observed:

> Antagonistic attitudes of Western powers toward the Chinese revolution, since its very beginning, are pushing new China to subordinate itself to the Soviet foreign policy....The Russians have masterfully taken advantage of the Korean case to pull China to their side.[205]

Before Stalin's death, action had been pending on healthy prisoners of war, sick and wounded prisoners of war, and on British civilians detained in North Korea. After his demise on March 5, 1953, almost immediately, "the severe tension that had prevailed on the eve of Stalin's death turned into its opposite."[206] On March 15th, new Chairman of the Council of Ministers Malenkov told the Supreme Soviet:

> At the present time there is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested countries. This applies to our relations with all states, including the United States of America.[207]

On March 18th, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov contacted Prime Minister Eden and promised "favorable consideration" on the request for the release of the British subjects in Korea. On March 28th, China and North Korea accepted a February proposal of the United States concerning the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.[208] Four days after returning from Stalin's funeral, Chou En-lai put forward a new proposal for the consideration of the previously

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205. Dedijer, op. cit., p. 434.
206. Dallin, op. cit., p. 120.
207. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), March 16, 1953.
208. Dallin, op. cit., p. 126.

interrupted Panmunjom talks on healthy prisoners. Molotov at once endorsed and supported it.[209] In essence, Chou's proposal on prisoners was almost identical to a United Nations proposal which the Communists had rejected only three months before.[210]

This is not to say that the problems were over at Panmunjom. Arguments over the prisoner exchange and post-war political conference continued until the armistice in July, and afterward. The American delegate, Mr. Arthur Dean, finally left in disgust in December, 1953.[211] In spite of the Communist-inspired diplomatic confusion, however, from the time Chou En-lai returned from Stalin's funeral it was obvious that Peking was determined to stop the war. Events that (by their previous standards) would have been justification for ceasing negotiations, didn't deter them.

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209. New York Times, April 2, 1953. "The first major international developments of this early post-Stalin period had not yet, as far as is known, provoked profound disagreements among the Party leaders. On the question of the urgent need to bring the Korean War to a close the government acted with a rapidity that would not have been possible otherwise." (Dallin, op. cit., p. 219.)
210. Boorman, op. cit., p. 16. Pawel Monat, Polish Military Attache to Peking during the Korean War period: "I think it was the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, that finally brought the war to an end." (Pawel Monat, "Russians in Korea: The Hidden Bosses," Life Magazine, June 27, 1960, p. 103.)
211. While the matter of a political conference after the war was under discussion at Panmunjom in February, 1952, the Chinese negotiators had proposed that the subject to be discussed be peaceful settlement in Korea "et cetera" (i.e., Taiwan and U.N. membership). The United Nations negotiators insisted that no matters should be on the proposed agenda that had to do with affairs "outside Korea." The Chinese Communists reluctantly accepted this provision two days later. (Survey, 1952, op. cit., p. 309.)

On June 18th, under orders from President Rhee, South Korean guards allowed a mass escape of approximately 25,000 prisoners from four main camps.[212] On July 16th, more than 10,000 Nationalist Chinese from Taiwan and Quemoy attempted to invade Tungshan Island, off the mainland coast. The peace negotiations continued, and on July 27th, the Korean War was over.

Khrushchev is reported to have said in Warsaw in 1956 that before his death, Stalin had strained Sino-Soviet relations almost to the breaking point.[213] The Korean War could certainly be evaluated as a major focal point of tension. To Mao Tse-tung, it might well be remembered not only as a cause of near financial ruination,[214] but an episode in which Communist China lost the territory they deemed most vital. Peter Calvocoressi has written:

> It is true that the Korean War started as a war between Koreans and that the first foreign intervention took the form of intervention by the United Nations in defense of a rule of international behavior, but before many months had passed a second foreign intervention—by China—had converted the war into a Sino-American one, in which the principal combatants were more intent on denying to one another a particular piece of territory (Korea) than in upholding a general principle....For it was not Korea...but Formosa which the antagonists deemed vital—the U.S.A. for reasons of defense, and China for reasons of self-satisfaction. Korea settled nothing between the U.S.A. and China, because it made no difference to the position of either in relation to Formosa.[215]

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212. Survey, 1953, op. cit., p. 207.
213. New York Times, June 4, 1956.
214. Boorman, op. cit., p. 17.
215. Survey, 1953, op. cit., p. 6.

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CHAPTER III

THE ERA OF SOVIET POLICY TRANSITION

UNFINISHED BUSINESS BECOMES A REGRETTABLE SITUATION

The hypotheses advanced thus far depict a subordinate Mao Tse-tung, obliged to sacrifice the attainment of his most prized immediate goals as he selflessly followed the tactical signals of Stalin, who directed International Communist strategy on the game board of world politics.[1]

Although there was a deep-rooted ideological rivalry between Mao and Stalin, stemming in part from Mao's insistence on the uniqueness of China,

> If any Chinese Communist, who is part of the Chinese people and their flesh and blood, talks about Marxism without regard to the peculiarities of China, his must be only academic, empty Marxism. /Mao Tse-tung/
>
> If Leninism were nothing more than an application of Marxism to the special environment in Russia, Leninism would be purely a one-nation ideology and nothing more than that....We know, however, that Leninism is an international ideology with roots in the international developments as a whole. /Stalin/[2]

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1. The degree of personal emotional involvement of Mao Tse-tung in the events of 1927-1953 is of course not known. It is known that he lost two wives, a sister, and two brothers in the revolution on the mainland, and a son in Korea. (Ullmann, loc. cit.)
2. Masamichi Inoki, Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's Ideology (Similarities and Differences), paper at the 3rd International Sovietological Conference, Japan, September, 1960.

there is also a case for Mao Tse-tung's realization that the success of Communism in China rested on his restraining himself within the framework of International Communist discipline. In 1940, when Soviet aid was heavily favoring the Kuomintang, Mao rationalized the situation by noting:

> ...the aid from the Soviet Union is an absolutely indespensable condition for China's final victory in the war of resistance. Refuse Soviet aid and the resolution will fail.[3]

He frequently referred to the leadership of the Soviet Union:

> The great peace camp, headed by the Soviet Union, is invincible. [Mao Tse-tung, 1951][4]

On Stalin's death, Mao confirmed his devotion to the cause in a junior status:

> The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a party personally reared by Lenin and Stalin. It is the most advanced, the most experienced, and the most theoretically cultivated party in the world. This party has been and is our model both in the past and at present and will still be our model in the future.[5]

To believe all the previous hypotheses, one does not have to assume that Stalin was operating as a power-mad politician, trying to establish a perimeter of Western containment around China, the future foe of Russia. It is possible to assume this, to be sure, but it is also possible to assume that he was doing what he felt was best for the

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3. Mao Tse-tung, On New Democracy, op. cit., p. 32.
4. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), February 10, 1952.
5. Mao Tse-tung, The Greatest Friendship, Radio Peking (NCNA), March 10, 1953. David Dallin notes, however, that "...in no case was the exaltation of Stalin [after his death] as hypocritical as it was in the case of China, and the leadership of both governments was well aware of this." (Dallin, op. cit., p. 422.)

Communist cause in the long run. He could have been restraining China to make them more dependent on Moscow, and thereby avoid an early split of the bloc.[6] He could have been invoking a principle of Lenin, by using the Taiwan issue as a medium of spreading discontent within the non-communist world, "necessarily, thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skillfully taking advantage of every, even the smallest 'rift' among the enemies."[7] He could also have been trying to delay the emergence in international circles of a pugnacious and somewhat embarrassing recruit that would bring discredit to socialism before she matured.[8] Stalin could have perhaps justified his actions on the basis of a combination of the three. The point is, a case can be made for the idea that before his death, Stalin could have given the Chinese an "ideological" rationale for his actions that would have implied that they would be allowed to recover their losses in due course.

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6. The restrictions on western exports to China, imposed at the time of the Korean War and retained largely in deference to American opinion, were more stringent than those regarding exports to the Soviet Union, through which China could get many of the goods in question. The Soviet Union thus acquired supplier status. (Survey, 1955-1956, op. cit., footnote, p. 8.)
7. V. I. Lenin, Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), p. 91. No issue in the early 1950's made so great a threat to United States-British relations. Communist China's rapprochement with the "neutralist" group was heavily influenced by South Asian (particularly Nehru) sympathy for Peking's Taiwan cause.
8. From an ideological article by Chen Chia-kang in 1950: "...our attitude toward the imperialist camp is one of hatred, not fear." (Radio Peking (NCNA), October 7, 1950.) Khrushchev, in 1954 (speaking of J. F. Dulles, but the remark could have had other significance): "Blind hatred is a bad adviser." (Moscow Radio (Tass), April 26, 1954.)

The Taiwan issue must certainly have been discussed at length during the 1952 Moscow visit of Chou En-lai and the prolonged stay of Liu Shao-chi. After Chou En-lai "requested" the extension of Soviet residence in Port Arthur, his speeches made frequent reference to the personal greatness of Stalin. In his farewell address at the Moscow airport he stressed:

> The talks...with the personal participation of Comrade Stalin, were successfully concluded.[9]

At his Soviet Army Day address to Russian troops at Dairen in February, 1953, he closed by saying:

> Long live the great Comrade Stalin, the most respected and beloved friend of the Chinese people, the leader and teacher of the toiling peoples throughout the world, and the standard bearer of world peace.[10]

This "loyalty" in the face of sacrifice was probably partly sincere, and partly feigned, just as Stalin's motives were probably to forward simultaneously World Communism, the security of the U.S.S.R., and his personal power. To Stalin these goals were not mutually exclusive; they were the essence of what had started his pragmatic fight for power in the early 1920's and with success had gained stature under the concept of "Socialism in One Country." In his last major address, five months before his death, he expressed his view of China's current position in the Communist order. From the civil war of 1917 through World War II, Russia had stood as the "shock brigade"; now they could devote their attention

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9. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), September 23, 1952 (italics inserted).
10. Radio Peking (NCNA), February 23, 1952.

to other forms of advancement while the neophytes took over this responsibility:

> It was very hard to live up to this honorable role. But this time has passed. Now from China and Korea to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, new "shock brigades" have appeared in the form of the People's Democracies; it has become easier for our party to struggle, and the work has become merrier.[11]

As Jan F. Triska has written:

> To Stalin, the Socialist "allies" of the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia were indeed satellites orbiting around and dependent upon the Soviet Union. Their sole purpose was to serve the U.S.S.R., which by then had highly developed socialism, in order to strengthen it further. Under the old "socialism in one country" slogan, this was a legitimate and proper view: To milk their economies, to subordinate their politics and to rearrange their social systems to fit their new role was imperative for the satellites as long as the Soviet "socialism in one country" precept was valid.[12]

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11. Dallin, op. cit., p. 12. Mr. Dallin concluded that "In the heated discussion that took place abroad in those days as to whether Stalin wanted war or peace, both sides were right: Stalin wanted Korean-type limited and protracted wars with the United States, and peace for the Soviet Union assured. (Dallin, op. cit., p. 61.) When the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War, General MacArthur proposed bombing the supporting facilities in China, limiting even this action to conventional weapons. (MacArthur address to Philippine Congress in 1961, Time Magazine, July 14, 1961, p. 23.) Secretary of State Acheson believed that if the United States dropped bombs in Manchuria, Russia would enter the war. (Truman, op. cit., p. 387.) Implicit in Stalin's above statement and Mr. Dallin's interpretation is the probability that Mr. Acheson's estimate of the situation was incorrect.
12. Triska, op. cit., p. 11. Edward Crankshaw: "We shall never know what the mature Stalin thought about Communism in the secret corridors of his mind: all we know is that publicly he used it, with perfect cynicism, as an instrument of power—as the Czars had used Christianity; as the early traders had used beads, bright cloth, and firewater." (Crankshaw, "Russia's Imperial Design," Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 712.)

In a sense, the events of history overtook the philosophy which had made Stalin successful. In his later years, technological progress in atomic weapons was changing the rules of profitable international struggle.[13] Moreover, the success of the post-war spread of Communism had introduced new factors that made Stalinist tactics self-destroying in the long run. The great accumulation of satellite appendages of such raw power and potential social pressure, continually subjected to economic and political sacrifice, would in time produce first impoverished dependents, and possibly in due time, mutinous reaction. In the womb of Stalin's social order were growing the seeds of its own destruction.

It was ultimately left to Nikita Khrushchev to readjust the Communist bloc to contemporary reality. This was not accomplished by the emergence of an all-seeing philosopher-king who suddenly proclaimed the new age of "Socialism in One Region." Although this thesis contends that as far as Communist China was concerned, the "new Russia" was born in January, 1955, the transition was (and still is being) sporadically accomplished by a torturous route under the pragmatic pressure of events. History forced the major reversals in the years between Stalin's death and the meeting

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13. Stalin was not oblivious to this, of course. He stressed his version of a "coexistence" campaign the year before he died. Acknowledging a problem is one thing, changing the habits of a lifetime of success is another. He is said not to have considered atomic weapons in terms of altering the course of history. (H. S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1959), pp. 7-8, 33-35.)

of the Twentieth Congress of February, 1956. At that affair, Khrushchev merely documented his acknowledgement of the new reality: in his later years, Stalin had become a crotchety abrasion in the machinery of forward-looking International Communism; the nuclear age had indeed changed the institutional rules of international struggle, total wars could no longer realistically be considered inevitable (by Russia at least); and he who would not acknowledge the rationality of turning to parliamentary revolution was indeed adventuristic.[14]

Communist China, as the following documentation will indicate, was the loser on the Taiwan issue again as the new age dawned. She certainly had hope, and perhaps even a promise, that ultimately her time would come. In the meantime, she had grafted the successful completion of her domestic revolutionary struggle to Taiwan, perhaps out of frustration, and perhaps for emphasis. This view was not wholeheartedly endorsed in the U.S.S.R.

Speech by Chang Kuo-chun (July 2, 1950):

> We fully support the June 28th statement of our Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai on the position of the Chinese People's Government of China. The statement points out that the Chinese people must liberate Taiwan and Tibet because these territories belong to the Chinese people.[15]

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14. "...During the Korean War, Stalin's...well known persistence was becoming sheer stubbornness; his earlier political flexibility was giving way to political sclerosis." (Dallin, op. cit., p. 110.) Roderick MacFarquhar describes the major controversial points of Khrushchev's speech as the defamation of Stalin, the denial of the inevitability of war, and the acceptance of the introduction of socialism by parliamentary means. (MacFarquhar in The Sino-Soviet Dispute, op. cit., pp. 39-40.) Stalin never denied the inevitability of capitalist vs. capitalist wars.
15. Radio Peking (Chinese International Service), July 3, 1950.

of the Yemenite Congress of Workers, Labor, in that action, threatened nearly bankrupting the government of the new country. In its first years, Israel had become a recipient of Soviet-bloc Jewish immigrants. Communist Bloc trained labor leaders had infiltrated many of Israel's economic sectors, their ranks would no longer replenished by immigration (as Israel at least) and it was not unreasonable that the Histadrut of Israel, so politically motivated, would be under Communist influence.[3]

Present Plans, as the Palestine Conciliation Commission, the Arab States in the United Nations, as the Israeli Government, may be known, the possibility may exist, however, that a peaceful, plan solution may have small room. In the meantime, the Arab refugee problem remains a source of Communist exploitation and tension in the Middle East. Prospects, and changes for improvement, are not immediately evident.

Respectfully submitted,

[illegible]

3/ "...serving the Soviet Bloc, Israel's...role would parallel that the Communist role Western Europe. His earlier political [illegible] the ability to [illegible] Communist influence within major political parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary as the subversion of Italy, the ability of the Communist Party of Israel, and the penetration of the Histadrut [illegible] Communist influence in Israel." [illegible] The Communist Influence in Israel, [illegible] Institute, 1953.

Soviet New Times (Moscow) (July 26, 1950):

> The liberation of China, except for Tibet, is completed.[16]

Chou En-lai address (October 30, 1950):

> The struggle between the Chinese people and the permanent Kuomintang reactionaries has not come to an end.[17]

Moscow Radio (to Southeast Asia) (November 21, 1950):

> The Chinese people, who, guided by their glorious Communist Party and their leader, Mao Tse-tung, have routed the Kuomintang and liberated the country from the imperialist enslavement are liberating all Chinese lands within the framework of the People's Democratic China.[18]

Nevertheless, in the months after Stalin's death, there must have been at least a flicker of hope that the Russians would consider Taiwan a negotiable debt. By the time the check was presented at the window, however, caution was obviously the better part of honor, the company was under new management, and the books were considered clear.[19] China's "unfinished business" had become Russia's "regrettable situation." That is where the matter still stands in 1962.

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16. Dallin, op. cit., p. 81.
17. Radio Peking (NCNA), October 3, 1950.
18. Moscow Radio (Soviet Far East Service), November 21, 1950.
19. Perhaps it is repeated experiences of this kind that contribute to what Michael Lindsay describes as a deterioration of Peking's reasonableness. In 1955 he wrote that on such matters as coexistence it was difficult to tell whether they were: (a) not sincere, or (b) sincere, but disordered as though operating in "a psychopathic state of emotional and intellectual confusion which makes them incapable of acting rationally..." (Lindsay, op. cit., p. 4.)

HYPOTHESIS VII

> Communist China was introduced to the new institutional rules of the United States-U.S.S.R. standoff of the post-Stalin period in a particularly painful way. Taiwan was the issue, and in Chinese eyes, Khrushchev could be seen as the villain.

Whether in deference to a prior commitment, or in an effort to appease a wronged and growing compatriot, Russian encouragement and assistance helped China build on her Korea-born reputation as a world military power to make tremendous gains in international prestige between the death of Stalin and the autumn of 1954.

Chou En-lai was permitted to march alongside the Soviet leaders at Stalin's funeral; he was the only representative from outside the U.S.S.R. borders to be so honored.[20] There was more subtle evidence of Russian deference to China. On February 14, 1954 Malenkov, Khrushchev, et al., attended a reception at the Chinese embassy in Moscow in honor of their treaty anniversary. The Chinese Ambassador wasn't even in town. Two weeks later, the same Russian assemblage attended a banquet for the editor of the Peking People's Daily; the editor was not even a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

On the diplomatic level, Russian collaboration was even more pronounced. The U.S.S.R. tried to persuade the Western powers to invite a representative of Communist China

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20. McLane, op. cit., p. 329.

to a Foreign Ministers' conference held in Berlin in early 1954.[21] This attempt failed, but at Berlin, Molotov again tried to raise Peking's diplomatic stature by making them an "inviting" power at a proposed Geneva Conference to be held in the spring of 1954 to discuss the twin Far Eastern issues of the still unsettled Korean political problems, and the mounting Southeast Asia crisis.[22] The United States wanted to make them "invited," i.e., not a sponsor but as a defendent, "to account before the bar of world opinion."[23] A compromise was worked out whereby the Berlin Conference as a body sent them an invitation "without the implication of diplomatic recognition." The implementation of the new Russian attitude was indicated in a speech to the Supreme Soviet by Chairman Malenkov on April 26, 1954.

> The fact that the inviolable friendship between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic and the People's Democracies has become confirmed over a tremendous part of the globe is exerting great influence on the whole contemporary international state of affairs.[24]

At Geneva, Chou En-lai's prestige soared. In a flush of self-confidence, he told the United States Secretary of State (whose plans for resolution of the Southeast Asia crisis had gone awry) "It should be clear to the United States delegate that.../the U.S./ cannot hope to achieve at the conference table what it failed to achieve on the battlefield."[25]

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21. Dallin, op. cit., p. 131.
22. Ibid., p. 139.
23. Ibid., p. 153 (J. F. Dulles quoted).
24. Boorman, op. cit., p. 19 (italics inserted).
25. Moscow Radio (Tass), April 26, 1954.

In fact, there was reason to believe that Russia's inattention to detail, possibly due to a brewing internal power struggle, was placing her in danger of losing control of her rising star.

> China's role in the events of the period (all three of the occasions mentioned by Mr. Dulles in his "brink of war" interview were occasions of conflict with China) suggested another and perhaps more reliable distinguishing mark of a great power than status at a conference: that it is dangerous to other great powers....China was treated with a quite conspicuous degree of respect by the U.S.S.R. during the year. This was the case at the Geneva Conference, where Mr. Chou En-lai appeared to be by no means inferior to Mr. Molotov in the formulation of policy—probably the most important meeting of the conference, a private talk between M. Mendes-France and Mr. Chou took place after Mr. Molotov had returned to the U.S.S.R. for the recess...[26]

Moreover, Chou En-lai used the recess at Geneva to make a sweeping trip through India, Burma, and North Vietnam. On his return to Geneva he said:

> The government of the People's Republic of China believes that the nations of Asia should consult among themselves with a view to assuming mutual obligations providing for joint measures to safeguard peace and security in Asia.[27]

He had established ties with what became known as the "neutralist" group that exist to this day, under the banner of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence."[28]

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26. Survey, 1954, op. cit., p. 2. Chou En-lai's growing assurance was obvious after his Geneva success. At a Moscow banquet he was heard to make flippant remarks to his Russian hosts as he chided them for not speaking Chinese. In speaking of the Russians' language deficiency he reportedly told Mikoyan and Kaganovich "There's no excuse for you people." (Salisbury, op. cit., p. 307.)
27. Dallin, op. cit., p. 157 (italics inserted).
28. The gradual shift of Chinese Communist policy toward affiliation with the "neutrals" is notable. In 1949, Mao Tse-tung had denied that there could be a "third road," i.e., that all must choose between "imperialism

After Chou's triumphant return to Peking, with an appropriate propaganda buildup by the Peking press and public speeches by dignitaries, he launched a massive effort to capture Taiwan.

People's Daily (July 23, 1954):

> The Chinese people once more declare to the whole world that Taiwan is China's territory and they are determined to liberate it. They will never stop until their aim is achieved.[29]

People's Daily (July 25, 1954):

> The Washington adventurists are aware of the fact that the Chinese people have the courage to meet any challenge.[30]

General Chu Te's Army Day address (August 1, 1954):

> As we greet this glorious anniversary this year, we can never forget that an inseparable part of our sacred territory, Taiwan, is not yet liberated....The Chinese people shall liberate Taiwan....So long as the Chiang brigands are not completely wiped out, so long as Taiwan is not liberated, our task of liberating the whole of China cannot be considered completed.[31]

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or socialism" ("one must lean to one side"). As early as April, 1951, however, he offered India foodstuffs in famine relief. This was followed by Chinese "goodwill" missions in October, 1951. (Survey, 1951, op. cit., p. 376.) The origin of the unexceptional sentiments of the Five Principles" (which have ties with the ancient Buddhist principle of Panch Shila) was the preamble of an Indian-Chinese agreement on trade signed by Chang Han-fu, Chou's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, while the latter was at Geneva. (Survey, 1954, op. cit., p. 244.) By the 1960's Russia and China appeared to be competing for favor among the "neutrals," but at times China's new interest to the south has possibly worked to Russia's advantage. Success in this field might be seen to have provided Communist China with a "sop" for their 1955 frustration over Taiwan (see below).

29. Radio Peking (NCNA), July 24, 1954.
30. Ibid., July 26, 1954.
31. Ibid., August 1, 1954.

Chou En-lai's address to the 33rd session of the Chinese People's Government council (August 11, 1954):

> The tasks now before us are to strive—together with other nations concerned...to take determined action on the liberation of Taiwan so as to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity....The people of China and the People's Liberation Army must redouble their efforts in every field, heighten their diligence, avoid the pitfall of concert, overcome all difficulties, and struggle to the end for the fulfillment of the glorious task of liberating Taiwan.[32]

On September 1st, a preliminary draft of the United States-Nationalist China Mutual Defense Treaty was presented in Taipei.[33] This portion of the eventual agreements between the two governments pledged the United States to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes" in case of armed attack on Taiwan or the Pescadores. The agreement contained provisions for the extension of this "treaty area" to such "other territories" as might be determined by mutual agreement. It appeared that the door would still be open for the Nationalist forces, given their known desire to attack the mainland,[34] to

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32. Ibid., August 13, 1954 (italics inserted).
33. Plans for this treaty were well known. It had been suggested by the Nationalists in December, 1953. (Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1954 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 278.) A remark by President Eisenhower in July 1954 about its preparation had been duly noted on mainland China. (Radio Peking (NCNA), July 24, 1954.)
34. Taipei press excerpts:

    Statement of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, a week before General MacArthur's dismissal: "I am glad to hear the importance of hitting back at the Communist supply bases has been realized....The Commander on the spot knows better than those away from the field of conflict what must be done, and when decisions must be made." (Radio Taipei (Radio Free China), April 6, 1953.)

    Hsin Shen Daily News, March 17, 1954: "The policy of

complicate matters considerably.[35] The Mutual Defense Treaty in turn opened the possibility of some embarrassing treaty commitments for Russia. Russia was allied with mainland China against Japan or any ally thereof. The United States and Japan had signed a Security Pact in 1951. It looked as though the "two Chinas" had the makings of some strong legal cases to involve their respective allies to the resolution of their perfect hate.[36] The sophisticated equipment required for amphibious warfare, given the currently rejuvenated Nationalist China and the complication of the Seventh Fleet, made each powerless to effectively strike the other without naval assistance from their powerful friends (United States and Russia). In September, 1954, a continuous

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retaliation stated by Mr. Dulles seems to be similar to the old containment policy in essence....We would like to call Mr. Dulles' attention to the fact that the policy of containment as advocated by the former Truman administration should not be repeated." (Ibid., March 18, 1954.)

President Chiang Kai-shek, January 1, 1955: "Again and again I have told you that freedom can be won only at the cost of our lives, and that our lost territory can be recovered only at the price of flesh and blood. Whether our country is to survive or perish, whether our counter-attack is to succeed or fail, will depend on the degree of our efforts and the firmness of our determination." (Ibid., January 1, 1955.)

35. That the United States was reluctant to have this happen was clear. The "unleashing" of Chiang, which was one of the first acts of the new President Eisenhower, when accompanied by Admiral Carney's announcement in Taipei in December, 1953, that United States military aid would not include landing craft, was, in fact, tacit admission of the hopelessness of their mainland cause.
36. Their areas of conflict ranged all the way from war to ping pong. "The all China Athletic Federation has protested to the Table Tennis Federation of Asia against Kuomintang participation in the 2nd Asia Table Tennis Championship." (Radio Peking (NCNA), September 11, 1953.)

bombardment of Quemoy island was commenced. Chinese Nationalist harassing raids increased in tempo. On September 30th, Khrushchev and Bulganin arrived in Peking.

It is known that during this visit, Russia made many concessions to Peking. Khrushchev agreed to withdraw Soviet troops from Port Arthur by the end of the year, even though Chou's agreement with Stalin in 1952 provided for their stay until both Communist countries had made "peace" with Japan. Russian rights regarding stock companies in oil, non-ferrous metals, shipping, and civil airlines which had been established by Mao Tse-tung's agreement with Stalin in 1950 were abruptly terminated, even though they were to have existed for 30 years.[37] All vestiges of pro-Soviet "autonomous" areas in Manchuria were terminated.[38] It may also be presumed that even the Sino-Soviet joint declaration on peaceful coexistence which was prepared during the visit reflected Russian concessions. Even though this has been known as the high water mark in agreement on "coexistence" in this period,[39] it contained qualifying phrases about peace in the Far East, specifically regarding Taiwan.[40] The details of undoubted

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37. Whiting, Conflict Resolution in the Sino-Soviet Alliance, loc cit.
38. Dallin, op. cit., p. 430.
39. Kenzo Kiga, The Binding and Disuniting Elements Between China and the Soviet Union, paper at the 3rd International Sovietological Conference, Japan, September, 1960.
40. "The Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic will continue to build their relations with countries of Asia and the Pacific, as well as other countries, on the basis of...mutual nonaggression...and peaceful coexistence.... Direct acts of aggression committed by the United States toward the Chinese People's Republic and the continued occupation /of/ Taiwan...are incompatible with the tasks

discussion about Russian military support in the Taiwan Strait are not known. Sino-Soviet scholar Alberto Falcionelli has written: "...the Chinese had asked Khrushchev for active, effectual help, with all easily foreseeable consequences, in the Formosa situation. Khrushchev had promised his help... because failure to do so would have meant further and irreparable loss of prestige for Russia..."[41]

It is not considered necessary to go this far to make the point. Documentation indicates little probability of Khrushchev having refused help, and even this is significant when one considers the fact that at the time of the Peking visit, Khrushchev was already the de facto ruler of Russia for all practical purposes.[42] The following is offered in support of this supposition; it consists of evidence of continued Chinese Communist resolution and Russian confusion.

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of maintaining peace in the Far East and lessening of international tension." (Documents 1954, op. cit., p. 322 (italics inserted).)

41. Falcionelli, loc. cit. David J. Dallin has written that in 1954, Moscow "at first supported the anti-Formosa drive." (Dallin, op. cit., p. 434.) Mr. Dallin's passage is footnoted as having been based on certain "D papers" (September 6, 1956, file K). It is explained that this material will not be made public until 1975 in deference to those behind the Iron Curtain who provided it. Access was offered to those with legitimate interest. Efforts were made to obtain this more definitive evidence of the nature of Khrushchev's commitment to Peking's Taiwan drive. The correspondence was broken off by Mr. Dallin's death.
42. Arthur Dean, "United States Foreign Policy and Formosa," Foreign Affairs, April, 1955. Malenkov had not made a single substantial speech or important statement since April, 1954. (Dallin, op. cit., p. 220.) After Stalin's death, Soviet power had actually been shared by four men: Malenkov (representing the government bureaucracy), Beria (the Secret Police), General Zhukov (the Soviet Army), and Khrushchev (the Communist Party). One by one, Beria, then Malenkov, and finally Zhukov lost their status. (Salisbury, op. cit., p. 253.)

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Peking resolution was reflected in both action and pronouncements. Amphibious excursions, aerial bombing, and artillery bombardment were carried out against the Nationalist-held offshore islands with ever-increasing frequency and intensity. Chinese Communist statements in no sense limited the objective to the offshore islands, however. Warnings were broadcast to Taiwan before, during, and after Khrushchev's visit:

> Return to the warm embrace of the fatherland....You are now at the crossroads of death.[43]

> The wind and the waves in the Formosa Strait will be unable to stop the advance of the victorious Liberation Army, and the American hope of saving the Chiang clique will fail.[44]

> ...now that the call for liberating Taiwan has been sent, I would like to give you another chance to choose...your path. It is not too late to realize your past mistakes....If you want to die for Chiang and the United States, then you dig your own graves.... The time is short, but we will wait for you until the last minute.[45]

Chou En-lai (December 8, 1954):

> We swear to the whole world: the Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan.[46]

General Chen I (January 20, 1955—a few days after returning from Europe):

> ...we can defeat Chiang, not only on the Chinese mainland but also on the sea. This will lead us to liberate Taiwan.[47]

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43. Radio Peking, August 31, 1954 (in Mandarin to Taiwan).
44. Ibid., September 2, 1954 (in Mandarin to Taiwan).
45. Ibid., October 30, 1954 (in Mandarin to Taiwan).
46. Ibid., December 8, 1954 (italics inserted).
47. Ibid., January 20, 1955.

Russian statements from the summer of 1954 until January 1955 defy generalization. Their attitude toward China is reflected in the samples below:[48]

Khrushchev on arrival at Peking (September 30, 1954):

> After the great October Socialist Revolution, the victory of the Chinese People's revolution is the most outstanding event in world history....may the unbreakable friendship and close cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the peoples of the Soviet Union be still further consolidated and developed day by day.[49]

Anniversary speeches in Peking (October 1, 1954):

> /Closing remark of Chou En-lai/: The Chinese people will certainly liberate Taiwan. /Khrushchev: (reviewed history of U.S. aid to Chiang, dated Sino-Soviet friendship from 1919, noted recent financial aid of Soviets, praised Chinese efforts in Korea)./ The United States is trying by every possible means to prevent the Chinese people from completely restoring the territorial integrity of their motherland, to obstruct the Chinese people from liberating Taiwan which is legally an inalienable part of China....The desire of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 600 million Chinese people to liberate Taiwan, integrally a part of Chinese territory is dear and entirely understandable to the Soviet Union. The Soviet people deeply sympathize with the noble cause of the great Chinese People....The Chinese People's Republic has already stepped forward in the international arena as a great power....The part played by the Chinese People's Republic at the Geneva Conference proves once again her influence as a great power...[50]

Khrushchev after returning to Moscow from China (November, 1954):

> This improvement in Sino-Soviet relations was not brought about by the establishment of a so-called new doctrine but by the actual results created by the changes in the balance of power...of both the U.S.S.R. and Communist China.[51]

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48. When Clement Attlee and his Labor Party group stopped in Moscow on their way to China in the summer of 1954, "Molotov begged them: please, do not try to embroil us with the Chinese in Peking." (Dallin, op. cit., p. 424.)
49. Radio Peking (NCNA), October 1, 1954.
50. Ibid.
51. Masao Onoe, A Study of Factors Binding the U.S.S.R. and

Statement of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (December 15, 1954):

> The government of the U.S.S.R. states that it shares the position formulated in the statement by the Chinese People's Republic Foreign Minister Chou on December 8th that the American-Chiang treaty is an interference in the internal affairs of China, an attempt on her territorial integrity, and places in danger the security of China and peace in Asia. The Government of the U.S.S.R. fully supports the demands of the Chinese People's Republic Government for the withdrawal of American troops from Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the Formosa Straits, and for the cessation of the aggressive actions against the Chinese People's Republic. The Soviet people understand the demands of the Chinese People's Republic and the determination of the Chinese people to liberate Formosa....The Soviet government declares that the responsibility for the consequences of the aggressive treaty of Mutual Security concluded between the U.S. and the Chiang clique rests entirely with the Government of the United States.[52]

Crises were closing in on Moscow from the west as well as the east. The rearmament of West Germany, their primary international preoccupation,[53] appeared imminent. After the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's plans for the European Defense Community had been dashed by the French Parliament, the more promising Western European Union arrangement had been proposed by Prime Minister Eden in September, 1954. East German leader Grotewohl reported that during Khrushchev's visit to Peking, the Soviet leader had been assured by Mao Tse-tung that Chinese Communist troops would be made available to the European theatre.[54] At any rate, at a Moscow conference on German problems in November,

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Communist China, paper at 3rd International Sovietological Conference, Japan, September, 1960.

52. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), December 15, 1954.
53. On January 3, 1955, Chairman Malenkov identified German rearmament as his number one problem. (Dallin, op. cit., p. 138.)
54. Ibid., p. 162.

an exchange between Bulganin and the Peking representative indicated that Communist China considered herself committed to Europe.[55] December quotations from Peking authorities tied the German and Taiwan problems together as though to extract a quid pro quo.[56] In his New Year message of 1955, Chairman of the Presidium of the Soviet Supreme Voroshilov acknowledged this gesture:

> The peoples of the Soviet Union and of the European People's Democratic countries were pleased and gratified to receive the Chinese representative's declaration that the Chinese people support with all their strength the European people's struggle for the defense of European peace and security..../and in regard to Far East problems/ The Chinese people are not alone. They are always insured with the complete and unconditional support of the Soviet people who are prepared to pass all their experience on in order to speed up the building of socialist China.[57]

The Kremlin was a museum of problems on New Year's Day; three other dilemmas were on the horizon.

(a) Fathoming United States Far East intentions: The contents of the Nationalist China-United States Mutual Defense Treaty were known, but the agreement had not been ratified. Supplementary agreements covering the scope of United States commitment outside the "treaty area," and the freedom of maneuver of Chiang Kai-shek were rumored to exist, but their contents were not known. The truth of the matter was that on December 10, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles had obtained the signature of Nationalist Foreign Minister

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55. New York Times, December 1, 1954.
56. Radio Peking (NCNA), December 6, 1954 (speech by Chou En-lai).
57. Ibid., January 2, 1955.

Yeh on diplomatic notes which would insure the United States a reasonable maximum of protection against Nationalist adventures toward the mainland from either the "treaty" or offshore areas. The "use of force" from either area would be a matter of joint agreement, "the inherent right of self defense," excepted.[58] The notes would become effective upon United States ratification of the treaty, and thus would form a "package" of agreements that would have warmed the cockles of the heart of Machiavelli (the United States would retain a maximum freedom of maneuver with a minimum chance of involuntary involvement, under the circumstances). In the meantime, however, the United States could count on the Nationalists abiding by the contents of the notes, on pain of non-ratification of the treaty; at the same time Washington could present the image of being in danger of losing control of the situation. In this interim period, the United States was therefore in a position of maximum bargaining strength and flexibility.[59]

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58. The contents of the Dulles-Yeh notes were officially made public on February 7, 1955. Speculation concerning agreements in addition to the Mutual Defense Treaty had predated their existence (New York Times, November 6, 1954). A bogus version appeared in a Japanese newspaper on January 9, 1954. (Radio Peking (NCNA), January 10, 1955.) The wording, though not the meaning, of the bogus version closely paralleled the text as eventually published. The timing of the development of the crisis was such that it might have been advantageous for Moscow to be assured of Washington's good faith in restricting mainland activity.
59. Dr. Thomas C. Schelling in The Strategy of Conflict explains the widely misunderstood art of "brinkmanship": "The brink is not...the sharp edge of a cliff where one can stand firmly, look down, and decide whether or not to plunge....Brinkmanship involves getting onto the slope where one may fall in spite of his own best efforts to

(b) Problems of the Nuclear age: In the spring of 1954, Malenkov had stated that he considered that the Soviet Union had nuclear deterrent capability vis a vis the United States, i.e., that United States' fear provided Soviet immunity from attack. In the 1954-1955 era, Khrushchev was one of the most notable opponents of this view.[60] On June 15, 1954, Khrushchev gave a speech in Prague in which he claimed that the Russians had created the hydrogen bomb before the United States.[61] His speech, as heard by those present, was

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save himself, dragging his adversary with him. Brinkmanship is thus the deliberate creation of a recognizable risk of war, a risk that one does not completely control. ...It means harassing and intimidating an adversary by exposing him to a shared risk....Some kind of commitment, or at least appearance of commitment, must lie behind the threat and be successfully communicated to the threatened party....For example, maneuvers that shift the final decision beyond recall to another party whose incentive structure would provide an ex post motive for fulfillment....The mutual-defense agreement with the Nationalist government of China is probably to be viewed partly as a means of shifting the decision for response to someone whose resolution would be less doubtful." (Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 124, 128, 142, 199.)

60. Herbert S. Dinerstein, "Nuclear Power—The Great Deterrent," Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Arthur E. Adams (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1961), p. 386; Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, op. cit., p. 18; Donald S. Zagoria, "The 1957 Conference and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," China Quarterly, July-September, 1961.

61. This claim apparently may be correct, in a sense. The argument revolves around what is a bomb. American scientists have disclosed that the first United States hydrogen test in 1952 involved a device that required extensive and bulky refrigeration equipment to keep the heavy hydrogen in a liquid state, whereas the first Soviet test in August, 1953 utilized lithium deuteride as a solid. The first U.S. test utilizing this obvious improvement (from a portability standpoint) was reported to be in August, 1954. Drs. Harvey Sacks (University of California) and David Zipser (Harvard) intimate that there was in fact a period when Russia held the key to the hydrogen balance. ("Communication Between Social and Physical Scientists,"

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a plea for more arms and a more aggressive attitude toward the United States. Many of his remarks were eradicated in the Pravda copy of the speech, and "We really carry out a peace-loving policy in the interests of the masses," was substituted.[62] The specific details of the strategic disagreement, and how closely they were involved with the internal Russian policy struggle are not known, but this consideration complicated decision making. At any rate, it has been said that the Taiwan issue was heavily debated in Russia during January 1955, on the basis of nuclear weapons.[63]

(c) The Russian domestic leadership upheaval, which was possibly accelerated by the culmination of all the above complications.[64]

The moment of truth in the Taiwan Strait was approaching.[65] As the United States was amassing a naval force in the seaward area consisting of 5 aircraft carriers, 3 heavy cruisers, and some 49-odd destroyers,[66] the spearhead of

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Science, Vol. 134, No. 3477, August 18, 1961, p. 509.)

62. Harry Schwartz in the New York Times, June 25, 1954; Dallin, op. cit., p. 221.
63. Alice Langley Hsieh, "Communist China and Nuclear Warfare," The China Quarterly, April-June, 1960.
64. "It may well be said that, like Trotsky, Malenkov fell by reason of the Chinese situation, in spite of having been no more to blame for Mao's autonomism than Trotsky was for Chiang's defection." (Falcionelli, loc. cit.)
65. In early January, 1955, United Nations Secretary General Hammarskjold made an unprecedented trip to Peking to talk to Chou En-lai. Hammarskjold had requested the conference on the basis of United States-Communist China prisoner difficulties, but Chou's reply indicated that that matter was not negotiable. Taiwan was the issue of the moment, and it was conceivably a prime consideration of the trip.
66. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), February 1, 1955.

Communist activity centered on the Nationalist-held Tachen island group, to the north of Taiwan. On January 19th, a combined amphibious force of approximately 100 motorized junks and 200 aircraft forced the surrender of 2,000 Nationalists on Yikingshan Island, about eight miles distant from the main Tachen island. The United States' "flexible response" was the accrediting of their threat by the so-called "Formosa Resolution." The Congress publicly confirmed the President's authority to employ U. S. armed forces "as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores including protection of "related positions."[67]

On January 28th (the date on which the United States Senate passed the Formosa Resolution), the British Government contacted the Kremlin, advised them that they considered it dangerous to proceed on the assumption that the United States would not defend even the offshore islands, and requested the Soviet government to restrain Peking.[68] At this critical juncture, the U.S.S.R. joined Great Britain in trying to halt the buildup of events in the Taiwan Strait.[69] Their attempted United Nations action was diplomatically unproductive in the literal sense, but it served to confirm Russia's disavowal of responsibility for Communist China's military ventures in the Pacific.[70] Moreover on January 29th, in an

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67. A. G. Mezerik, International Review Service, Vol. IV, No. 47, October, 1958, p. 45.
68. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), January 28, 1955.
69. Survey, 1955-1956, op. cit., p. 9.
70. The United Nations evolution was rather complicated, and did not work out to be an open affront of Peking by

interview with William R. Hearst Jr. and Kingsbury Smith, Molotov gave public tacit approval of a pending United States plan to evacuate the islands of the Tachen group still in Nationalist hands.[71]

Within a week, the United States State Department announced that orders had been issued to the Seventh Fleet to remove 20,000 Nationalist civilians and 10,000 troops from the Tachens.[72] Communist aircraft were bombing the islands as the U.S. Naval units entered the area.[73] The Navy announced that "any attack on the Tachens now will be construed by the United States as interference with the mission of the Seventh Fleet and such interference could prompt United States retaliation."[74] The Chinese Communist

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Moscow. Russia introduced resolutions in the Security Council asking for condemnation of the United States and for the invitation of a Peking representative to discuss the motion. New Zealand introduced a resolution providing for a cease fire. It became known that Communist China would not discuss a cease fire under any circumstances (they hold it to imply interference in China's domestic affairs), and would not discuss any issue in a United Nations session at which the Chinese Nationalist representative was present. Russia thereupon introduced a resolution that would bar the Taipei representative (which was defeated), abstained on another (not their own) to invite the Peking representative to New York (which was passed); the invitation was sent, but was turned down in Peking. (Year Book of the United Nations, 1955 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956.)

71. Molotov said he couldn't imagine why Peking would object to the evacuation, since they were trying to dislodge the Nationalists themselves. When asked if he would make a formal request to the Chinese Communist government on this point, he answered: "Does the Government of the United States ask us to do it?" (Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), January 30, 1955.)
72. Survey, 1955-1956, op. cit., p. 95.
73. Ibid., p. 8.
74. New York Times, February 7, 1955.

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forces stood down as the evacuation commenced.[75] The Peking reaction was documented in the next issue of the official Party newspaper, the People's Daily:

> This criminal act is an infringement upon China's sovereignty and an intervention in China's internal affairs.[76]

The inevitable had happened; Communist cohesion had had to give ground under the pressures of a more complicated age. The tactics of the old regime had delayed Peking's acquisition of Taiwan. Mao Tse-tung had sacrificed begrudgingly with the hope of recovering his loss under the more predictable code of "old school" honor in due course, but the institutional rules of the modern era prevented compensation. Taiwan claims had been caught out of step in both phases.

On February 8, 1955, Malenkov announced his resignation as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.[77] Professor Falcionelli writes:

> ...the military had decided to take action...against Malenkov because, among other reasons, they knew they were now in an adventure which could turn into a general war. By removing Malenkov they avoided greater risks and at the same time secured Khrushchev's gratitude since they helped him to lay on another "responsible" the burden of his obligations contracted with Peiping.[78]

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75. "Fight when we can win and run away when we cannot—this is the popular interpretation of our mobile warfare today." Selected quotations of Mao Tse-tung, New York Times, June 4, 1961.
76. Radio Peking (NCNA), February 5, 1955.
77. Time Magazine reported that this forthcoming event was widely rumored in Moscow at the time of Hearst and Smith's interview with Molotov. It accused them of having a "built-in capacity for missing the point." (Time Magazine, June 30, 1961, p. 48.)
78. Falcionelli, op. cit. Later in February, perhaps to salve the wound, Molotov made a point of referring to the "great"

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This climax did not bring the Strait crisis of 1955 to an abrupt end. By March, their continuing bombardment of the offshore islands prompted Mr. Dulles to remark that they seemed "dizzy with success. They entertain a very exaggerated sense of their own power."[79] During the same month, Kao Kang, the old pro-Soviet commander in Manchuria in the days just before the mainland victory, was purged.[80] A symbolism has been suggested.[81]

After giving Mr. Dulles credit for threatening nuclear reprisal,[82] Chou En-lai left his forces at "general quarters" and departed for the Bandung conference. There, in his opening speech, he devoted primary emphasis to condemning the United States policy in the Taiwan area. This brought on immediate criticism, especially from the Philippine and Thailand representatives who felt that the Asian-African conference was not the place to air grievances not common to the group. Four days later, after consultations with the

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Chinese people—an honor otherwise reserved for the "great Soviet people." (Harold H. Fisher, "Post-Stalin Policy in Asia," Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 340.)

79. New York Times, March 22, 1955. Mao Tse-tung in 1940: "We must on no account fight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor become dizzy with success." (Mao Tse-tung, Questions of Tactics..., op. cit., p. 13.)
80. Kao Kang committed suicide on March 31, 1955. (Dallin, op. cit., p. 430.)
81. Falcionelli, loc. cit. If purges are symbolic of Mao's psychosis regarding Taiwan it is perhaps notable that a mainland purge was reported in the Taipei press in March, 1951. This closely followed the unsuccessful efforts to work out a Korean settlement before Communist China was named an aggressor by the United Nations and was at about the time the U.S. Seventh Fleet mission in the Strait became permanent.
82. Radio Peking (NCNA), March 12, 1955.

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various delegations, Chou evidenced a marked mellowing. He announced that he desired to "enter into negotiations...to discuss the question of relaxing tension...in the Taiwan area."[83] After he returned to China, the military activities in the Strait were slowly decreased.[84]

Both Bulganin and Khrushchev had occasion to speak in Warsaw in the spring of 1955. Bulganin made brief reference to Taiwan:

> It is quite clear that having taken refuge on Taiwan, the Chiang clique would never had dared to start its gangster-like actions had it not had the support from a strong benefactor in the person of the United States government...the Government of the Soviet Union, on its part, fully supports the attitude of the Chinese People's Republic in the Taiwan question and those steps which People's China is undertaking to strengthen peace in that area.[85]

Khrushchev gave a 30-page speech on foreign affairs—not a word on Taiwan.[86]

According to an item in U.S. News and World Report,[87] Khrushchev is reported to have made a remark to President

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83. Survey, 1955-1956, op. cit., p. 12.
84. Mao Tse-tung in 1940: "We should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fight to a close." (Mao Tse-tung, Questions of Tactics..., op. cit., p. 13.)
85. Moscow Radio (Tass), May 11, 1955 (italics inserted).
86. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), April 21, 1955. Later at the same Warsaw conference, Chinese Communist representative General Peng Te-huai removed any doubt that may have remained regarding Peking's commitment to Russia's military problems: "If the peace of Europe is disturbed, if the imperialist aggressors launch war against the peaceable European states, our government and our heroic 600 million people will, shoulder to shoulder with the government and peoples of our fraternal countries, fight the aggressor until final victory is won." (Radio Warsaw (Polish Home Service), May 12, 1955.)
87. U.S. News and World Report, June 19, 1961, p. 34.

Kennedy at Vienna in the summer of 1961 that would appear to be a rather unusual thing to say, in view of the fact that Communist China has been obviously powerless to cope with the Seventh Fleet without Russian assistance since soon after the start of the Korean War. Khrushchev reportedly said: "If I were Mao Tse-tung, I would have taken Formosa long ago." If the hypotheses thus far advanced are correct, perhaps the eavesdropper misunderstood. What Khrushchev should have said was, "I wish Mao Tse-tung had taken Formosa long ago," followed, perhaps by an aside in sotto voice, "in about May or June, 1950, to be exact." If Peking's humor regarding Taiwan has not improved by the time they get nuclear weapons, Khrushchev may be in danger of losing control of his own destiny.

CHAPTER IV

THE KHRUSHCHEVIAN ERA

BANDUNG TO LEBANON

To examine a subject so pockmarked with voids of reliable information at critical junctures and so rife with discontinuities as Sino-Soviet relations, one must attempt to retain some sort of an image of Russian and Chinese national purposes and trends against which he can check his necessary conjecture for reasonableness. This becomes more and more difficult the closer one gets to the present, and the more involved the Moscow-Peking relations become with each passing year. For the three and a half year period from the spring of 1955 to the autumn of 1958, Russia offers a more stable image than China. Beginning in January, 1955, Moscow's leadership appeared to modify other policies, in addition to their retrenchment on issues that threatened war with the United States. Domestically, they were giving way to social pressure and placing primary emphasis on economic growth; in bloc policy, "socialism in one region" was becoming the keynote. In broad perspective, therefore, Russia can be seen to have pursued a constant conservative drift.[1]

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1. Khrushchev's frantic and ultimately successful efforts to keep policy moving in this direction reached their

China is not so easy to catalog, even in terms of such oversimplified generalization. It is helpful if one applies two concepts to Chinese analysis. The first is their apparent ethnocentrism and patience with the historic process. An anecdote of Richard Harris, Far East expert for the London Times describes this succinctly. He writes of an occasion in China in early 1949 when he overheard some Chinese enlisted soldiers casually discussing the situation of a divided country in a civil war, drawing frequent comparisons with a similar condition which persisted in China during the Sung dynasty. When he spoke to them in their native tongue they were hard pressed to identify his nationality, thinking of a third Western nation only with difficulty. In reflecting, he surmised that he would expect almost any British soldier to remember the names of at least twenty foreign countries, but doubted that he would find him comparing inflation in Britain during the 1950's with the inflation during the Wars of the Roses.[2]

The second concept which must be kept in mind by the Western analyist is what the French statesman Edgar Faure

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watershed point in June, 1957 when he executed the unprecedented coup of invoking Central Committee support to over-ride the Presidium. Traditionalists Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov were dismissed from the Central Committee as an "anti-party" group. (Dallin, op. cit., p. 453.) In a sense, Khrushchev came to power as a "leftist," and is making his reputation as a "rightist"; Stalin's progression was roughly the reverse.

2. Richard Harris, "China and the World," International Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 2, April, 1959.

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has called the "undulatory mechanics" of Chinese Communism. There is a certain dichotomy in the ordinary dialectic of Marxism (the union of opposites), to which one must accustom himself, but the Chinese Communists go beyond this. They are "able to think of contraries as being entirely compatible."[3] This is not to say that the undulatory mechanics deals in thoughts that do not have meaning, or that the meanings are not often profound. It merely means that the Westerner must occasionally shift mental gears to get the message. These two points are mentioned not to reiterate the cliche about the "strange Oriental," but because they both bear on the analysis that follows later.

With due respect for the difficulty of generalizing Chinese political tendencies during the three and a half year period vis à vis Russia, they appear to have made a random excursion from a position to the "dogmatic" side of Moscow, overshooting to the "revisionist" side, then abruptly returning to "dogmatic." This oscillation was either a valiant attempt to conform to Moscow's conservative drift, in spite of the difference in their revolutionary and economic maturity, or was a premeditated arabesque of maneuver about the Russian datum in application of undulatory mechanics.

As shown above, in the case of the Taiwan issue, the zig zag of Chinese tactics to a more soft line occurred dramatically under the moderating influence of the "neutral"

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3. Edgar Faure, The Serpent and the Tortoise (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958), p. 111.

Afro-Asians at the Bandung Conference during the waning days of the 1955 Strait crisis. The Peking Ministry of Foreign Affairs had described the crash of an airplane enroute to the conference as murder engineered by secret agents of the United States.[4] Four days later, Chou En-lai told the conference "The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. The Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States of America," and offered to negotiate the Taiwan issue.[5] The United States ultimately accepted this offer, and on the 1st of August, 1955, talks commenced at the ambassadorial level in Geneva. These consultations continued there until December, 1957. The impasse of "negotiating" the Taiwan issue can be appreciated by noting the continuously presented Chinese "position," still being reiterated by Chou En-lai three years later:

> The Sino-American dispute in the Taiwan Straits area and the Chinese people's internal matter of liberating their own territory are two matters entirely different in nature. The United States has all along tried to confuse these two matters so as to cover up its aggression and intervention in China. This is not to be allowed.[6]

During the preparations for the talks and the consultations themselves, the Chinese Communists relaxed their

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4. Radio Peking (NCNA), April 12, 1955.
5. Survey, 1955-1956, op. cit., p. 13.
6. Radio Peking (NCNA), September 6, 1958. The divergence of policy positions from the outset is indicated by the following statements: Chou En-lai, June 28, 1956: "The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan. This is the unshakable common will of 600 million Chinese people." President Eisenhower, July 7, 1956: "Let there be no misapprehension about our steadfastness in continuing to support the Republic of China." (Barnett, "U.S. and Communist China," op. cit., p. 173.)

[illegible]

military pressure on the coast. From the spring of 1955 to the late summer of 1958 they subjected the offshore island of Quemoy to intermittent—sometimes briefly intense—artillery shelling, but never so intense or prolonged as to suggest the intention to dislodge the garrison. There was evidence of long range plans, nevertheless. Seven jet airstrips were being constructed within 150 miles of Taiwan, and a railroad network connecting this military complex with Shanghai was being completed.[7]

Commencing in mid-1955 external evidence indicated an increasingly "soft" line in all phases of Chinese Communist foreign and domestic policy. This seemed to coincide with the good fortune of increasingly amicable relations with the "neutrals," and domestic economic success. By January, 1956, mainland China was reporting herself to be a year ahead of schedule in the first five year plan.[8] Mao Tse-tung's speeches increasingly encouraged the relaxation of internal pressure, and in February, 1957 he urged his people to "let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend." By the spring of 1957, he was predicting no more wars for fifteen years.[9]

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7. Washington Post and Times Herald, April 12, 1956 (testimony of Assistant Secretary of State (Far Eastern Affairs) Robertson before the House Foreign Affairs Committee).
8. Radio Peking (NCNA), January 1, 1956 (People's Daily article). "The most significant Soviet-Chinese economic development of this period was the agreement signed on April 7, 1956, during the visit of Anastas Mikoyan to Peking, which provided for the construction of 55 industrial units in addition to 156 already in construction, at a cost of 2.5 billion rubles." (Dallin, op. cit., p. 435.)
9. New York Times, June 13 and 16, 1957.

China appeared to be trying to outdo Khrushchev in domestic "contention" when the balloon burst in the early summer of 1957. The free expression of opinion had taken an intolerable form from a particularly embarrassing group of Chinese citizens—the intelligentsia and the students. Many of the latter had spent most of their politically-conscious lives under the Communist regime. By early June, riots were threatened;[10] Mao Tse-tung made one last attempt to be "reasonable" in his People's Daily article of June 8th,[11] and soon thereafter released a modified version of his unpublished "Hundred Flowers" speech of the previous February.[12]

Flagrant violators of "socialist principles" were exposed, and the domestic line started a "zag" to the "hard" side.[13] As might be expected of their "undulatory mechanics," no new policy was inferred. A report by the Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party dated October 20, 1957 was devoted to the Hundred Flowers ("rectification") campaign

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10. Radio Peking (NCNA), May 31, June 8, 1957 (Ko Pei-chi articles, People's Daily).
11. Ibid., June 8, 1957 ("What is it For?", in People's Daily).
12. Mao Tse-tung, On the Current Handling of Contradictions Among the People (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1957).
13. Professor Ko Pei-chi of People's University had made a speech in which he suggested that it would be an act of patriotism to kill all the Communists and overthrow the government. (Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 23, 1957.) Victor Zorza reported a public meeting at which a speaker had said "the masses wish to kick out or even to kill the communists." It reminded him of what was being said in Hungary and Poland before their uprisings the year before. (Manchester Guardian (England), June 13, 1957.)

of the early spring, and regarded the "campaign against the right-wing as forming a second stage of the rectification campaign itself."[14]

Though the break was more ragged, intra-bloc policy patterned after the Russian conservative drift also appeared to ultimately frustrate the Chinese. A prelude to trouble was offered by the Chinese reaction to Khrushchev's speech exposing Stalin's excesses at the Twentieth Congress in February, 1956. The fact that it was a surprise move embarrassed the Chinese.[15] It contrasted notably with a Mao Tse-tung speech read at the same Congress. Secondly, it may be presumed that sudden emphasis of the ills of the "cult of personality" offended the Chinese Communists. They had been under the sole leadership of Mao Tse-tung for over twenty years, and moreover, he had been one of the most important contributors to Communist theory since Lenin. They must have felt that they were about to inherit the advantages of being the compatriots of the successor of Stalin in the apostolic chain of World Communist leadership. Mainland editorials didn't cover Khrushchev's remarks about Stalin at first,[16] and when they later discussed it, editorial comment was heavily laced with qualifying expressions stressing his

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14. Faure, op. cit., p. 111.
15. Edward Crankshaw, San Francisco Chronicle, December 12, 1961. (The Chinese admitted that it had been a surprise.)
16. Radio Peking (NCNA), March 30, 1957. (People's Daily of March 30, first article noted; the speech was given February 14th.)

accomplishments in spite of his methods.[17] Symbolically, the Stalinist issue was later discussed in Communist China under the heading of "great power chauvinism" rather than the "cult of personality."

Nineteen fifty-six was the year of East European uprisings, and the Chinese Communists took an active interest in these events.[18] Their original position was that of support of the principle of polycentrism of the Communist bloc, stressing local loyalty to the national Communist parties. In Poland, where the Polish armed forces remained under the control of the local Communist Party, Peking is said to have restrained Khrushchev from intervening. In Hungary, where the armed forces slipped from Communist control, Peking is said to have pressed for Russian military intervention when Moscow was hesitating. "The Chinese attitudes were opposite in the two cases, but each was judged by a consistent principle."[19] Later, they registered apparent disgust with the whole chain of events. In November, 1956, the Chinese Communist press implicitly blamed Russian policy for both uprisings,[20] and the events were thereafter alluded

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17. People's Daily of April, 1956: "Some consider that J. V. Stalin was entirely wrong. This is a serious error. J. V. Stalin was an outstanding Marxist-Leninist, but a Marxist Leninist who did commit serious mistakes and did not perceive them..." On May Day, 1956, a large portrait of Stalin was displayed in the main square in Peking. (Dallin, op. cit., p. 438.)
18. G. F. Hudson notes: "The line which Peking took on this upheaval in Eastern Europe was, however, less important than the fact that it took a line at all." (Hudson in The Sino-Soviet Dispute, op. cit., p. 3.)
19. Ibid.
20. Radio Peking (NCNA), November 2, 1956 (People's Daily article).

to by remarks loaded with innuendo.[21]

> The counter revolutionary uprising launched by Nagy's gang in October, 1957 has taught the Hungarian people, and the people of other socialist countries...many important lessons.[22]

From a position of "out-thawing the Russian thaw" (acting as mediator and moderator of bloc disputes in support of the Leninist principle of national equality which had been resurrected at the Twentieth Party Congress),[23] Communist China swung through the "dead center" of Russian policy and on to an even more rigorous demand for national subserviency

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21. Peking's pointed interest in the East European uprisings is given added significance by the poignant analysis of the post-Stalin history of Hungary by Paul Kecskemeti. The case demonstrated the problems of quasi-monolithic totalistic leadership in capsule form. The basic principle invoked is that often the great danger of revolt comes not in the "oppression," but in the "decompression" cycle of Party policy fluctuations. The relief of pressure must be accompanied by extremely close monitoring of the existing "historic conditions." The latter are very sensitive to national differences and the evolution is particularly demanding on a "bloc" basis. Although the sinusoidal oscillations of Soviet policy during the uneasy period of transition from Stalin to Khrushchev rule were restrained to the limits of positive stability within Russian society, as these were mimicked in East Europe they appeared in the nature of ad hoc improvisations and were not synchronized organically with local conditions. Instability resulted as harmonics were hit in some areas. (Paul Kecskemeti, "Decompression in Hungary," Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 587-601.) This problem is analogous to trying to play several game fish on a common reel. Judicious relaxation of tension on the Soviet "fish" may produce dangerous slack in the Hungarian (or Chinese) line. To make matters worse in this instance, that great oversight in Communist canon—the lack of provision for constitutional succession of command—made coordination even more difficult as various would-be fishermen were wrestling to see who would finally hold the pole.
22. Radio Peking (NCNA), June 20, 1958 (People's Daily article).
23. Doak A. Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 362.

to central bloc leadership. They professed to favor the unitary rather than confederate command structure. After cancelling a trip to Poland in the summer of 1957, Mao Tse-tung is said to have personally demanded a revision of a declaration of the conference of Communist parties in Moscow in November, 1957 to a form that so stringently specified Moscow's authority that Yugoslavia would not sign it.[24] The trend of Moscow's rapprochement with Belgrade initiated in 1955 was thereby interrupted. Thereafter the symbolic pronouncements regarding Yugoslavian "revisionism" grew farther and farther apart. By 1958, though the Russian articles disapproved of revisionistic policies in a doctrinaire manner, on July 4th, Soviet writer Pavlov wrote a piece complimenting the "heroic deeds of the Yugoslavian Communists" during World War II in honor of the Yugoslav national "Fighters' Day" holiday.[25] In contrast, the People's Daily of the previous week had described Tito and his "plight" as follows:

> A dwarf Kerensky in a muddy pond can try as desperately as he may to spit at a giant on a lofty mountain, but he will find his spittle falling on his own face.

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24. Ibid., p. 362. Mao Tse-tung at the 1957 Moscow Conference: "The socialist force has surpassed the imperialist force. Our socialist camp should have a leader, and this is the Soviet Union. The enemy also has a leader, and this is America. If there is no leader, the strength will be weakened." (Allen S. Whiting, "The Developing Partnership: China and the Soviet Union," Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Arthur E. Adams (Boston, D. C. Heath and Company, 1961), p. 379.) The year before, criticism of Yugoslav statements on the Hungary uprising had been more moderate in the People's Daily than those in Pravda. (Ibid., p. 377.)
25. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), July 4, 1958.
26. Radio Peking, (NCNA), June 26, 1958. At the Party Congress

[illegible]

It is therefore seen that by late 1957, both in domestic and intra-bloc policies, the Chinese Communists had completed their "excursion" to the right and either through dissatisfaction with the trend of events in the "socialism in one region," or through the emergence of leftist influence in their leadership, began to hide behind the shield of dogma, following what Michael Lindsay calls "Stalinist fundamentalism."

In foreign policy, a similar Chinese attitude was reflected in their encouragement of a more confident assertion of bloc power vis à vis the West. The technical success of Russia's "Sputnik" in the fall of 1957 was to the Soviet leaders but a sign of a weaponry standoff with the West at parity, but on November 17, 1957 Mao Tse-tung heralded the event as proof of the ascendency of the "East wind over the West wind."[27]

Meanwhile, particularly after Sputnik, Khrushchev played up the theme of "coexistence" to the hilt; he stressed his decision to reduce the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania,[28] wrote letters to President Eisenhower proposing an expansion of Soviet-American trade[29] and an agreement against surprise attack,[30] professed unilateral suspension of nuclear tests,[31]

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two years before, Chinese Communist ideological authority Liu Shao-chi had spoken approvingly of the Yugoslav detente.

27. Zagoria, "The 1957 Conference...," op. cit., p. 372.
28. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), July 12, 1958.
29. Ibid., June 7, 1958.
30. Ibid. (Tass), July 7, 1958.
31. Ibid. (Soviet Home Service), June 11, 1958.

and in general ushered in the era of his technological success under his slogan of "less guns, more butter."[32] Primary Russian emphasis, however, was placed on repeated calls for a "summit" conference of the United States, Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. These began at about the turn of the new year of 1958.[33]

It was primarily in the context of summit talks that Khrhshchev met the Middle East crisis of the summer of 1958.[34] Unrest in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, and the consequent threat of Communist capitalization on threatened revolutionary activities, particularly in Syria, caused the United States and British military units in the Mediterranean area to go on alert in June. The revolution occurred in Iraq on July 14th, and this was followed by the landing of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon and British troops in Jordan. Communist press reaction was laced with invectives, but Khrushchev's primary proposal was for a conference of the big four plus India and the Secretary General of the United Nations.

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32. Ibid. (Tass), June 11, 1958.
33. Khrushchev forwarded prospective agenda items; China's Problems were not mentioned. (Ibid. (Tass), June 16, 1958.) The Chinese press favorably supported the conference, nevertheless, and berated the three Western powers for using "obstructionist" tactics. (Radio Peking (NCNA), June 22, 1958 (People's Daily).)
34. It is true that in a letter to President Eisenhower, Khrushchev reminded him that "The Soviet Union too possesses atomic and hydrogen bombs, an air force, and a navy, plus ballistic missiles of all types, including intercontinental ones," but the focus of even this letter was on a proposition for a conference. (Moscow Radio (Tass), July 19, 1958.)

[illegible]

His first offer proposed the site of Geneva, and a convening date less than a week away.[35] Prime Minister Nehru, in accepting the invitation pointedly specified that he interpreted the invitation to mean that the conference was to be concerned only with the Middle East, and that it was not the "summit" conference of which Khrushchev had talked since the first of the year.[36] This remark was not acknowledged, and the Moscow press continued to refer to the new offer as a "summit" conference thereafter.[37] After an exchange of letters with the proposed participants Khrushchev altered his proposal, presumably to better accommodate their desires, to hold the conference within the framework of the United Nations Security Council. He continued to stress the importance of India's participation even though they were not sitting with the Security Council at that time.[38] On July 28th Khrhshchev made his third summit offer in nine days,[39] repeating the request for the five powers, and left on the next day for a three day secret meeting with Mao Tse-tung in Peking.

Everything would seem to come out correctly in the plot thus far advanced (and would concur with the traditional explanation of the conference), if it were found that as a result of this meeting, Khrushchev's offers for a summit parley abruptly came to a halt as a consequence of pressure

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35. Moscow Radio (Tass), July 19, 1958.
36. Ibid. (Soviet Home Service), July 21, 1958.
37. Ibid. (Soviet Near East Service), July 23, 1958; Ibid. (Soviet Home Service), July 28, 1958.
38. Ibid. (Soviet Near East Service), July 23, 1958.
39. Ibid (Soviet Home Service), July 29, 1958.

from Mao. A review of the press for this period shows that this was not the case. The Chinese Communists had followed the summit proposal developments through the invitation of India and modification to have the meeting in the Security Council with a high measure of endorsement, and had continued to refer to the proposition as a "summit" conference throughout.[40] After returning from Peking, Khrushchev wrote another letter to President Eisenhower in which he stressed his continued desire for a conference.

> ...the question of convening a conference of the heads of government of the five powers...has not been settled in a positive way....We are awaiting your acceptance of our proposal on a summit conference at any time...[41]

Moreover, after the Mao-Khrushchev meeting the Peking press continued to support the idea.

> The aggression of the United States and Britain in the Middle East and their attempts to delay the five power summit conference have aroused condemnation and protest among the people all over the country.[42]

For several days the press releases in both countries practically dared the West to accept the proposal as reiterated by Khrushchev; on August 7th, a Tass release made fun of a report in an Italian paper which spoke of a sudden change of summit policy after the Peking meeting.[43] This point has not been labored to show that Mao Tse-tung was not offended at the idea of sponsoring a conference in the Security Council before a representative of Nationalist

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40. Radio Peking (NCNA), July 4, July 25, July 30, 1958.
41. Moscow Radio (Tass), August 5, 1958.
42. Radio Peking (NCNA), August 5, 1958 (italics inserted).
43. Moscow Radio (Tass), August 7, 1958.

China, where the Asian big power candidate was India.[44] On the contrary, it is hard to imagine that this wasn't a grievance. The point is, that apparently this was one agenda item of the Khrushchev-Mao talks that was not settled in favor of China. A certain amount of cover-up would be expected if Mao had received this concession, but this could have been scored with a fraction of the publicity the issue got for the week following the conference. Moreover, the offer was left open, to be accepted by the West any time they wanted to call the Communists' hand. Although the Peking meeting was undoubtedly called for an urgent purpose, probably because of Chinese pressure,[45] it appears doubtful that the "summit conference" element of this pressure was relieved.

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44. A London correspondent for the New China News Agency was quoted in a London newspaper on July 22nd in an article which expressed strong reservations about the "pitfalls" of the Security Council scheme. He apparently was just late in getting the word. This leak was a statistical exception.

45. A few writers have suggested that Khrushchev called the conference in an effort to get Chinese assistance in creating a diversionary incident to overcome Russia's embarrassment by the Western show of force in the Middle East. It is difficult to interpret the Communist or "neutralist" press as reflecting a propaganda loss by Moscow. The Middle East situation came to the attention of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly (which was endorsed by both the Russian and Chinese Communist news media); the ruling resolution was sponsored by ten Arab states, and called for the evacuation of Western troops. In a letter to President Eisenhower, Khrushchev was later to say: "...[Taiwan is not another Lebanon] which has recently fallen victim to a foreign intervention unanimously condemned by the latest Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly." (Moscow Radio (Tass), September 7, 1958.)

There were evidences of other sources of possible Chinese pressure in addition to the summit conference issue. Things had not been working out well in Far Eastern politics for Peking. Their troop withdrawals from Korea in 1958 were producing few of the anticipated political advantages.[46] They had curtailed trade and cultural relations with Tokyo before the Japanese elections in an effort to bring political pressure to bear, yet their "opponent" Kishi had won.[47] Their Middle East policies had apparently been less passive than Moscow's. The respective statements of the governments after the Western landings may be contrasted.

U.S.S.R.:

> The Soviet Government urges the United States Government to discontinue its armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab countries and to withdraw its troops from Lebanon immediately....The Soviet Government... reserves the right to take the necessary measures dictated by the interests of peace and security.[48]

China:

> ...the United States government, in a sudden rage and panic, has brazenly launched armed intervention against Lebanon...the 600 million Chinese people will give all out support to the Arab people's just struggle. Should the United States not withdraw immediately its force of aggression from Lebanon, it will surely eat the fruit of its own actions.[49]

"All out support" was the recurrent theme in the China mainland press. Vice Premier and Foreign Minister

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46. New York Times, February 20, 1958.
47. U. S., Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, Testimony on the Mutual Security Act of 1959, May 11, 1959, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959.
48. Moscow Radio (Tass), July 16, 1958 (italics inserted).
49. Radio Peking (NCNA), July 16, 1958 (italics inserted).

Chen I said that if the United States and Britain did not "cease their aggression," "the 600 million Chinese people... will not look on with folded arms."[50] G. F. Hudson has reported that Communist China offered to send "volunteers" to Lebanon.[51] The London Times' Richard Harris has written, "I personally suspect that had the Chinese been in the position the Russians were in, the very first American Marine landing in Beruit would have produced some Chinese landing in Syria."[52] Demonstrations were staged in Peking on a scale without parallel in Moscow. Peking Mayor Peng Chen spoke to nearly a million people in Tien An Men Square, repeating that the "east wind prevails over the west wind" as paraders carried banners with captions reading "British Troops Out of Jordan," and "U.S. Troops Out of Lebanon."[53]

In the parades described above, a third set of banners were carried. They proclaimed "U.S. Forces Out of Taiwan." In China's complete Middle East propaganda campaign, the issues of Lebanon and Taiwan had been tied together and depicted as a coordinated American pincers movement against the Eurasian Communist bloc; the ominous fate of the United States was continually predicted.

> The United States aggressors poke their snake heads all over the world...every act of aggression will take the aggressors a step nearer their own graves. This is the dialectics of historical development.[54]

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50. Ibid., July 22, 1958.
51. G. F. Hudson, "Mao, Marx, and Moscow," Foreign Affairs, July, 1959, p. 569.
52. Harris, op. cit.
53. Radio Peking (Chinese Home Service), July 17, 1958.
54. Ibid. (NCNA), September 14, 1958 (Red Flag article).

The evidence therefore seems to bear out the observations of A. M. Halpern: "During 1958, the Chinese both in actions and demands for action, and in their evident dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's relative moderation, made it clear that they wanted a world-wide Communist policy exploiting the bloc's initiative."[55] It seems reasonable to assume that it was at the Khrushchev-Mao meeting in late July that this dissatisfaction was made clear. Khrushchev probably wouldn't have come to Peking unless he was prepared to make at least some concessions. The innocuous joint communique issued on August 3rd, after the conference, reflected little but a balance of give and take. The idea of a conference of the "big powers" was mentioned; this is scored as a "take" for Russia, as has been noted. The only possible concession to China notable in the communique was the statement that revisionism was "the chief danger of the communist movement."[56] The propaganda heat for Taiwan was on in China at the time of the visit, and when late in August the bombardment of Quemoy suddenly increased to five times the normal expenditure, it is reasonable to believe that Mao Tse-tung was commencing a tactical maneuver tailored to the limits of a commitment extracted from his ally, Khrushchev.

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55. A. M. Halpern, "The Foreign Policy Uses of the Chinese Revolutionary Model," China Quarterly, July-September, 1961.
56. Radio Peking (NCNA), August 3, 1958.

THE 1958 EPISODE--AS IT HAPPENED

The weight of the literature on the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 would probably challenge the tonnage of the Communist projectiles that dropped on Quemoy. It had a complicated plot, political implications charged with emotion, and was a good vehicle for "think pieces" on military strategy under the threat of nuclear weapons. The purpose here is to try to fit its many discontinuities into a hypothesis that would explain the Chinese Communist intentions in the light of Sino-Soviet relations over the Taiwan issue developed thus far.

In view of the almost continuous trickle of bombardment, counter bombardment, sporadic air battles, and the stream of editorial insults between the Chinese Nationalist forces on Taiwan and the offshore islands and the Communists on the mainland, it is almost impossible to pinpoint the date when buildups for a given Taiwan "crisis" begin, or when the episode can be considered closed. As far back as July 17th, 1958, Nationalist Chief of Staff General Wang Shu-ming cancelled all military leave on Taiwan because of reported troop concentrations and the arrival of long-range guns in the mainland area opposite Quemoy. At about the same time the United States Seventh Fleet in the Pacific was alerted as a result of international tension over Lebanon. Both sides reported evidences of mounting tension and military buildups thereafter.[57]

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57. Although through June and July the Soviet press touched

By mid-August, the Nationalists were reported to have 100,000 troops on Quemoy and Matsu, the rest of their forces (including about 300 jet fighter airplanes) on Taiwan.[58] The Communists had an estimated 128,000 troops opposite the offshore islands,[59] 200 to 500 heavy gun positions from which they could cover all of Quemoy, a fleet of torpedo and motor gun boats,[60] a reported 17 Soviet M and W type coastal and large submarines equipped with snorkles (believed to have been assembled in the Shanghai area),[61] and a sizeable percentage of their 1800 Soviet-built jets which were staged at the new airfields in the immediate vicinity. Neither side had a significant number of modern amphibious warships. The drama began on August 23rd when 55,000 Communist artillery rounds ruined on Quemoy and its approaches.[62]

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the Taiwan issue only in a very casual and routine manner, by mid-August it was "making the papers." It might be significant that on August 7th, five days after Khrushchev's return from Peking, the Soviet newspaper Sovetsky Flot said that the United States and Nationalist forces were preparing to attack the Chinese mainland.

58. New York Times, September 7, 1958.
59. Washington Post and Times Herald, September 3, 1958. This count is lower than the Communist buildup in the same area in June, 1950, before the Korean War. (Figures from testimony of Ex-Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Military Situation, op. cit., Part 3, p. 2621.) The 1958 crisis was a journalist's field day, and the proportionate press coverages of the two eras were completely reversed.
60. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Prospect for Quemoy," New York Times, September 14, 1958.
61. New York Times, August 24, 1958.
62. London Times, August 29, 1958. All artillery ammunition used throughout the crisis was of Soviet make. (Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Robertson; U.S., Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959, p. 390.)

In essence, the framework of the conflict was that which evolved during the 1954-1955 crisis. The Republic of China-United States Mutual Defense Treaty had been ratified in February, 1955, and its provisions, as well as those of the Dulles-Yeh diplomatic notes were in full effect. It may be recalled that the various treaty arrangements provided the issue with a plot within a plot. The master plot concerned the Chinese antagonism over the island of Taiwan and its traditionally appurtenant islands, the Pescadores. This was the "treaty area" which the United States was pledged to defend. The Taipei government claimed sovereignty over the mainland, as well as these islands. The Peking government claimed sovereignty over an identical expanse. Russia was publically pledged merely to "immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal" if its ally, the People's Republic of China, were "attacked by Japan, or any state allied with it."[63] In 1958, as in 1955, both Russia and the United States had protected themselves from involuntary involvement in the Chinese dispute by limiting their material support to items basically defensive in nature. Each had about the same measure of control of the situation regarding Taiwan and the Pescadores. The United States' treaty commitment was more stringent, but it had almost complete control of the material resources of the smaller area of Taiwan. Russia probably had less control over conventional bombs, delivery aircraft, or *ad hoc*

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63. *Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements*, *loc. cit.*

amphibious transportation of the mainland forces due to the diverse requirements and continental size of mainland China, but had a convenient hedge in the "Japanese" clause of their treaty agreements. The master plot, therefore, could be said to encompass a roughly symmetrical standoff, with a minimum chance of United States-Russia involuntary involvement, considering the level of Chinese technology at the time.

The "inner" plot concerned the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. These were under de facto control of Nationalist China and were by now the site of the garrison of one-third of her troops. Whereas before 1949 Taiwan and the Pescadores had a measure of historic precedent as an entity separate from mainland China, the offshore islands had continuously been territory of the continental government until the Communist mainland victory. The Chinese Communist government had never controlled them; they marked the rear salient of Chiang Kai-shek's retreat. The Nationalist China claim of de jure sovereignty rested on the same ground as the claim for sovereignty of the entire China mainland.

Although the United States was not responsible for the defense of these islands, the "Formosa Resolution" of the Congress in January, 1955 had made it clear to the world that an attack on these islands might be construed by the United States as part of an attack on the "treaty area," and that in fact certain types of preparations on the mainland itself might likewise be so construed. In this context the President, as Commander in Chief, could of course exercise

due military prudence by ordering the opposition of such attacks or buildups by protecting the offshore islands, or even destroying the offensive capability of the Communist forces in the staging areas of the mainland itself.

The fact that Chiang Kai-shek had stationed a heavy percentage of his combat forces on these islands in effect exerted pressure on the United States toward defining an attack on them as a threat to Taiwan, if only because Taiwan's defensive strength was reduced by a like percentage. Tension was added by the fact that the offshore islands' proximity to the coast made it feasible for the Communists to attempt an invasion in masses of small craft, without the need of Russian participation. Still more insidious consequences could be envisioned if one took cognizance of the mass of supporting evidence and subscribed to the opinions of ex-President Truman, ex-Secretary of State Acheson, and others, which held that Chiang Kai-shek exerted a constant bias toward the escalation of tension and spreading the conflict to the mainland.[64] This latter bias had been partially accounted for

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64. President Truman speaks of the Korean War era: "...all of Chiang's actions suggested that...he hoped to get us involved on China's mainland." (Truman, op. cit., p. 402.) Secretary Acheson speaks of the offshore islands in 1958: "Two intentions are pretty clear. One, Chiang Kai-shek's to embroil the United States with his enemies; the other, the Communist intention to drive the United States into conflict over an issue so unimportant as to lose us the support of all our friends..." (New York Times, September 7, 1958.) Scholarly opinion representative of a large body of material: "Generalissimo Chiang wanted not merely a successful defense of the offshore islands, but an enlargement of the war, drawing the United States into it." (Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and the United States," Western Political Quarterly, December, 1959, p. 1085.)

by the diplomatic assurances previously obtained by Secretary of State Dulles, but Nationalist action in "the inherent right of self-defense" naturally had to be excepted from the requirement of prior joint agreement. Under the conditions of the physical location of the offshore islands,[65] and the nature of the Communist threat, considerations of offense and defense have a tendency to merge.

The "inner plot" was thus a delicate balance. The Nationalists and Communists exchanged artillery volleys. Chiang Kai-shek could exert pressure to the west only at the risk of finding himself without United States support. Mao Tse-tung could exert pressure to the east only at the risk of finding himself under attack by the United States while Russia dodged behind the escape clause of "Japan."

The United States had much to lose if it committed itself either way on the offshore matter. When the Chinese Communists dropped a match into this tinder box of intrigue, Press Secretary James Hagerty said in plain language what diplomats would have to say more delicately:

> The Chinese Communists have been trying to find out for years what we might do if they tried to take over Matsu and Quemoy on the way to Formosa. As far as I'm concerned, they can keep on guessing...[66]

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65. The Quemoy island group constitutes an area of some 56 square miles, and has 57 miles of broad, sandy beaches, most of which back up onto mud flats. Big Quemoy is less than three miles away from the nearest points of Communist held territory. Matsu is ten miles from the mainland, is a barren, rocky, hilly area of seven square miles.
66. New York Times, August 23, 1958.

Throughout the rapid buildup of events after the unprecedented mainland barrage began, the world guessed and waited with baited breath. The Communist batteries so dominated the approaches to the island of Quemoy as to effect a tight blockade preventing the arrival of logistic support from Taiwan.[67] The convergence of United States military forces began as the Communist press methodically followed the progress of Naval units transferred from the Lebanon and Hawaii areas, Air units from the United States mainland, and Marine units from Japan and Okinawa. They duly noted name, date, and number. Moscow ultimately reported that the United States had the greatest concentration of forces in the Western Pacific since World War II.[68]

By early September, the most immediate problem appeared to center about the supply of the offshore garrisons. The mainland radio had been broadcasting messages to the Nationalist leaders on the offshore islands[69] since the bombardment started.

> To Wu Lien, Commander of the Quemoy forces: Your water routes to Taiwan have been blockaded by us, and you have not the slightest hope of holding the island, of being reinforced, or being able to withdraw....As your fate has entered the most critical stage, you should give orders to surrender or should lead your soldiers in a revolt at once if you care about yourselves.... If you will only contribute to the fatherland the people will excuse you in accordance with our fixed policy.[70]

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67. The Quemoy garrison is entirely dependent on Taiwan for food, ammunition, and all military materials. (New York Times, September 5, 1958.)
68. Moscow Radio (Tass), September 5, 1958.
69. This is in contrast with the 1954-1955 crisis when the "last calls to the faithful" were directed mainly to Taiwan (see above).
70. Radio Peking, August 28, 1958 (in Mandarin).

Throughout the world leaders of various type governmental systems have been, the media's presence and action have been felt. The Communist leadership dominated the conference to the point of causing one to believe a major holocaust confronted the arrival of tropical storm Tammy.[87] The convergence of foreign media outlets during which the Communist party deliberately failed the presence of local media representatives from the Western world, the United States media, was quite evident. They were there, and media from Europe was welcome. They were invited news, and media. However silently neglected were the United States and the previous accommodations of Panama in the Western Media would have[88]

By early indications, the most immediate problem appeared to revolve about the supply of the different newspapers. The decision rests not with [illegible] but with the [illegible] Embassy or the Ministry of Foreign [illegible] since the accreditation process.

[illegible]

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87. The Tammy correlation is actually designated as Tammy for Tina, meteorology, and [illegible] designation. [illegible] Tammy, September 9, 1970).

88. Panama media [illegible], September 9, 1970.

89. This is in contrast with the [illegible] which view the local media as the [illegible] media presence [illegible] Tammy (and Nixon).

[illegible] Media Review, Issue 80, 1970 (in Spanish).

On September 4th, Chou En-lai announced that his government considered their territorial waters to extend twelve miles from the coast instead of the three that the United States (and most of the Western world) recognized. If the United States observed this, they would have been completely isolated from the zone which the Communist shore batteries were keeping sterile of Nationalist supply vessels.

At the same time, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles were meeting in Newport, Rhode Island in consultation over the offshore predicament.[71] Late in the day of September 4th, Mr. Dulles made a statement which definitively said little more than what Press Secretary Hagerty had said earlier. He noted the treaty obligation to defend Taiwan, and the contingencies of interpretation spelled out in the Formosa Resolution. He did emphasize the offshore islands' increasing importance in relation to the defense of Taiwan.[72]

On the next day, Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Peng Teh-huai (Minister of Defense), et al., met in Peking at the "Fifteenth State Conference" and accepted a motion to offer to resume talks with the United States at the ambassadorial level in Warsaw (the United States had offered to meet at this site four times within the previous nine days).

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71. Moscow Radio (Tass), September 4, 1958. The broadcast noted that the United States press considered their forthcoming decision the most important since the start of the Korean War.
72. New York Times, September 5, 1958.

On the 7th, the Moscow press repeated a New York Times report that at a United States National Security Council meeting it had been decided to ignore the Peking twelve mile territorial waters limit and that U.S. Naval units would escort Nationalist supply ships to the proximity of Quemoy on the basis of the traditional three mile provision.[73] Such a procedure did in fact start on that same date, and the mainland artillery avoided the sector in which four U.S. ships "violated Chinese Territorial waters," and the first of what was to become hundreds of "serious warnings" was issued by Peking.[74]

A measure[75] of logistic support to the Nationalist offshore garrison was thus set in motion, as both Chinese Communist and United States military elements exercised meticulous care to avoid direct clashes. Throughout the rest of September, the delicate balance was held as the continuing United States military buildup was covered by the Communist press. Nike-Hercules (defensive) installations of Taiwan were given heavy coverage, the movement of some 155 mm howitzers (capable of firing either conventional or nuclear warheads) to Quemoy, relatively less. On September 24th, a new era of fighter tactics was introduced in the sporadic Nationalist-Communist air battles over the mainland

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73. Moscow Radio (Tass), September 7, 1958.
74. Radio Peking (NCNA), September 7, 1958.
75. On the 17th of September, Chiang Kai-shek was reported to believe that the efforts to break the blockade were futile; only by bombing mainland installations could Quemoy be relieved. (Washington Post and Times Herald, September 17, 1958.)

coast when the Nationalist planes scored several kills with the United States-furnished infra-red homing missile, Sidewinder. At a press conference on September 30th, Secretary of State Dulles reviewed the United States position with regard to the offshore islands.

> The situation is that we do not have any legal commitment to defend the offshore islands. We do not want to make any such commitment. We do not have it today.... The United States did not feel that it was sound to make the major commitment of force to those areas that the Chinese government wished to make....We thought that it was rather foolish to put them there, and as I say, if there were a cease fire it would be our judgment, military judgment even, that it would not be wise or prudent to keep them there.[76]

Four days later, the military tension still mounting, Peking Minister of National Defense Peng suddenly announced:

> The day will certainly come when the Americans will abandon you....The clue is already there in the statement made by Dulles on September 30....Out of humanitarian considerations, I have ordered the bombardment to be suspended on the Fukien Front for seven days, starting from October 6th.[77]

The cessation of the bombardment was made conditional on the requirement that Nationalist supply vessels not be escorted by the United States Navy. On the appointed date the shore batteries were silent, and the Nationalist ships commenced re-supply in quantity. Peng ultimately issued another statement, extending the cease fire for two weeks,

> ...so as to see what the opposite side is going to do and to enable our compatriots on Quemoy, both military

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76. Department of State Bulletin, October 20, 1958, p. 602.
77. Radio Peking (NCNA), October 5, 1958.

> and civilian, to get sufficient supplies, including food and military equipment, to strengthen their entrenchment.[78]

On the eve of a visit to Taipei by Secretary of State Dulles, Peng announced the breaking of the cease fire under the guise of their permanent excuse, violation of the twelve mile limit by United States forces. "Shelling must...be resumed as a measure of punishment."[79] After the Secretary of State's visit, Minister of Defense Peng issued a fourth statement:

> I have already ordered our troops at the Fukien Front not to shell the airfield in Quemoy and the wharf, beach, and ships at Liaolo Bay on even dates /so that you can replenish/ to facilitate your entrenchment for a long time to come. If there is lack of anything, just say it and we will give it to you.[80]

After early October, the Communists clearly did not want the offshore islands. As one traces through the history of the previous weeks, there is reason to doubt that they ever wanted them.

In the first place, they took great pains to avoid utilizing any element of surprise. A steady buildup of threatening remarks had alarmed the United States by mid-summer. Even before the bombardment had started, the tension had prompted a well-publicized inquiry regarding United States policy in the brewing offshore problem from the Chairman of a congressional committee to the Secretary of State.[81]

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78. Ibid., October 12, 1958.
79. Ibid., October 20, 1958.
80. Ibid., October 25, 1958.
81. Department of State Bulletin, September 8, 1959, p. 379.

Not only did they not strike when world attention was focused on the Middle East, but they waited to apply maximum pressure after United States military units from all over the world (including the Mediterranean) had been assembled in the Taiwan area.

Secondly, knowing full well the fact that the only basis of United States opposition would stem from the idea that Taiwan was threatened as a result of their offshore efforts, during the propaganda buildup before the bombardment and throughout the crisis, one is hard pressed to find a single Peking quotation which does not take pains to specify that their operations in the offshore island area were in the nature of a preparation for an attack on Taiwan. Since before the bombardment started, the United States had taken official cognizance of this and had published warnings on that basis.[82]

Third, in every case where the cross purposes of pacifying Chiang Kai-shek and the American public, while at the

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82. The connection was repeatedly noted and made public by the United States State Department. In a press release of August 28, 1958, the Department of State "took note" of a specific broadcast of the Fukien Command of the Chinese Communist Armies of August 27th, which had said "The Chinese People's Liberation Army has determined to liberate Taiwan, a territory of the fatherland, as well as the offshore islands," and that a landing on Quemoy was imminent. (Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 1958, p. 415.) The case was reviewed by ex-President Eisenhower in a television interview of December, 1961: "...the thing that always made the decision easy, in anticipation, at least, was that the Red Chinese constantly said: "We are not interested in Quemoy and Matsu. We're going to take Formosa." (Time Magazine, December 1, 1961, p. 14.)

[illegible]

same time giving the Chinese Communists a credible threat or opening for accommodation called for a subtle, intentionally ambiguous statement from the United States, the Communists always quickly chose the interpretation which was least favorable to offshore island aspirations. When at the height of the crisis Secretary of State Dulles released his statement of September 4th, the most "threatening" remark of which was that Quemoy and Matsu "have increasingly become related to the defense of Taiwan,"[83] Chou En-lai answered on the 6th: "On September 4th, 1958 the United States Secretary of State Dulles, under the authorization of U.S. President Eisenhower, issued a statement openly threatening to expand aggression against the People's Republic of China."[84] Pravda echoed: "In this bellicose declaration, Mr. Dulles, on behalf of the President, threateningly declares that the United States will not hesitate to use arms to defend, as he puts it, Quemoy and Matsu." The paper also spoke of "Eisenhower's decision to send American armed forces to the offshore islands."[85] In the press conference of September 30th, Mr. Dulles said "If there were a cease-fire in the area which seemed to be reasonably dependable, I think it would be foolish to keep those large forces on these islands."[86]

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83. New York Times, September 5, 1958.
84. Radio Peking (NCNA), September 6, 1958.
85. Moscow Radio (Soviet South Asian Service), September 8, 1958.
86. Department of State Bulletin, October 20, 1958, p. 603.

(A close reading of the entire statement does not exclude an interpretation which would see the garrisons reduced, but the islands not abandoned.) On the next day, Moscow published a resume by Nikolai Andreyev and Alexander Petrov. "/Secretary Dulles said/ that if the Chinese Communist Government ceased fire, the United States would also agree to make certain concessions. As far as I can tell, Mr. Dulles said yesterday that the concession would be that the Chiang Kai-shek forces, most of whom are concentrated in the offshore islands, would be withdrawn."[87] The idea of evacuation of the islands at the price of a "cease fire" was described as unfair to the Chinese people.[88]

Fourth, the Chinese Communists' military decisions never indicated that a landing on the offshore islands was being seriously planned.[89] They were operating at the wrong time of the year for amphibious operations; late August,

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87. Moscow Radio (Soviet North American Service), October 1, 1958.
88. The idea of a cease fire and the evacuation of the offshore islands had come up during the 1954-1955 crisis, and according to Moscow, had the support of the British Government. A spokesman for the British Foreign Office was quoted on January 27, 1955: "Should the Peking government be ready to cease military operations on such a basis /cease fire/...having in view the repudiation by the Chinese People's Republic of the national territory of Taiwan and the Pescadores—then Britain would have to support the Chinese People's Republic's claims to the coastal islands of Tachen, Matsu, and Quemoy, which have been Chinese islands from time immemorial." (Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), February 20, 1955.) Peking was not interested.
89. The Chinese Nationalists apparently did not think a landing was planned. On the day the bombardment started, the Nationalist Defense Ministry said they thought it was to be a "fatigue bombardment." (New York Times, August 24, 1958, p. 3.)

September, and October sea states are often too high for amphibious operations, even in the three mile open water strip to Quemoy. At the height of the crisis on September 5th, a typhoon struck the Strait.[90] Quemoy and Matsu were never subjected to bombing, as the Tachens had been in 1955. Not until September 17th were deep-penetration shells used from the mainland against the Nationalist gun emplacements.[91] There was never any indication of the assembling of amphibious craft or even a fleet of junks; nor was there a mobilization of troops in the coastal areas.[92] In summary, the Chinese Communists spoke of conquering Taiwan, probably didn't have enough troops on the coast to take Quemoy, and didn't even mobilize them.

One scans the record for a watershed point at which a previous decision to invade the offshore islands was cancelled, in vain. If the statement of American intentions is sought as the reason for a change of mind, Mr. Dulles was never more specific than in his public reply to Congressional inquiry, when he noted that "ties between these /offshore/ islands and Formosa have become closer and their interdependence has increased...it would be highly hazardous for anyone to assume

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90. When the typhoon hit, Vice Admiral Beakley, Commander of the Seventh Fleet, was reported to have said that he felt that the season would prevent amphibious landing attempts. (New York Times, September 8, 1958.)
91. Washington Post and Times Herald, September 18, 1958. Commander, U. S. Forces Pacific, Admiral Felt was reported to have said that the Nationalist shore battery effectiveness was "nil." (New York Times, September 28, 1959.)
92. New York Times, September 8, 1958.

that a Chinese Communist attack would be a limited operation."[93] This statement was released on August 23rd, the date the bombardment opened. If one tries to single out the threat of nuclear weapons as a deterrent factor in a landing attempt, the Communist press had referred to a nuclear capability of the Seventh Fleet and the presence of Matador guided missile delivery systems on Taiwan before the crisis started.[94]

This is not to say that there were absolutely no contingencies in the evolution. A couple of "windfall" bonuses might have tumbled to Peking. First, the offshore garrisons might have defected early in the game. It is notable that before the Communists issued the United States escort vessels their first "serious warning" and logistic support started getting into Quemoy, the mainland radio was actively soliciting on Quemoy:

> ...the 600 million Chinese people have continually demanded the liberation of Taiwan, Quemoy and Matsu.... The United States aggressor must get the hell out of our territory of Taiwan....Quemoy and Matsu have become as hopeless as a pair of turtles intrapped in a flask. If they do not choose to surrender they will be totally destroyed....The Chinese armed forces will deal a head-on, direct blow to the U.S. aggressor in the same way as they did during the Korean War,...Kill the U.S. advisers and defect to our side.[95]

This would probably have been mental, not physical extortion. Quemoy was reported to have three months supply of food when

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93. Department of State Bulletin, September 8, 1958, p. 379.
94. Chi Lung, "U.S. Strategy in a Blind Alley," World Culture, No. 23, December 5, 1957; Radio Peking (NCNA), June 30, 1958.
95. Radio Peking, August 29, 1958 (in Mandarin).

the crisis started.[96] It is hard to believe, in view of the history of the Nationalist-Communist conflict for the previous nine years, that Peking placed much hope on this.

A second windfall item might have been accrued if the United States had been enticed to silence the mainland batteries by force. The plot is hard to piece together, here, because there were so many possible courses of actions. This might have been done by giving the Nationalists conventional bombs and permission to hit ground targets on the mainland. It probably could have been done by American air power using conventional bombs. It surely could have been done with nuclear weapons. All three methods involved some risk of escalation of the conflict, and Peking probably anticipated Moscow assistance at some level.

The nuclear aspects of the crisis deserve special mention. There is a history of evidence of Communist China's attempts to get nuclear weapons from Russia. In November, 1957, Marshal Peng led a Chinese party of military experts to Russia, and the resulting quotations indicated that one of the primary purposes of the trip was to plead for tactical nuclear weapons.[97] Chinese Communist military journals were among the first in the Communist world to comment on the United States' interest in filling out their spectrum of deterrent capability by having weapons of intermediate potency.

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96. New York Times, August 24, 1958; Christian Science Monitor, September 3, 1958; Washington Post and Times Herald, October 21, 1958.
97. Zagoria, op. cit., p. 37.

The idea behind most of the Chinese articles was that all big military powers must be able to reply in kind, and that tactical nuclear weapons were pertinent to the Taiwan Strait issue.[98] After Peng's mission returned empty handed, the Chinese Communist articles shifted to a line that might be interpreted as resentment. By the spring of 1958, they had resumed their argument of the early 1950's, stressing the idea that nuclear weapons were not important, and that in due course their "workers" would produce them, etc.[99] This analysis fits hand in glove with Russian-Chinese press response to the idea of the establishment of a nuclear and rocket weapon-free "peace zone" in Asia. This idea had taken the form of a declaration of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo early in 1958. (There was a Soviet representative at the conference). The Moscow papers heavily endorsed the plan; the Peking press ignored it.

After the start of the offshore island crisis of 1958, one of the few notable differences between the Moscow and Peking press releases was the marked preponderance of Russian emphasis on the nuclear capability of the United States forces. Except for two brief periods, one starting about September 16th (near the time the 155 mm guns were taken to Quemoy), and the other after the Sidewinder was used, the Chinese Communists portrayed the United States as a conventional power. Even in the two exceptional periods they did not

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98. Ibid., pp. 29, 32.
99. Ibid., p. 33.

relate nuclear weapons to Quemoy and Matsu. The addition of a new weapon of any capability merely appeared to prompt a brief flurry of general nuclear comments.

On the other hand, reading the Moscow news leaves one with the impression that nuclear reprisal was being threatened daily by the United States. (Mention or hint of nuclear weapons was notably missing from official U.S. statements.) On September 5th, a Pravda article by "Observer" wrote that the American military "adventurers" were "resorting to brazen, provocative blackmail by threatening China with atomic war" and quoted a UPI story that had said that certain developments might require "small atomic bombs against points."[100] On September 7th, when the United States Navy commenced escorting Nationalist supply vessels without opposition, the probability of the United States attempting to silence the shore batteries was concurrently reduced. On the same date, Khrushchev sent a communication to President Eisenhower, his first since the bombardment started:

> It is needless to say that the attempts to frighten other nations by atomic blackmail are utterly hopeless in the present circumstances with United States possession of the monopoly of atomic arms long lost....One can say with full confidence that threats and blackmail cannot intimidate the Chinese people....The Chinese people will give worthy rebuff to the aggressor....an attack on the Chinese People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union....whether this region will continue to remain a dangerous hotbed of war will depend fully on the further action of the government of the U.S.A....All we want to do is call your attention to the situation which no one would be able to get out of, neither you, nor we, should a war break out in the Far East.[101]

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100. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), September 5, 1958.
101. Ibid. (Tass), September 7, 1958. (Italics inserted.)

Moscow editorials were heavily laced with references to United States news releases which tended to emphasize the possibility of United States reliance on nuclear weapons in case of a spreading conflict. Hanson Baldwin had written, "Use of nuclear weapons would reduce the number of sorties required—for bombing mainland airfields—by a factor of perhaps 1000."[102] On September 11th, the New York Times had reported U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Felt as saying "his forces had only a limited supply of conventional high-energy explosives...and would be compelled to use nuclear ammunition at an early stage." On September 15th, Moscow Radio said that tactical U.S. Air Force units with nuclear weapons had arrived on Taiwan.[103] Within the next few days, the 155 mm howitzers were taken to Quemoy.[104]

On September 16th, the U.S.S.R. sent a diplomatic note to Japan concerning United States military activity there, with special emphasis on nuclear weapons. The note suggested that a situation might be arising "wherein Japan might become, willingly or unwillingly, an accessory to... a situation that constitutes a grave threat to peace in the Far East and throughout the world."[105] On the 19th of

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102. New York Times, September 7, 1958.
103. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), September 15, 1958.
104. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Limited War," Atlantic Monthly, May 1959. Mr. Baldwin places great importance on the delivery of these guns, and likens them to a modern day "fleet in being." This analysis does not lead to that conclusion. It would seem that they arrived after the fact, if the fact ever existed at all, and that they perhaps served merely to sweat another letter out of Khrushchev.
105. Moscow Radio (Tass), September 16, 1958. Two Soviet diplomatic notes on the same subject had been sent to Japan in June, 1958.

[illegible]

September, Khrushchev sent President Eisenhower a second letter, this one so abusive (as presented in the press) that it was returned unopened:

> I must tell you outright, Mr. President, that atomic blackmail with regard to the People's Republic of China will intimidate neither us nor the People's Republic of China. Those who harbor plans of an atomic attack on the People's Republic of China should not forget that the other side too has atomic and hydrogen weapons and the appropriate means to deliver them and, if the People's Republic of China falls victim to such an attack, the aggressor will at once get rebuff by the same means.[106]

The subject of nuclear weapons and Khrushchev's hypersensitivity to the threat of escalation of conflict in the Taiwan Strait permits the drawing of some tentative conclusions. First, it was established that at the Peking meeting in early August, Communist China appeared to be in line for some concessions. The visible evidence of meaningful concessions was missing. The facts thus far make it possible to believe that Khrushchev was willing to buy the Chinese Communist plan of action in the Taiwan Strait, and offered support in "kind"[107] in case the United States attacked the mainland, provided that the United States struck the first blow. If pressed, this would have been a feasible risk for Khrushchev to take. It required confidence in

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106. Moscow Radio (Tass), September 19, 1958.
107. Rumors, believed planted by Chinese Communists, circulated in Eastern Europe in mid-August, after the meeting; they said that Khrushchev had promised Mao Tse-tung nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. (New York Times, August 31, 1958.) Russian commentaries during the crisis often cited Moscow's backing of Peking in terms implying a prior obligation: "If they /the United States/ count on a repetition of the tragedy of Munich they are sadly mistaken." (Moscow Radio (Soviet European Service), September 12, 1958.)

President Eisenhower's cool headedness, and he had good presedent for that.[108] Second, it is completely possible to believe that Khrushchev was totally alarmed at the possibility of the spreading of the conflict, once he reflected on the many variables of individual human judgment involved[109] and made the scurrilous statements to President Eisenhower to try to warn the United States of his commitments to Mao Tse-tung. The price of this warning had to be public confirmation of a commitment formerly obscured in the wily "Japan" clause of the treaty. This was a costly precedent to set, in view of his many peripheral allies; an even more costly move would evidently have been to publicly commit himself to mainland China before he was assured that they were willing to relieve pressure on the supplying of Quemoy (possibly in accordance with their prior agreement). It is also noteworthy that Peking had volunteered to conduct diplomatic talks with the United States by the time he sent

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108. It was widely reported that President Eisenhower personally turned down a proposal that communication lines in mainland China be bombed in the event of an attack on Quemoy in 1954. This was reportedly done at a National Security Council meeting on September 12, 1954. (Washington Post, November 8, 1954; Manchester Guardian, November 9, 1954; Survey, 1954, op. cit., p. 10.) Early in the 1958 crisis, Moscow Radio quoted President Eisenhower as saying that nuclear weapons could not be used "except with the specific authority of the President." (Moscow Radio (Tass), August 28, 1958.)

109. A possible Russian "second thought" that strikes the writer as humorous: it was reported that the Nationalists were going to paint Communist markings on their aircraft and attack U.S. ships to establish a provocation. (Moscow Radio (Tass), September 3, 1958.)

the first letter.[110] The chances of the United States' willful enlargement of the crisis were slight before September 7th, after that date, nil.

Khrushchev's public and liberal interpretation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty will be arbitrarily scored as a special bonus for Peking, but not as a rationale for their starting the bombardment. If anything, the Chinese Communists were trying to play down the dangers of escalation of the crisis into the nuclear phase; they were meticulously playing a conservative game from the standpoint of both physical contact with the U.S. forces and total war propaganda. Moscow had become alarmed at the possible results of what was now probably considered an ill-advised Chinese idea. It is true that the Chinese Communists' apparent commitment to the creation of a static tension might have been modified by the Chinese Nationalists or the United States. The Nationalists on Quemoy could have defected, or the United States might have attacked the mainland before attempting to escort the Nationalist supply ships, but both of these "windfall" contingencies

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110. Yugoslav officials said that Khrushchev's all-out support for Peking reflected confidence that the Chinese Communists did not intend to bring on a conflict with the United States. (New York Times, September 18, 1959.) The London Times' Richard Harris: "The moment Mr. Khrushchev said he stood entirely by China's side over Quemoy, we might deduce that the Chinese were not going to—and had certainly been told not to—precipitate anything that could become a world war." ("China and the World," International Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 2, April, 1959, p. 167.)

[illegible]

appear to have had a low probability of occurrence. The compelling Chinese Communist inducement must have been one which had validity in a standoff bombardment. On this basis, motives are suggested.

The crisis occurred at a time when a high level of domestic loyalty was needed. It coincided with the high point of organizing the commune system; this was the heyday of the "Great Leap Forward." Mass demonstrations of indignation against the United States were staged (at least 302 million were claimed to have participated),[111] and articles often combined the description of these gatherings with claims of progress in communization.[112] (It was also during the height of the offshore crisis that claims were made that were later reportedly resented in Moscow. The September 1st Red Flag reported that the Chinese could already see the first buds of communism,[113] and the People's Daily of September 13th implied that Mao Tse-tung was the ideological leader of the world Communist movement.)[114] It is extremely hard to judge how heavily Peking weighed the beneficial effects of reminding

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111. Radio Peking (NCNA), September 18, 1958.
112. "...[212 million have demonstrated thus far] The people's communes are developing at a much quicker rate. In iron and steel and agricultural production, the people are working round-the-clock with tremendous energy." (Radio Peking (NCNA), September 13, 1958.)
113. Falcionelli, loc. cit.
114. John Bradbury, "Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea," China Quarterly, April-June, 1961, p. 15 (footnote). This is a continuing point of Sino-Soviet friction. In 1960, a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party wrote of Mao Tse-tung as "the greatest contemporary theoretician of Marxism-Leninism." (Ullman, loc. cit.)

the people of an outside enemy while incorporating their communes. It is not believed to have been the controlling factor in the instigation of the crisis.

Some feel that the breaking off of the U.S.-Chinese Communist ambassadorial talks in Geneva in December 1957 weighed heavily on the Peking decision to start the bombardment.[115] At that time, United States Ambassador Alexis Johnson was transferred to Bangkok, after sixteen months of talks, during which time the two sides could not even agree on an agenda.[116] The Chinese Communist representative would not meet with the First Secretary left in his place. On June 30th, a Peking government statement covered the well known ground about the United States trying to confuse domestic and international issues, and declared that "The United States occupation of China's territory of Taiwan created tension in the Taiwan area. This is a naked act of aggression against China, and the Chinese people have the full right to take...measures to repulse it."[117] On this occasion, Peking issued an ultimatum: the Chinese Communist government would call off the talks unless the United States government designated a representative at the ambassadorial level within fifteen days.

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115. "...the offshore crisis was an oriental expression of the communist leaders' willingness to begin negotiation." (John Scott, "The Case for Two Chinas," The New Leader, October 6, 1958, p. 5.)
116. Edmond O. Clubb, "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Policy, 1950-1955," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 4, December, 1959, p. 528.
117. Radio Peking, (NCNA), July 1, 1958.

In early July, both Moscow and Peking reported that Secretary of State Dulles had announced at a press conference that he was considering continuing the talks with the American Ambassador in Warsaw.[118] The United States did not formally reply to the ultimatum. On July 28th, Washington proposed that the talks be resumed in Warsaw; they repeated the offer three times before September 5th. Warsaw Ambassador Jacob Beam even tried to set a date on September 4th. At the high state meeting in Peking on the 5th it was decided that the Communists would offer to resume negotiations; Chou En-lai advanced the proposal formally, and the United States accepted on the 7th. The marathon talks began again in Poland on September 15th.

There is a measure of Chinese face-saving in this sequence, but it is considerably diluted by the intervening United States offers. The Chinese had recalled their representative for instructions before September 5th;[119] there was little doubt that the renewal of the talks was imminent, with or without the bombardment. It is easy to refute the idea that they brought the United States to its knees to negotiate by starting the bombardment; this is probably why they never tried to present this interpretation with any degree of conviction.

The theory has been advanced that the crisis was timed to effect United States domestic Congressional elections.

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118. Moscow Radio (Tass), July 1, 1958; Radio Peking (NCNA), July 3, 1958.
119. Ibid. (Chinese Home Service), September 10, 1958.

This idea is not convincing, if only because there is reason to question which political party is identified with China policies Peking dislikes more (see later). In the case of the crisis, some notable Democrats heavily backed the Administration (Ex-President Truman, Senator Paul H. Douglas). With regard to election results, the Democrats did make gains in the House, Senate, and Governorships, but such factors as the Sherman Adams case, economic recession, Sputnik, and the Middle East heavily diluted any China inputs.

It has been said that the crisis was planned to invoke greater sympathy in the United Nations when the question of Chinese membership was brought up.[120] Results, at least do not speak well for this as a motive. The voting on the proposal to keep China representation off the General Assembly agenda had been reflecting a gradual change in favor of discussing the issue for years. The "percentage" rate continued to show the same trend as before with no discontinuity at the year 1958. Each side had a new positive vote (those wanting it kept off the agenda, South Africa, and those wanting it on the agenda, Iraq—hardly surprising after the revolution). Austria, Greece, Iceland and Libya moved to the "abstain" column to keep the rate at about its norm. In further refutation of the idea of the United Nations session being a crisis motive was the easily predictable

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120. New York Times, September 24, 1958 (editorial). On August 11, 1958, the U.S. Department of State had issued a paper entitled "Policy in Relation to the Nonrecognition of the Chinese Communist Regime" which was heavily played up in Communist propaganda.

[illegible]

result of a resurgence of the charge that Peking was "trying to shoot her way into the United Nations." The phrase was heavily used that fall.[121]

The more one studies the incongruities, the more obscure the plot becomes. Stewart Alsop has written:

> There is little significance in the inner history of the 1958 crisis, simply because the basic decisions had already been made in 1954 and 1955. The only really new decision was the decision not to permit Chiang to use his air force over the mainland even against the Chinese Communist batteries which were shelling Quemoy, as she had been permitted to do in 1954-1955.[122]

Exception is taken to this statement. The 1955 crisis gave every indication of being a close thing; by comparison, the 1958 crisis was a "canned" problem. In 1955, up to some point near the time the ships of the Seventh Fleet approached the Tachens, there were about three and a half variables in the tactical equation: The People's Republic of China, the U.S.S.R., the United States, and to some extent, the Republic of China. Moscow-Peking arrangements were not firm, and the participants were involved in "gamesmanship" with second and third actors. The chance of escalation under these complicated relationships was great. In 1958, although again the eruption occurred when Russia was the "debtor" in

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121. There was some discussion about bringing the Taiwan Strait crisis before the United Nations. Russia was against it from the start, saying that the U.N. had no right to discuss the question, since it would be interference in China's domestic affairs. (Moscow Radio (South Asian Service), September 27, 1958.) The contrast with 1955 is noteworthy.
122. Stewart Alsop, "The Story Behind Quemoy: How We Drifted Close to War," Saturday Evening Post, December 13, 1958, p. 88.

[illegible]

the cycle of Sino-Soviet give and take, Moscow and Peking appeared to be operating from some common point of ground rule reference. China had evidently extracted a more conservative promise that Russia felt obliged to keep. United States' opposition was given every encouragement, and every pressure was relieved when the approach of a crucial decision was even hinted. In 1954, the Chinese Communists thrust the crisis on the primary actors and let its limits and course be shaped by the pragmatic turn of events; the 1958 affair followed a path which a political bookmaker would have predicted with heavy odds, had he been given the nature of the Chinese intentions on the eve of the bombardment. In short, there was another important difference in the 1958 crisis. Chinese Communist motivation was different.

If not territory, what was Peking's primary goal? After all, the costs of the episode to Communist China were not insignificant. One expense was apparently the high usage of adrenalin in Moscow. Good will is probably a highly valued commodity in the Sino-Soviet bloc, and China clearly cashed the bonus check that was due in the autumn of 1958. Secondly, she perpetuated the "mad dog" image she established in much of the Western world during the Korean War. Third, she strengthened Chiang Kai-shek. Material in the form of armaments, a few functional small ships, and aircraft were added to his inventory through the exigencies of immediate need. By early September, the United States' aid to Taipei had exceeded the 1958 quota,[123] and thereafter they had to pull

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123. New York Times, September 19, 1958.

[illegible]

[illegible]

out the stops.

If one adds a small value for the unlikely "windfall" items, the domestic enthusiasm during communization, the Warsaw talks, and maybe a little for U.S. politics and the United Nations, the ledger still doesn't balance. Peking's predominant motivation is still missing. It is believed that their basic rationale stemmed from the thought behind the remarks of Mao Tse-tung when he took the podium at the Supreme State Conference on September 8th, the day after Khrushchev's first letter to President Eisenhower. He didn't mention the offshore islands, but said:

> The present situation is favorable for the people all over the world who are fighting for peace....The general trend is that of the east wind prevailing over the west wind....China's territory of Taiwan...and all United States military bases in foreign countries are all nooses around the neck of United States imperialism. Nobody but the Americans themselves have made those nooses, put them around their own necks, and handed one end of the rope to the Chinese people...[124]

HYPOTHESIS VIII

> The primary purpose of Communist China's creation of tension in the Taiwan Strait in 1958 was to strengthen their future claim to Taiwan by erecting an impediment to "Two China" solutions.

The Chinese Communists were attempting to weaken the legal structure of the United States' support of the Nationalist cause by creating the image of a bridge of United States protection, grafting the two Chinas together, the western

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124. Radio Peking (NCNA), September 8, 1958.

extremity of the bridge resting on the marshy ground of precedent of the offshore islands.[125]

A "Two China" solution to the Taiwan dilemma refers to any of several possible arrangements whereby the international community would recognize, not necessarily in the diplomatic sense, the existence of two separate and distinct states—Mainland China and Taiwan China. A prevalent corollary of the idea is that some sort of outside guarantee should be given to preserve the status quo in China today and prevent military assaults by either of the "Chinas" against the other. There are many suggested forms that this could take. (The present Taiwan government could be established as sovereign over Taiwan and the Pescadores;[126] a Taiwan plebiscite might be held in order that they might choose a government for home rule, colonial status, United Nations trusteeship of Taiwan, etc.) The issue would presumably be closed, and the tension which has existed since 1949 would disappear in due course.

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125. The British Foreign Secretary in a written reply to the House of Commons on his government's opinion of the legal status of the offshore islands in February, 1955, said that they "undoubtedly" formed "part of the territory of the People's Republic of China." Since the Japanese Peace Treaty, Taiwan and the Pescadores have been held to be in an "indefinite" legal status. Legally, the Nationalists remain on the basis of a duly authorized post World War II military occupation, pending further arrangements (Survey, 1955-1956, op. cit., p. 10.)

126. On February 8, 1955, before ratification of the U.S.-Nationalist China Mutual Defense Treaty, three reservations were placed on the agreement by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One reservation specified that the treaty did not imply Chinese Nationalist "sovereignty" over Taiwan and the Pescadores. This conforms to the legal limbo in which the Japanese Peace Treaty left these islands. (Survey, 1955-1956, op. cit., p. 11.)

assembly of the Cuban version in its entire context of
[illegible] of the original [illegible].[19]

A "Pan Africa" movement in the Cuban mission could
in any of several distinct directions, depending on inter-
national economic trends evaluated, and consequently on the
political power, the relations of the leadership and factions
within--Mission Chief and Cuban Govt. A prevalent
tendency in the Cuba is not such as to exclude possible
efforts by some of [illegible] the Cuba group
and private military [illegible] the others of the "Cuban"
[illegible] the others. There are many suggested roles that
this could take. [The previous Cuban government could be
characterized as primarily pro-Soviet and [illegible][20]
a Cuban [illegible] which is only to mean that they could
accept a [illegible] the [illegible] relations, [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. The Cuban could pre-
sumably be flexible, and not [illegible] from its material gains
[illegible] assistance to [illegible].

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[19]. The United States [illegible] in a similar [illegible] to the
[illegible] of [illegible] in the [illegible] of [illegible], 1959,
[illegible] [illegible] "Communist Threat [illegible] of the
[illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Under the
[illegible] Cuban [illegible], Cubans and the [illegible] have
been [illegible] to be in an "[illegible]" [illegible] [illegible].
[illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] on the basis of a [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

It is hardly surprising that the idea has wide appeal outside the Communist world. Authorities on Oriental affairs almost universally agree that the people of Taiwan do not want to be ruled by the present Peking regime.[127] Although to subscribe to the policy might imply skepticism of Chiang Kai-shek's eventual control of the mainland, it does not require a conviction that the present Communist regime is free of the threat of internal revolt. By the same token, many (particularly among the "neutralists") who accept the Peking government as a permanent fixture in the wave of the future in Asia—yet do not like the continual exposure to an explosive situation in the Strait—endorse the plan in one of its forms.

The two most adamant opponents of the idea are the present governments of Taipei and Peking. In international affairs, their arguments and claims are almost identical; the problem arises by virtue of the fact that the claims of each encompass the whole of those of the other. To them, "Two China" policies include the complete scope of the broad definition set forth above, and in addition branch out into fringe areas which almost encompass acknowledgement of the

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127. "There is not the slightest question that the vast majority of the inhabitants of the island—Taiwanese as well as Chinese from the mainland—are opposed to subjecting Taiwan to the rule of the Communists." (Eustace Seligman, "A Two-Chinas Proposal," The New Republic, October 16, 1961, p. 13.) "...it is certain that a majority of more than 90% would say that Formosa should not be united with the mainland under the present communist regime." (Michael Lindsay, "The Future of Formosa," The New Republic, October 6, 1958, p. 8.)

[illegible]

existence of the "other China."[128]

In the latter context, before the 1958 crisis, a Two China policy might have been perceived to be lurking over the horizon at the very source of American leadership. President Eisenhower had once indicated that a Two China policy was under study.[129] Secretary of State Dulles had said that the "United States would not oppose forever" the entry of Communist China into the United Nations,[130] and that "the United States will negotiate, or even recognize, Communist China any time it will serve the interests of the United States."[131] Open support of a Two China policy for the United States had been voiced by Senator Langer (R-North Dakota),[132] Senator Morse (D-Oregon),[133] Senator Sparkman (D-Alabama),[134] Senator Kefauver (D-Tennessee),[135] Supreme

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128. China Post article, Taipei, 1954: "It is difficult, it seems to us, to argue that to sit at a conference table with the Peiping regime to discuss the situations in Korea and Indo-China should not in any way be interpreted as constituting any degree of de facto recognition. To so argue is to draw a very fine legal distinction indeed. Not being the proud possessor of as fine a legal mind as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles... /we find it/ an impossibility to follow such a line of legal argument." (Radio Taipei (Radio Free China), February 23, 1954.) After spending five weeks in Communist China in 1956, during which time discussions were held with top government officials, French statesman Edgar Faure concluded that "the main headache to the Chinese leaders is to avoid the "second China," to reject every plan, to frustrate every manoeuvre intended to perpetuate the existence of "two Chinas," the China of Peking and the China of Taipei." (Faure, op. cit., p. 19.)
129. New York Times, January 21, 1955.
130. Ibid., November 11, 1953.
131. Ibid., January 17, 1958.
132. Congressional Record, Senate, June 30, 1956.
133. New York Times, January 24, 1955.
134. Ibid., January 30, 1955.
135. Ibid., April 3, 1955.

Court Justice Douglas,[136] Adlai Stevenson,[137] and Korean truce negotiator Arthur Dean.[138] American scholarly articles frequently advocated the idea, and members of the ADA were its perennial supporters. In the summer of 1958, Radio Peking reported that the National Committee of the U.S. Democratic Party advocated a "Two China" policy.[139]

Outside the United States, the idea was widely endorsed. Prime Minister Attlee is usually credited with initially endorsing the concept in December, 1950,[140] and it had received wide British support ever since. Canada's Minister for External Affairs Lester Pearson and New Zealand Prime Minister Walter Nash had favored it,[141] as had Japanese statesmen Shigemitsu and Kishi.[142] India, constant supporter of Chinese Communist United Nations membership and opposed to United States action in the Strait, favored representation of the Taipei government at talks on the Strait matter, and evidenced interest in easing tension via the "Two China" route.[143] In short, the movement could become formidable; as Taiwan grew in wealth and tradition as a separate entity,[144]

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136. W. O. Douglas, North from Malaya (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 361.
137. New York Times, April 8, 1955.
138. Dean, "U.S. Policy and Formosa," op. cit., p. 361.
139. Radio Peking, June 18, 1958 (in Mandarin to Taiwan).
140. Truman, op. cit., pp. 402-403.
141. New York Times, February 8, 1956; Ibid., September 13, 1958.
142. Ibid., February 23, 1955; Radio Peking (NCNA), July 7, 1958.
143. Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 176.
144. In 1962, Taiwan's real increase in gross national product was reported as 8% per year; per capita income was

and the world grew weary of the Communist arguments and incessant tension, it could have been expected to gain momentum. In looking ahead, Peking saw that it must try to dilute the pressure that could be brought to bear. The best answer to this was to try to woo the people on Taiwan and to discredit the United States' position.

At first glance it would appear that if discrediting the United States were to be attempted by emphasizing Chiang's military dependence upon them (the rationale might progress: foreign power in the East is bad, Seventh Fleet is bad, Seventh Fleet separates two Chinas, therefore Two Chinas is bad), that this, and a policy of wooing Chiang's forces on Taiwan would be mutually exclusive. It is here that one must apply the "Oriental concepts" mentioned above, and attempt to think in terms of patience,

> Friends in Taiwan: There are flames of war between us. They should be stopped and extinguished. To achieve this, talks are needed. Of course, it would not matter so much even if the fighting would continue for another thirty years. It is, however, better to secure an early peaceful settlement. The choice is up to you.[145]

dialectics,

> The more reactionary their enemies become, the greater revolutionary fervor the people will acquire and the faster their enemies will go to their doom....Struggle,

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increasing at 5% per year. Industrial output had more than doubled in the past eight years. Land reform legislation had prohibited buying individual plots of more than 7.5 acres; only 14% of the agricultural families were tenant farmers. The living standard was reported to be exceeded in Asia only by Malaya and Japan. (Robert P. Martin, "The China That's Prospering," U.S. News and World Report, January 1, 1962.)

145. Radio Peking (NCNA), October 6, 1958 (Marshal Peng quoted) (italics inserted).

> failure, struggle again, failure again, and finally victory—this is the logic of the people.[146]

and constancy.

(January, 1955):

> ...a cease fire...in effect means asking the Chinese people to recognize the "legality" of United States occupation of Chinese territory, Taiwan. It means asking the Chinese people to admit that the United States can invade China and to recognize the moves of certain persons now scheming for so-called "Two Chinas" to split China.[147]

(October, 1958):

> .../The U.S. is/ attempting under the name of a "cease fire" to poke its nose into Quemoy and Matsu and to freeze the split of China so as to facilitate the realization of its plot of creating "Two Chinas." ...The Chinese people absolutely will not allow this plot to succeed....They will never allow the U.S. to distort China's matter into an international dispute.[148]

The "revisionist zig" that started at the Bandung Conference fit hand in glove with the wooing of the Taiwan forces. A change in Peking propaganda line could be noted; the "Kuomintang and United States reactionaries" became "the oppressed people of China being manipulated by the United States." At an address to the National People's Congress on June 28, 1956 Chou En-lai proclaimed:

> We have consistently stood for national solidarity and united resistance against external enemies. In the interest of our great motherland and our people, the Chinese Communist and the Kuomintang members have twice fought shoulder to shoulder against imperialism....We can still link arms again and unite....Now on behalf of the Government, I formally state: We are willing to negotiate with the Taiwan authorities on specific steps and terms for the peaceful liberation of Taiwan, and we

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146. Red Flag, August 16, 1958 (Mao Tse-tung quoted).
147. Radio Peking (NCNA), January 19, 1955 (italics inserted).
148. Ibid., October 7, 1958 (italics inserted).

> hope that the Taiwan authorities will send their representatives to Peking or some other appropriate place, at a time they consider appropriate, to begin these talks with us.[149]

More surprising yet, it has been widely reported that in November, 1956, Chou En-lai offered Chiang Kai-shek a place in the Communist government as part of the solution. In December, 1956 he added that he considered a Minister's post "too low" for the Generalissimo, and suggested the rank of "Marshal" for life.[150] In March, 1956 in a speech to the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference, Chou En-lai remarked:

> All decent Chinese should unite as patriotic members of one big family and together fight against and crush the schemes of United States imperialism.[151]

In May, 1956, mobs in Taipei demonstrated against the United States in protest against alleged judicial lenience shown an American soldier who had shot a native "peeping Tom." By the summer of 1956, although their pleas had elicited no response from the Nationalist government, some observers felt that the mainland attempts to incite subversion on Taiwan were becoming reasonably successful,[152] but the image of Mao Tse-tung's soft exterior soon paled as the Peking government's dissatisfaction with the internal (Hundred Flowers) and international (East European revolt) developments were followed by the "dogmatic zag."

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149. Current Background No. 395, July 5, 1956.
150. New York Times, October 6, 1958 (quotes from Phompenh, Cambodia).
151. Current Background No. 439, March 8, 1957.
152. Lindsay, "The Future of Formosa," op. cit., p. 10.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1958, Chiang was alternately portrayed as an "out and out traitor and faithful running dog of U.S. imperialism"[153] and as a victim of a United States plot to overthrow him. In any case, the ultimate goal of United States foreign policy was said to be the execution of some nefarious scheme, whether it be United Nations trusteeship or a local plebiscite, whereby "China" was to be permanently split. Throughout, the "people" of Taiwan had the mainland's sympathy, for in any event, Taiwan was to be an outpost of "U.S. imperialism."

Chou En-lai addressed the National People's Congress on February 19, 1958. He charged the United States, Britain, and Japan with plotting a "Two China scheme," and his closing remarks of a long speech were: "We will never allow a state of "Two Chinas" to arise in any international organization, conference, or occasion."[154] In the spring of 1958, Chou singled out a British Member of Parliament on tour and assured him that the Peking government would never accept what he described as "Washington's Two China policy."[155] The mainland press closely followed the developments of Taiwan "independence" movements. They cited the "Free Taiwan Movement" of Chen Shih-hsiung, the "Provisional Government of the Taiwan Republic" of Liao Wen-i, and the "Taiwan Independence League." Samples of editorial comment include:

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153. Radio Peking, August 30, 1958 (in Mandarin to Taiwan).
154. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1712, February 13, 1958.
155. Washington Post and Times Herald, August 31, 1958.

> Anybody who launches an intrigue to divide China by means of the Taiwan problem will ultimately certainly realize that this is mere wishful thinking.[156]
>
> Washington clamores for "Trusteeship" of Taiwan, and maneuvers for the creation of "Two Chinas."[157]
>
> Traitor Liao Wen-i and his lot are sinister pawns held ready by the U.S. for the continued division of China in case Chiang Kai-shek becomes useless.[158]

The latter argument was developed at length:

> The U.S. scheme, if realized, would not only harm the people of China, but also the Chiang Kai-shek clique. To accomplish this scheme, the U.S. has conducted a series of activities in the past few years...it merged the U.S. command on Taiwan with the MAAG....Meanwhile, the U.S. forced Chiang Kai-shek to cut his armed forces in order to bring Chiang Kai-shek under its control.... Politically, the U.S. has fostered the pro-American and anti-Chiang Kai-shek elements inside and outside Taiwan by means of which they could control Chiang Kai-shek and pave the way for his possible resignation.... Furthermore, the U.S. has tried to persuade the Kuomintang members who are disgusted with Chiang Kai-shek to join its projected opposition party to strengthen the anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaign.[159]

Throughout the 1958 Strait crisis, the multiplicity of arguments (Chiang is a warmonger, Chiang is being put upon by the United States, the United States' aim is the establishment of a permanent imperialistic base under a "Two China guise) permeated all propaganda and policy pronouncements.

> The Chiang Kai-shek clique has been strengthening war preparations....On the other hand, the U.S. imperialists are rather cool to the Chiang Kai-shek Clique's demand for more military aid, despite all the favors and flattery the clique uses. Being the masters, the American imperialists can do anything they wish....Of course the U.S. imperialists are still using Chiang Kai-shek and have not yet kicked him out of office. They have found

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156. Radio Peking (NCNA), June 13, 1958.
157. Ibid., June 8, 1958.
158. Ibid.
159. Radio Peking, July 11, 1958 (in Mandarin to Taiwan).

[illegible]

> that Chiang Kai-shek is not as useful as before. That is why the U.S. is following a policy of not letting Chiang Kai-shek down but not giving him sufficient aid, either. All members of the Chiang Kai-shek clique should wake up if they want to keep their self respect.[160]

> The punitive military operations taken by the Chinese people against Chiang Kai-shek's troops entrenched on Quemoy and Matsu are therefore completely proper and necessary.[161]

> The "cease fire" idea pressed by the U.S. at Warsaw is nothing but a "Two China" scheme in disguise.[162]

The whole Chinese Communist strategy, what has been described as their "dialectics of warfare,"[163] was embodied in the four speeches of Marshal Peng announcing the restrictions of offshore bombardment. In his second, he explained:

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160. Ibid., August 24, 1958.
161. Radio Peking (NCNA), September 20, 1958 (address by Chen I) (italics inserted).
162. Ibid., September 25, 1958. The earlier U.S.-Communist China negotiations at Geneva had been utilized in Peking propaganda to imply that the United States was trying to interest them in a "deal" to create Two Chinas and thereby scuttle the Nationalists. (Philip E. Mosely, "The Moscow-Peking Axis in World Politics," in Moscow-Peking Axis, Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 202.)
163. Anna Louise Strong claims that Marshal Peng was a key architect of this complex rationale. She writes of having been at a social gathering with Peng in late September 1958 where his "attempts" to take the offshore islands were discussed as a standing joke. In her words: "It is clear to anyone in China that Peking could have taken Quemoy by warfare or got it by bargaining with Dulles." She expressed the opinion that Chiang Kai-shek's mainland drive was a known factor which lent itself to manipulation. "If...Chiang Kai-shek is their /Peking's/ greatest enemy, he is also their greatest friend." (Anna Louise Strong, "Chinese Strategy in the Taiwan Strait," New Times (Moscow), Vol. 46, November, 1958.) It is interesting to note that Marshal Peng was arrested in September, 1959 as a rightist in a procedure that at one point had Mao Tse-tung in tears. (David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal Peng Teh-huai," China Quarterly, October-December, 1961, pp. 63-69.)

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

> Some Communists may not yet understand this for the time being...you will understand after a while....Among the Chinese in Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu, the majority are patriots; only a few are traitors....The Kuomintang in Taiwan has not yet entered into peaceful negotiations with us and a reasonable solution has not been worked out....If you are not willing to hold peace talks, fighting is unavoidable....We are forced to fight when we want to fight and stop when we want to stop.[164]

When after his speech, Chiang Kai-shek, in response to United States pressure,[165] had renounced the use of force to recover the mainland,[166] Peng gave evidence of trying to modulate the timing of his "dialectic process" and insure continuing Nationalist pressure to the westward. In his fourth speech to the Nationalists:

> Chinese problems must be settled by us Chinese alone. American political broker Dulles likes to mind other people's business; he wants to take a hand in the matter of long standing dispute between the Kuomintang and the Chinese People's Republic, and order Chinese to do this or that, to hurt the interests of the Chinese and to serve the interests of the Americans.... Dulles said that he saw a China of the Communists; that, this country being actually in existence, he was willing to deal with it, and so on....Compelled by circumstances, the Americans have changed their policy and treated you as a "de facto political unit," that is to say, in fact, not as a country. Such a "de facto political unit" is still needed by the Americans at the initial stage starting from the present time. That means isolating Taiwan. At the second stage, Taiwan is going to be placed under Trusteeship....There is only one China, not two in the world. On this we agree....we are not advising you to break with the Americans right away. That would be an unrealistic idea.[167]

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164. Radio Peking (NCNA), October 12, 1958.
165. In his press conference of September 30, 1958 Secretary of State Dulles said that the idea of Chiang returning to the mainland was "highly hypothetical." "I don't think that just by their own steam they are going to get there." "No force will be used from the treaty areas except in agreement between us." (Department of State Bulletin, October 20, 1958, p. 603.)
166. New York Times, October 24, 1958.
167. Radio Peking (NCNA), October 25, 1958 (italics inserted).

[illegible]

It is possible to dismiss this complicated rationale as merely a Chinese Communist justification of a military position with which they could not cope. This, however, would be an unrealistic over-simplification. United States deterrent power was assembled quickly and in great strength, but this was predictable--even solicited. To purposely put yourself in a position in which you cannot fulfill your avowed commitments is certainly unorthodox, but the explanation can be traced, is reasonably well documented, and explains many otherwise unaccountable discontinuities in Chinese Communist actions.[168] The idea had already occurred to Edgar Faure during his visit to Peking in 1956.

> Should one not go so far as to think that China does not want the status quo to come to an end--even in the form most honourable to her--within the limited relations of a single country? Does not China find it to her advantage to be placed in the most absurd position possible in regard to as much of the world as possible, until she receives her "restitutio in integrum?"[169]

THE 1958 CRISIS AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

The interpretation of evidence just presented shows the 1958 Strait crisis as a Chinese Communist evolution planned within the framework of Russian acquiescence, such acquiescence being in response to pressure for concessions which were felt due. In the course of events, Peking was able to make two seemingly innocuous points which may have increased Russian

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168. Mao Tse-tung: "The path of revolution, like the road of every activity in the world, is always tortuous, never straight." (Extract from Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, New York Times, June 4, 1961.)
169. Faure, op. cit., p. 20.

apprehension of the relationship between the two countries.

The first was Khrushchev's public interpretation of his obligation under the 1950 treaty to give military assistance to the People's Republic of China in case the mainland was attacked by the United States, even though United States alliance with Japan in such a venture was a moot point. In the months that followed there was an effort in the Moscow press to gradually play down Khrushchev's more virulent remarks on this point.[170]

The second was possibly the more insidious. It consisted of Peking's emphatic documentation of the fact that in spite of the changing world situation and Moscow's new master strategy of victory through economic, rather than total war means, the Taiwan issue was not going to be allowed to die or to be absorbed in some sort of a quid pro quo, no matter what the West, or the Russians for that matter, might suggest as a handsome repayment for the relaxation of tension. On this issue, Communist China was "going for broke." Edgar Faure noted this attitude in Peking before the crisis.

> Settlement on Formosa, diplomatic recognition, return to the United Nations, the Security Council, "the Big Five," international prestige, Asiatic leadership—all these interlock....The whole operation must work without a hitch. Care must be taken lest the least grain of sand get into the works, such as a clumsy and premature recognition, even if well intentioned. Above all, there must not be, there must not be even a hint of, a second China.[171]

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170. Khrushchev's more mild statement of October 6, 1958—not his letters of September 7th and 19th—were cited as the action which "served the cause of peace and averted the outbreak of war." (Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), December 22, 1958.)
171. Faure, op. cit., p. 21.

It is possible to make interesting conjecture about Russian policy regarding a Two China solution. In their press, it is mentioned infrequently, and only when necessary in the course of a routine backing of Peking. Before 1958, during the annual autumn resurgence of the Chinese representation issue in the United Nations, the Russian representatives implied their disfavor of "Two Chinas" but definitive quotations could not be found. At the discussion during the crisis, in 1958, Gromyko dismissed the idea as "impossible."[172] A study of the Chinese and Russian press releases during the summer of 1958 (as the crisis was approaching) reveals Russia's almost complete avoidance of this facet of the issue. This is possibly the single notable discrepancy in the two coverages during the build-up period. During the crisis, the Russian press occasionally referred to their abhorrence of the idea (indeed in Khrushchev's unopened letter to President Eisenhower of September 19th, he referred to the United States' "undisguised attempt to create a 'Two Chinas' situation"),[173] but it could hardly be ignored since it was Peking's primary propaganda line.

If popular interpretations of the broad differences between Russian and Chinese Communist foreign policies are correct, it stands to reason that Russia would prefer a more flexible Peking stand, at least amenable to compromise when it was desirable to relax international tension. Since one

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172. New York Times, September 24, 1958.
173. Moscow Radio (Tass), September 19, 1958.

rarely finds reference to Russia's position on "Two Chinas," common sense might be a reliable guide.

> The Soviet leadership has no pressing territorial ambitions, except for its continuing phobia about West Berlin, while Communist China has many appetities. Because of what it regards as Soviet "pacifism," it is farther than ever from overrunning Taiwan and thus ending once and for all the civil war. It may even fear that Moscow could accommodate itself in practice, though not in so many words, to a "Two Chinas" solution.[174]

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174. Philip E. Mosely, "Khrushchev's Party Congress," Foreign Affairs, January, 1962, p. 191.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

If this "distinctive pattern" fashioned of the "objective unique events" of Sino-Soviet relations regarding the Taiwan issue has added any new dimension to the equation of world politics, it is that there is a distinct possibility that there is a long standing animosity beneath the surface which has not been relieved. Indeed it is not likely to be relieved by the present leadership in Peking on any grounds but total compensation.[1] This deduction suggests a review of United States foreign policy alternatives in 1962. Implicit in the conclusion is the admonition that we (1) do not imagine options which we probably do not have, and (2) do not undersell the advantages of our present position.

The option which we very probably do not have concerns the perennially-debated issue of the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. The non-Communist schools of thought of how to handle the future of the Nationalist Chinese vary in decreasing order of sympathy from the United States, to Britain, to the "neutralists" for whom India may

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1. "...for Mao, the revolution will not be completed until the five-starred Communist flag flies over the Ministry of Defense in Taipei..." (Claude A. Buss, The Arc of Crisis (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1961), p. 341.)

be assumed spokesman. It is doubtful that even the latter would condone opening the flood gates and letting Peking deal as they chose with the eleven million people of Taiwan. Realistically, what Peking would define as a "Two China" solution is the only current option. From the maze of procedural and legal complexities, four possible accommodations of increasing advantage to the Chinese Communists have been suggested: Taipei in the Security Council, Peking in the General Assembly; both Chinese governments in the General Assembly, India in the Security Council; Peking in the Security Council, Taipei in the General Assembly; Peking in both Security Council and General Assembly, Taipei in the General Assembly as a new nation.[2] If the unbelievable should happen, and the United States should sponsor the fourth alternative,[3] there is little reason to believe that we should not take Peking at its word to reject the offer outright.

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2. William W. Boyer and Neylan Akra, "The United States and the Admission of Communist China," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXVI, No. 3, September, 1961, pp. 333-350.
3. "In 1956, an election year, a Democratic-sponsored resolution, reaffirming support of the Republic of China and opposing the seating of Red China in the United Nations, passed the House by a vote of 391 to 0 and 86 to 0 in the Senate. Not a single Congressman or Senator of either party was willing to vote against this resolution. This is a phenomenon unprecedented in American political history....It is now being stated in certain quarters that we have a "Two-China" policy. We do not have a Two-China policy any more than we have a Two-Korean policy, a Two-Vietnam policy, or a Two-German policy." (Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 1959, p. A3385 — text of address by Assistant Secretary of State (Far Eastern Affairs) Robertson, March 13, 1959.) Changes of policy under the current Democratic administration are negligible. Prospective Secretary of State Rusk at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on his

[illegible]

As Edgar Faure observed:

> The People's China cannot conceive being put on a similar footing with Formosa; she cannot consider recognition concurrently with Formosa. She will never agree to take part in a parallel system, to share plenipotentiaries or accept credentials drawn up for both Chinas....Rather than find herself "paired" with Taipei in some sort of diplomatic mesh, Peking much prefers the status quo from which, after all, she in no way suffers.[4]

Many predict that the United States will be forced into some sort of accommodating proposal to the Chinese Communists as a result of the gradual shift of General Assembly attitude. It has been suggested that at some point the United States should become non-committal, or even heavily sponsor an offer which Peking would presumably turn down, and thereby lose "face."[5] The United Nations problem is dynamic and will have to be played "by ear" as the diplomatic winds shift the sandy terrain. There will probably

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nomination: "I see no prospect at the present time that normal relations could be established with the authorities of Peiping because they seem to feel that the abandonment of the government and people on Formosa would be a prerequisite to any such normal relations." (Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate; 87th Congress, January 12, 1961, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961.)

4. Faure, op. cit., p. 19.
5. This would seem to be a rather inane concept. It may become necessary, but it appears doubtful that Peking's aplomb would be shaken by such a "clever" maneuver. There are many precedents on which to predict their response to subtle offers of rapprochement; e.g., Secretary of State Dulles' guarded words of September 30, 1958 concerning a possible reduction of forces in the offshore islands in return for a cease fire were picked up by the Communists as an outright offer to completely give the islands to Peking, and this was haughtily rejected without any apparent embarrassment.

be important hurdles to cross on this matter in the years to come, but in broad perspective it would appear that the debates about Chinese membership in the United Nations that are continually conducted in the United States are essentially an intramural sport.

At the Canadian Club in Ottowa on March 13, 1959, Assistant Secretary of State Robertson observed that "Since 1950, the difference in basic China policy between former President Truman and President Eisenhower is the difference between tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee."[6] It could now be added that President Kennedy has followed suit. This can be explained by the simple fact that throughout the period, there have been few realistic alternatives. It is not the purpose here to suggest errors in American foreign policy; quite the opposite, a critical analysis only points out that even the practical opportunities for an alteration of course were minimal.[7]

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6. Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 1959, op. cit., p. A3389.
7. A review of learned articles on the subject of United States China policy over the recent years might tend to refute this statement. The key word is "practical." In the words of writer and lecturer Hans J. Morgenthau, University of Chicago: "It is, however, not self evident ...that an intellectual who knows how to lecture and write books knows by definition also how to make foreign policy. The intellectual does not need to have, and is frequently devoid of, that quality which is indespensible to the statesman—practical wisdom...In the world of the intellectual, ideas meet with ideas, and anything goes that is presented cleverly and with assurance. In the political world, ideas meet with facts which make mincemeat of the wrong ideas and throw the pieces in the ashcan of history." (Hans J. Morgenthau, "Kennedy's Foreign Policy, Failure and Challenge," The New Leader, July 3 and 10, 1961, p. 5.)

"Foreign policy" cannot be discussed unless one's objectives are defined. This is not difficult; it is a process by which a nation attempts to maintain its national existence, and that means safeguarding national security. It casts no reflection on the well-established high purposes of the United States to admit that our government, in carrying out the people's will, seeks to accelerate the demisé of Communist imperialism or that the name of the game is power politics. That one objective of this game should be to select policy alternatives (under conditions where all else remains equal, at least) that will tend to accentuate Communist bloc differences is admitted by the complete spectrum of political bent within the consensus of the United States Congress.[8] There are two routes to splitting China and Russia.[9] In 1950, the United States was on the fence;

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8. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Robertson in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (May 11, 1959):
Senator Humphrey (D-Minnesota) (questioning the wisdom of U.S. Far East policy):
"It seems to me our policies are forcing these people /Communist China and the Soviet Union/ to adhere even more rigorously to each other. I don't have any specific answer, but I am doubious as to whether we are promoting the ends which you and I both think we ought to promote."
Secretary Robertson:
"You read it all the time—that we ought to be making up to the Red Chinese because that would alienate them from the Russians. I think that is just about as unrealistic a theory as any that could possibly be advanced."
Senator Humphrey:
"I think so, too."
(Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 86th Congress; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959.)
9. A steady debilitating and eroding tension between the two may be preferable to an open rupture at this time. (Zbigniew

Prime Minister Attlee, speaking for the British Government, favored wooing China from Russia. President Truman recalls a conversation with Mr. Attlee in December of that year.

> In his opinion, the Chinese Communists were potentially ripe for "Titoism." He could not consider that China was completely in the hands of Russia, and therefore the aim ought to be to divide the Russians and the Chinese—who are natural rivals in the Far East. He said "...all of us should try to keep the Chinese from thinking that Russia is their only friend. I want the Chinese to part company with Russia. I want them to become a counterpoise to Russia in the Far East. If we don't accept this theory, if we just treat the Chinese as Soviet Satellites, we are playing the Russian game."[10]

It is submitted that by the time these remarks were made, the United States was already caught up in the sweep of historic events (triggered by Stalin) which by 1962 has carried the situation so far in the opposite direction as to reverse the more likely route of eventual rapprochement 180 degrees.[11] "Being caught in the sweep of history" does not refer to a situation in which the United States let herself get into a position of relatively less control of her own destiny than did the other primary actors. The net has caught us all, and rather than grasp for some hopeless

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K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.) This subject deserves continuing study.

10. Truman, op. cit., p. 402.
11. This is currently argued both ways:
"I expect to see the U.S. Government give lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union against China, and my actuarial life expectance is thirty-odd years." (Scott, "The Case for Two Chinas," loc. cit.)
"Let us get the perspective straight on the relative danger to us from Russia and from China. China is only the auxiliary; Russia is the real power. Let us not waste on China the energy which should be reserved for Russia." (Buss, The Arc of Crisis, op. cit., p. 337.)

objective, it is better that we re-evaluate our relative position in the waiting game into which the whole world is forced.

It is sometimes said that time is not on our side. This is not necessarily true in the Taiwan situation. With the passage of time, internal conditions on Taiwan are getting steadily better, not worse. Even by 1958, Michael Lindsay (who by no stretch of the imagination could be labeled a member of the so-called "China Lobby"),[12] observed:

> Up to a few years ago many foreign observers considered that, if the Formosans had been able to express their preferences in a free election, the order of choice would have been (1) independence, (2) return to Japan, (3) continuance of Kuomintang rule, and (4) unification with the mainland under communism....It is quite possible that a solution which left Formosa as an independent State under United Nations protection would have secured majority support in Formosa some years ago, but much of today's discussion of the Formosa problem ignores the changes which have been taking place during the past nine years. Today...the present government would very likely win the election....Excluding Japan, Formosa may be quite well the best administered country in Asia....Corruption still exists and will be hard to eliminate so long as public service is so badly paid, but here again Formosa could probably compare favorably with most other Asian countries.[13]

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12. Lord Lindsay of Birker, as a British official, lived in the Chinese Communist areas during World War II, and in 1955 wrote: "In most of the war-time disputes with the Kuomintang the Communists seemed to be in the right on the merits of the case, and in the complicated three-sided negotiations from 1944 to 1946 the Communists seemed to show greater good faith than either the Kuomintang or the Americans, though they were often very inept in handling their case." (Lindsay, China and the Cold War, op. cit., p. 3.) He is a former tutor in Yenching University, Peking (1938-1941), a lecturer at Harvard and Yale after World War II, and is currently Chairman of the Far East Program at The American University, Washington, D. C.
13. Lindsay, "The Future of Formosa," op. cit., p. 8 (italics inserted).

The United States policy of mainland isolation and non-recognition has certainly had purposes beyond disapproval of Peking's conduct; the complications which would emerge in many non-Communist Asian countries with high overseas Chinese populations would be extensive once a Peking embassy was set up. Of course this policy has had its price, but in the intervening years the world has grown used to it and has made adjustments accordingly. A sudden change could be expected to arouse some adverse comment even from our allies to whom it was originally so objectionable.[14]

Possibly the most important consideration in evaluating our present position, is the complication of an increasingly conservative Russia, getting more and more out of step with her relatively backward stepchild, China, very probably feeling the strain of Chinese pressure rising from a multiplicity of contingencies in the Taiwan issue. A sudden overt change of policy, simply in the name of "relieving tension" should be examined carefully in the context of past indications as well as present events to see just what tension is being relieved, and from whom. Richard Hughes, of the London Times spent the years 1945-1961 in the Far East. He wrote an article for the New York Times in 1961 in which he said:

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14. The British Chief Minister of Singapore told author and publisher John Scott in 1958 that a sudden change in U.S. recognition policy would create havoc. Mr. Scott observed: "I was rather amused to find high British officials on the ambassadorial level ready to admit quietly that in effect U.S. China policy supported Her Majesty's Government's interests in Southeast Asia." (Scott, loc. cit.)

[illegible]

> No Western reporter who has worked in both Moscow and Peiping has the slightest doubt that the Soviet Union, despite fraternal indignation in public about Western discrimination, is secretly delighted that its difficult ally is not in the United Nations.[15]

In 1961, Edward Crankshaw came into possession of Russian and Chinese Communist circulars (dated 21 June, 1960 and 10 September, 1960, respectively), "hitherto secret correspondence...from a satellite source." They listed recent Sino-Soviet grievances, among them China's condemnation of Russian policy which had prevented the establishment of a unified Sino-Soviet Pacific Naval Command. "Moscow, it seems, was afraid that the Chinese would draw the Soviet Union into a war over Formosa."[16]

The purpose of these concluding observations is not to suggest a China solution, but to emphasize the importance of taking note of changing conditions as the waiting game is played. The development of sound political policy, like the parametric form of scientific generalization, depends on a continual re-examination of the root hypotheses on the basis of current observation. Like science, there is no absolute truth and no final goal, but if the trends are extrapolated honestly, and the historic perspective is raised above the episodic sequence of the immediate past and viewed on the plane of dynamic flow, the focus will be less blurred when a fork in the road is approached. Our images must be

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15. "Should Red China be Admitted?" New York Times, September 17, 1961.
16. Edward Crankshaw, The Observer (London), February 12, 1961.

shed when they no longer correlate with reality.

There is no foreseeable solution to the Taiwan dilemma; moreover, thoughts of new policy commitments are for the moment unrealistic. From the United States' viewpoint, the situation is not necessarily deteriorating. We might be thankful that time can pass before we must commit ourselves to a step. When the time comes, let us hope that our rationale is up to date and that our position vis à vis both Russia and China is more clear. As their interests diverge their problems increase.

> It is tempting to suggest that in a very real sense the advent of the Bolsheviks to power spelled the end of Marxist ideology.[17]

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17. Ernest J. Simmons, Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 106.

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